The High Court of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh has dismissed a petition seeking to challenge trial and revisional court orders that restricted the number of permitted defense witnesses, firmly affirming that a second revision petition is legally barred under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023. Justice Sanjay Dhar, presiding over the case, ruled that the court’s inherent powers cannot be utilized to circumvent explicit statutory prohibitions designed to prevent the abuse of judicial processes. The ruling underscores the judiciary’s commitment to curbing attempts to protract legal proceedings through repetitive filings.

The litigation originated from a complaint filed by S. Gagandeep Singh against Bansi Lal Bhardwaj under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The dispute centered on a cheque for ₹10,00,000 issued in September 2009. Following the conclusion of the complainant’s evidence, the accused requested to summon 19 witnesses to substantiate a defense involving alleged land transactions. The trial court permitted only a limited number of witnesses, citing the list's excessive nature and the likely intent to delay the proceedings. This decision was subsequently upheld by the 3rd Additional Sessions Judge in November 2024.

In his ruling, Justice Sanjay Dhar addressed the legal validity of the petitioner’s attempt to bypass the lower court’s decision via Section 528 of the BNSS. The court held that the petition was, in effect, a second revision application, which is expressly prohibited by sub-section (3) of Section 438 of the BNSS.

"The High Court is vested with inherent powers under section 528 of BNSS to prevent abuse of process of court or to secure the ends of justice, but the said power cannot be used to circumvent a bar contained under any other provision of the Sanhita," Justice Dhar noted in the judgment. By invoking this principle, the Court clarified that inherent jurisdiction is not a tool to override legislative intent regarding the structure of appellate and revisional remedies .

Addressing Procedural Laches and Timelines

A significant aspect of the High Court’s judgment involved the timing of the petition. The Court observed that the petitioner approached the High Court in October 2025, approximately eleven months after the revisional order was passed in November 2024. While the BNSS does not prescribe a specific limitation period for filing petitions under Section 528, the court established a clear benchmark for judicial efficiency.

Justice Dhar observed that on the analogy of revision petitions, which are typically capped at 90 days, a similar period should be considered reasonable for invoking the High Court’s inherent powers. Failing to provide a plausible explanation for an eleven-month delay rendered the petition unsustainable on the grounds of laches. The Court emphasized that such delays hinder the administration of justice and interfere with the orderly progression of trial proceedings. This interpretation provides a necessary safeguard against the indefinite postponement of legal resolutions.

Determining the Necessity of Defense Evidence

Beyond the procedural bars, the High Court examined the merits of the petitioner’s request to summon 19 witnesses. The accused had intended to use these witnesses to prove that the complainant was a property dealer who had reneged on land settlement agreements, thereby nullifying the debt claimed under the Negotiable Instruments Act.

The Court held that the trial magistrate was correct in narrowing the scope of the defense evidence. According to the bench, the primary purpose of allowing defense witnesses is to permit the accused to "probabilize" their defense rather than to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. Justice Dhar pointed out that the existence of land transactions and the resulting legal obligations could be established through documentary evidence—specifically, the original or certified true copies of the relevant sale deeds—rather than through the oral testimony of numerous individuals associated with the transactions.

"An accused is not required to prove his defense beyond reasonable doubt . He has only to probablise his defense ," the Court noted. By requiring the accused to produce only those witnesses essential to the verification of these documents, the trial court appropriately balanced the right to a fair trial against the mandate to maintain judicial efficiency . The High Court affirmed that the accumulation of redundant witnesses serves only to prolong the trial without contributing substantively to the defense's credibility.

Implications for Future Criminal Proceedings

The dismissal of this petition serves as a firm reminder to legal practitioners that procedural shortcuts and repetitive appeals will not be entertained if they lack statutory foundation. The Court’s emphasis on the 90-day reasonableness rule for Section 528 applications introduces a layer of predictability for litigants while reinforcing the principle that the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction is reserved for instances of clear miscarriage of justice rather than as a substitute for standard appellate or revisional channels.

For the parties involved, the judgment marks the conclusion of a significant procedural dispute, directing the trial Magistrate to proceed with the case based on the established framework for evidence. The case remains active before the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class (City Judge) in Jammu, where the accused is now required to proceed with his defense within the limitations set by the lower court’s original order. The ruling stands as a precedent for the interpretation of the new Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, highlighting how the judiciary intends to handle the transition in procedural law by focusing on substance over volume in criminal litigation. This decision clarifies that while the right to a fair trial is paramount, it does not grant an unfettered right to obstruct or delay judicial outcomes through excessive witness lists or non-maintainable legal challenges. The matter will now likely move toward a final judgment in the original Section 138 complaint.