The High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad has dismissed a petition filed by the president of a local housing society, reaffirming that citizens must exhaust all alternative statutory remedies before invoking the court’s extraordinary writ jurisdiction to compel the registration of a First Information Report (FIR). Justice J.C. Doshi, presiding over the matter, clarified that the High Court is not the initial forum for aggrieved individuals seeking police action when established, sequential procedures under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) remain available and untapped.

The petitioner, Vinubhai Vallabhbhai Dhorajiya, had approached the court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India , seeking a writ of mandamus to direct local police authorities in Surat to register a formal complaint. The core of the dispute stemmed from allegations that the former president of the Gayatri Nagar Society had utilized their influence to seize illegal possession of a common plot belonging to the society. Despite lodging written complaints with both the local police station and the Commissioner of Police, Dhorajiya reported that he received no response or acknowledgment, prompting his decision to seek intervention from the High Court .

In his petition, Dhorajiya argued that the nature of the allegations—specifically the unauthorized occupation of community land—required urgent judicial oversight. However, the State, represented by Assistant Public Prosecutor Ms. Dhwani R. Tripathi , contended that the petition was not maintainable . The State’s position centered on the argument that the judiciary should not be flooded with writ petitions for the registration of FIRs when the law provides specific, efficacious, and structured mechanisms for such grievances.

Prioritizing Statutory Pathways for Criminal Complaints

During the proceedings, the court focused extensively on the established legal framework governing police inaction. Justice Doshi emphasized that the judiciary must exercise restraint, noting that the High Court ’s jurisdiction is discretionary and subject to self-imposed limitations designed to ensure that lower-level statutory authorities perform their duties first.

The court heavily relied on the Supreme Court ’s landmark rulings in Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. and Sudhir Bhaskarrao Tambe v. Hemant Yashwant Dhage & Ors. , which have consistently held that if police refuse to register an FIR, the aggrieved party should first approach the Superintendent of Police under Section 173(4) of the BNSS (previously Section 154(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ). Should that fail, the law mandates that the complainant must move a motion before the jurisdictional Magistrate under Section 175(3) of the BNSS , which empowers the Magistrate to monitor investigations and, if prima facie satisfied, direct the registration of an FIR.

In rejecting the plea, Justice Doshi noted the burden placed on the judicial system by such petitions, stating, “We are of the opinion that if the High Courts entertain such writ petitions, then they will be flooded with such writ petitions and will not be able to do any other work except dealing with such writ petitions.”

Defining the Limits of Writ Jurisdiction

The court further referenced the recent decision in Sujal Vishwas Attavar v. State of Maharashtra , which reinforced the principle that the High Court is not obligated to entertain a writ petition simply because an allegation of negligence has been leveled against a statutory authority. The ruling underscored that the BNSS provides a “structured sequential mechanism” that must be followed. Deviating from this sequence bypasses the roles of the police and the Magistrate, effectively undermining the decentralized legal structure intended to handle such criminal matters.

The High Court observed that while Article 226 is a powerful instrument for the protection of constitutional rights, it is not a substitute for the standard procedural requirements defined by criminal law. Exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy , such as violations of fundamental rights or extreme lack of jurisdiction, were not established in the present case. Consequently, the court found the petition to be premature, as the complainant had not demonstrated that he had fully exhausted the remedies specifically provided to him under the current legislative framework.

Consequences for Future Complainants

The judgment underscores a growing trend among Indian courts to discourage the practice of bypassing lower judicial and police tiers. By formalizing this dismissal, the High Court of Gujarat has signaled that it will not serve as a first-instance grievance redressal mechanism for matters that are statutorily earmarked for the Magistrate’s oversight.

For the petitioner, the ruling means that he must now pursue his complaint through the procedural steps outlined by the court. If he wishes to challenge the alleged land grabbing at the Gayatri Nagar Society , his path forward involves either securing action from the Superintendent of Police or, failing that, filing an application before the concerned Magistrate who possesses the authority to oversee the investigation and ensure that a proper probe is conducted.

The dismissal of the petition marks the end of the High Court ’s involvement in this stage of the dispute. By discharging the Rule, the court has effectively pushed the responsibility of the investigation back to the competent authorities, maintaining that a proper, orderly investigation under the supervision of a Magistrate is the only appropriate method to address the claims of illegal possession. The decision reinforces the principle that judicial efficiency relies upon the strict adherence to sequential legal processes, ensuring that higher courts reserve their limited resources for matters where lower remedies have been proven definitively ineffective or exhausted.