Gauhati HC Dismissed Petition Seeking To Quash Criminal Proceedings Involving Rape Allegations Under POCSO

s/o Col (Retd) BPS Sirohi, A 82, Defence Enclave, Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera, Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh.

It is entirely in order and stands perfectly justified that the Gauhati High Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Hamedur Islam Alias Hamidur Islam vs The State Of Assam And Anr in Case No.: Crl.Pet./1608/2025 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2026:GAU-AS:4316 that was reserved on 19.03.2026 and then finally pronounced on March 25, 2026 has dismissed a petition seeking to quash criminal proceedings involving allegations of rape under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, despite a compromise between the accused and the victim’s father. It must be mentioned here that the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Pranjal Das who was presiding over the case minced absolutely just no words to state in no uncertain terms that even in a premarital love relationship, a forceful physical relationship against a woman’s wish remains a criminal act. It must be disclosed here that the petitioner, Hamedur Islam alias Hamidur Islam, approached the High Court invoking Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) to quash Fakirganj PS Case No. 16/2025. The case involved charges under Sections 329(4), 64, and 351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) read with Section 4 of the POCSO Act. It was made crystal clear by the Gauhati High Court that a heinous crime like rape cannot be compromised under the POCSO Act.

At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Pranjal Das sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 2 that, “Invoking the jurisdiction of 528 of the BNSS, the petitioner is seeking quashing of criminal proceedings by way of Fakirganj PS Case No. 16/2025 (GDE No. 10 dated 1/2/2025); charge sheet No. 44/2025 dated 30/4/2025 submitted after completion of investigation in the said case under Section 329(4)/64/351(2) of the BNS read with Section 4 of the POCSO Act.”

To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 3 that, “The case had arisen out of an FIR dated 1/2/2025 lodged by the father of the alleged victim girl with the allegation that on 29/1/2025 at 4 PM, while his wife was absent at home, the accused petitioner entered their house and committed rape upon her daughter while she was alone and thereafter, he escaped and threatened her not to disclose the incident. It is further alleged that in the evening he came to know about the incident and also that her clothes were torn at that time.”

As we see, the Bench enunciates in para 4 that, “The primary contention of the petitioner side is that in the meantime, an agreement dated 30.05.2025 was entered into between the accused petitioner and the informant whereby they are stated to have compromised the matter and the informant recording his no objection to the quashing of this matter.”

As it turned out, the Bench then specifies in para 5 stating that, “It is submitted by the learned counsel that in the meantime, the girl has also become a major and they were in a love relationship earlier when the alleged incident is stated to have taken place and that now, with the consent of both the families, the accused petitioner and the girl are proposing to enter into matrimony and live together. Therefore, the petitioner is seeking quashing of this proceeding.”

Do note, the Bench notes in para 10 that, “The law relating to the quashing of criminal proceedings pursuant to settlement between the parties has crystallized through several important decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In this regard, reference may be made to Narinder Singh and others vs State of Punjab and another, (2014) 6 SCC 466 and State of Madhya Pradesh vs Laxmi Narayan and others, (2019) 5 SCC 688.”

While citing the relevant case law, the Bench observes in para 11 that, “The relevant paragraph Narinder Singh and others vs State of Punjab and another, (2014) 6 SCC 466 may be reproduced herein below:

“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion ne sum up nod lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 182 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings

29.1. Power conferred under Section 182 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, Under Section 182 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis is petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(1) ends of justice. or

(17) to prevent abuse of the process of any court

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants white working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.”

While citing yet another relevant case law, the Bench observes in para 12 that, “The relevant paragraph State of Madhya Pradesh vs Laxmi Narayan and others, (2019) 5 SCC 688 may be reproduced herein below:

“15. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point. referred to hereinabove, it is observed and field as under:

15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offenses under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves:

15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoits etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society.

15.3. Similarly such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act, etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and on the Arms Act etc. shall have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 107 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC.”

Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 13 that, “The law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court on the subject matter carves out exceptions for serious and heinous offences including offences having impact on society and powers of quashing cannot be exercised to quash these kind of offences, even if the parties have arrived at a settlement. Such a quashing in these kinds of cases may not be in the interest of society and hence, discouraged.”

It would be worthwhile to note that the Bench notes in para 18 that, “In the instant case, the victim girl is stated to be a major at present and though it is contended that she and the accused petitioner are proposing to get married – however, she has not entered into any agreement with the accused petitioner. Rather, the agreement has been entered into by the accused petitioner with the father of the girl, who was the informant in the case.”

It is worth noting that the Bench then notes in para 19 that, “The girl being a major at present, her opinion is very much pertinent with regard to the issue. After all, she was the victim of the alleged incident. From her statements recorded before learned JMFC and as well as police during the investigation, she has consistently stated about commission of rape and has not indicated any consent on her part. It is true that in such statements she has stated about her love affair, but any such physical relationship between the parties being consensual does not emerge from her statements. Rather, it is the opposite.”

Most significantly, the Bench then encapsulates in para 20 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “Even if a man and a woman are in a relationship; that would certainly not give a license to the man to commit rape upon the girl. Though marital rape is still not criminalized in the country, but even in a premarital love relationship between a man and a woman; committing forceful physical relationship upon her against her wish would still be a criminal act.”

Most forthrightly and equally significant is that the Bench then hastens to add in para 21 noting succinctly that, “As per the materials, prima facie the girl is stated to be a minor aged about 17 years at the time of the alleged rape. Therefore, in the given facts and circumstances; considering the nature of the penal provisions involved and the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, especially with regard to quashing vis-a-vis certain kinds of serious offences - I come to the considered opinion that it would not be justified to quash the criminal proceedings in exercise of the inherent powers of the court.”

Finally, we see that the Bench then aptly concludes by directing and holding in para 22 that, “Consequently, the instant criminal petition stands dismissed and disposed of.”

In a nutshell, we thus see here that the Gauhati High Court has made it indubitably clear that a love relationship is not an unfettered license for rape. We see in this leading case that the Gauhati High Court refuses to quash POCSO proceedings despite compromise between the accused and the victim’s father. Very rightly so!