Gujarat High Court Dismisses Petition on Airport Construction FIR, Issues Contempt Notice to Litigant for Defamatory Remarks

Introduction

In a stern rebuke to what it termed a "classic example of a thoroughly misconceived and an abuse of process of law" petition, the Gujarat High Court at Ahmedabad dismissed Special Criminal Application No. 8358 of 2023 filed by Vishwas Sudhanshu Bhamburkar, a party-in-person. The petition sought directions to compel police authorities to register an FIR against builders allegedly involved in forging documents to obtain No Objection Certificates (NOCs) from the Airports Authority of India (AAI) for constructions near Surat Airport. Justice M. R. Mengdey, presiding over the single-judge bench, not only rejected the plea but imposed costs of ₹25,000 on the petitioner, initiated contempt proceedings against him for making scandalous and defamatory remarks against the judiciary, including the Supreme Court, and directed a review of the petitioner's permission to argue cases in person. This ruling underscores the court's intolerance for frivolous litigation and attempts to undermine judicial institutions, particularly in matters involving public safety and procedural compliance under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).

The case highlights ongoing tensions between litigants' rights to seek redressal and the judiciary's duty to prevent abuse of its process, especially when petitions recycle previously adjudicated issues. Bhamburkar's allegations centered on deviations in building coordinates that purportedly compromised aviation safety, invoking mandatory FIR registration under Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P. (2014) 2 SCC 1. However, the court found no prima facie cognizable offense, particularly in the absence of any forgery claims from the AAI itself. This decision, pronounced on February 3, 2026, after reservation on January 16, 2026, serves as a cautionary tale for pro se litigants engaging in successive litigation without merit.

Case Background

The origins of this dispute trace back to concerns over unauthorized constructions near Surat Airport, which Bhamburkar raised through a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) filed as Writ Petition No. 633 of 2019, still pending before the Gujarat High Court. In that PIL, Bhamburkar alleged that builders had obtained NOCs from the AAI by submitting inaccurate World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS-84) coordinates and site elevations, leading to constructions deviated by 42 to 1609 meters from approved locations. These deviations, he claimed, obstructed safe flight operations and displaced the runway threshold by 615 meters, posing risks to public safety under Article 21 of the Constitution.

Bhamburkar's quest for criminal action began on April 11, 2021, when he approached Dumas Police Station in Surat with an application alleging offenses under Sections 467 (forgery of valuable security), 468 (forgery for cheating), 471 (using forged documents), 420 (cheating), and 120-B (criminal conspiracy) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The police refused to register an FIR, citing no disclosure of a cognizable offense, and filed the complaint. Undeterred, Bhamburkar escalated to the Commissioner of Police under Section 154(3) CrPC, which also met with rejection for similar reasons. Internal police communications, including a closure report, acknowledged the allegations but proceeded without FIR registration, prompting Bhamburkar to file Special Criminal Application No. 5144 of 2021 before the Gujarat High Court.

A coordinate bench dismissed that petition on September 19, 2022, directing Bhamburkar to pursue remedies under Sections 156(3) or 200 CrPC before a magistrate, emphasizing the availability of alternative statutory avenues. Bhamburkar challenged this before the Supreme Court via Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 10419 of 2022, which was dismissed on December 9, 2022, with the apex court finding no grounds to interfere. Complying with the directive, Bhamburkar then filed Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 2 of 2023 under Section 156(3) CrPC before the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) at Surat, seeking police investigation into the alleged forgeries.

On June 30, 2023, CJM P. B. Patel rejected the prayer for investigation under Section 156(3), observing that the AAI's affidavit in the PIL contained no averments of forged documents. Instead, the magistrate invoked Section 200 CrPC to examine the complainant and issued summons. Aggrieved, Bhamburkar filed the present petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, read with Sections 482 and 401 CrPC, seeking quashing of the CJM's order, a reference for contempt against the magistrate, directions for FIR registration, and even training for the CJM, alleging ignorance of Supreme Court precedents like Lalita Kumari .

The timeline reveals a pattern: from initial complaint in January 2020 to repeated judicial interventions spanning over four years, with no resolution due to perceived lack of evidence. The core legal questions were whether mandatory FIR registration applied absent explicit forgery, if a magistrate could treat a Section 156(3) application as a complaint under Section 190 CrPC, and the propriety of successive petitions challenging settled issues.

Arguments Presented

Bhamburkar, appearing as party-in-person, mounted a vigorous case rooted in procedural mandates and public interest. He argued that his January 14, 2020, complaint to the Surat Police Commissioner clearly disclosed cognizable offenses under the cited IPC sections, triggered by builders' submission of fabricated coordinates to secure NOCs, resulting in hazardous constructions. Citing the Constitution Bench ruling in Lalita Kumari , he contended that FIR registration under Section 154 CrPC is imperative upon disclosure of cognizable offenses, without preliminary inquiry into veracity. He accused police of fabricating records and conducting unauthorized "inquiries" without FIR, amounting to "bullying" the complainant and defying Supreme Court directives.

Bhamburkar emphasized compliance with hierarchical remedies under Section 154(3) CrPC and highlighted the earlier High Court order in SCA No. 5144/2021, which noted the complaint's disclosure of cognizable offenses, questioning if judges could perpetuate injustice via "alternate remedies." He invoked A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sr. Nayak to assert that any person can set criminal law in motion, dismissing the CJM's reliance on AAI's non-complaint as irrelevant. Further, relying on Sudhir Bhaskar Rao Tambe v. Hemant Yashwant Dhage , he argued that prima facie cognizable offenses and the need for police investigation warranted Section 156(3) directions. Bhamburkar stressed public safety implications under Article 21, supported by AAI's own NOC terms voiding permissions for deviations, and Bombay High Court precedents directing FIRs for similar airport violations. He decried judicial and executive non-compliance with Lalita Kumari 's para 111 directives, framing his petition as a quest for accountability rather than personal vendetta.

The State, represented by Public Prosecutor Hardik Dave and Additional Public Prosecutor H.K. Patel, opposed the petition as repetitive and an abuse of process. They pointed to the finality of prior dismissals—SCA No. 5144/2021 by the High Court and its affirmation by the Supreme Court—as barring re-litigation of identical prayers for FIR registration, general diary production, and action under Section 166A IPC. The State argued that Bhamburkar's private complaint under Section 156(3) had already led to cognizance under Section 190 CrPC, with proceedings pending before the CJM, rendering the High Court petition superfluous. They dismissed the added prayers for contempt reference and magistrate training as misconceived, noting that judicial orders cannot form contempt bases.

The State highlighted police actions: summoning Bhamburkar for evidence, querying AAI and municipal authorities (who provided no forgery replies), and filing the complaint absent cognizable offenses. They contended no evidence of forgery emerged, aligning with the AAI affidavit in the PIL, which spoke of coordinate discrepancies but not deliberate fabrication. The prosecution urged dismissal with costs, portraying the petition as an attempt to bypass statutory remedies and pressure lower courts.

Legal Analysis

Justice Mengdey meticulously dissected the petition, concluding it exemplified misuse of extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226/227, especially when Section 397 CrPC revision against the CJM's order remained available. The court reiterated that Lalita Kumari mandates FIR registration for cognizable offenses but clarified its inapplicability here, as no prima facie forgery was established. The AAI affidavit, filed in the PIL, explicitly noted builders' self-provided data and post-grant deviations via joint surveys, but omitted any forgery allegations. Paragraph 6 of the affidavit underscored that discrepancies could lead to demolition and NOC cancellation, yet absent such claims, no IPC offenses under Sections 467/468/471 were disclosed.

The bench distinguished between deviation (a civil/regulatory issue) and forgery (requiring intent to deceive), finding the latter unsubstantiated. Bhamburkar's failure to specify forged documents during hearings sealed this view. On the CJM's approach, the court upheld treating the Section 156(3) application as a complaint under Section 190(1)(c) CrPC, which permits cognizance on "information from any person" or own knowledge. This flexibility, absent in law prohibiting such treatment, allowed inquiry under Section 200, aligning with Bhagwan Samardha Sreepada Vallabha Venkata Vishwanandha Maharaj v. State of A.P. principles on magisterial discretion.

Precedents like XYZ v. State of M.P. and Sudhir Bhaskar were deemed inapplicable, as those involved clear cognizable disclosures warranting police probe; here, none existed. The court rejected Bhamburkar's contempt prayer against the CJM, affirming that bona fide judicial orders cannot constitute contempt, per Perspective Publications (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra . Successive prayers mirroring dismissed SCA No. 5144/2021 violated res judicata, with the Supreme Court's non-interference underscoring finality.

Critically, the ruling addressed Bhamburkar's provocative questions in para 3 of the petition—questioning Supreme Court orders' efficacy and courts' compliance—labeling them "contemptuous by nature." Remarks in the petition and oral submissions, such as portraying the Supreme Court as a "blabbering formality" unable to enforce orders, were seen as defamatory, intending to lower judicial dignity. This echoed the other source's report of the court recording exchanges where Bhamburkar reaffirmed allegations against the court, leading to the contempt notice. The bench differentiated between legitimate criticism and scandalous attacks, invoking the Contempt of Courts Act to protect institutional integrity.

The analysis balanced litigants' access to justice with preventing overburdening courts, emphasizing that public safety claims (e.g., runway displacement) required evidentiary substantiation, not mere assertions. Unlike Bombay High Court cases cited by Bhamburkar, where explicit misrepresentations triggered FIRs, here regulatory lapses by builders did not equate to criminal forgery without AAI corroboration.

Key Observations

The judgment is replete with pointed observations on procedural propriety and litigant conduct. Key excerpts include:

• On the petition's nature: "The present petition is a classic example of the petition which is thoroughly misconceived and an abuse of process of law." This underscores the court's view of Bhamburkar's repetitive filings as burdensome.

• Regarding evidence of forgery: "Even during the course of hearing of the present petition, the petitioner has miserably failed to point out which documents were forged and produced before the Airport Authority for obtaining the NOC." This highlights the evidentiary shortfall central to dismissing FIR demands.

• On magisterial discretion: "There is nothing in law which would preclude the learned Magistrate from treating the application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. as complaint... An information received on the basis of an application filed under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C would definitely fall under Section 190 (1) (c)." This clarifies procedural flexibility.

• Addressing contemptuous averments: "The questions which are raised by the petitioner Party-in-Person in the present petition, more particularly, in Para-3 of the petition are, by their very nature, contemptuous and are not of any significance." Directly from the recorded exchanges, this ties into the other source's mention of the court countering the petitioner's reaffirmation of allegations.

• On overall conduct: "From the aforesaid it appears that a disgruntled litigant after having failed to obtain favourable orders from the institution is out to defame the august institution. By making the averments in the petition as well as the remarks made by the petitioner during the course of hearing before this court are made with an intention to lower the dignity of the institution at large." This pivotal quote encapsulates the basis for the contempt notice.

These observations, drawn verbatim, emphasize the court's reasoning on meritlessness and decorum.

Court's Decision

The Gujarat High Court unequivocally dismissed the petition, declaring it "frivolous, misconceived and abuse of process of law," and imposed ₹25,000 costs on Bhamburkar to deter similar vexatious actions. The impugned CJM order of June 30, 2023, was upheld, affirming the magistrate's refusal of Section 156(3) investigation while proceeding under Section 200 CrPC. Prayers for FIR directions, general diary production, contempt reference against the CJM, and his training were rejected as baseless and overreaching.

Most significantly, the court issued a notice to Bhamburkar under the Contempt of Courts Act, requiring him to show cause why proceedings should not be initiated for his defamatory remarks, including letters to judges and oral statements undermining court authority. The Registry was directed to place the matter before the appropriate bench and reconsider Bhamburkar's in-person argument certification, signaling scrutiny of pro se privileges in light of his "contemptuous demeanor."

Implications are profound: this reinforces Lalita Kumari 's boundaries, mandating FIRs only for clear cognizable disclosures, not speculative claims. It protects lower judicial officers from baseless contempt accusations, promoting orderly litigation. For future cases, litigants challenging FIR refusals must provide concrete evidence, especially in regulatory-criminal overlaps like airport safety. The ruling may deter frivolous PIL follow-ups, easing judicial dockets, but raises access concerns for genuine public interest voices. In aviation law, it signals that coordinate deviations trigger civil remedies (e.g., demolition) over automatic criminal probes absent forgery proof.

Practically, the contempt notice could lead to sanctions, chilling aggressive advocacy, while the costs recovery underscores financial deterrents. Broader effects include bolstering institutional resilience against "disgruntled" attacks, yet prompting reflection on executive-judicial coordination in enforcing Supreme Court mandates. As the PIL lingers, this decision prioritizes procedural rigor over unverified alarmism, potentially influencing similar disputes nationwide.