The High Court for the States of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh has quashed a long-standing criminal proceeding under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, ruling that prosecution evidence resting solely on inadmissible disclosure statements constitutes an abuse of the judicial process. Justice Manisha Batra delivered the judgment, directing that the First Information Report registered at Police Station Kalanwali, District Sirsa, along with all subsequent proceedings and the framed charges, be set aside for the petitioner, Harpreet Singh.

The decision stems from a January 2021 investigation in which police officials intercepted three individuals on a motorcycle, recovering 2,700 tablets of Tramadol Hydrochloride. Following the recovery, the individuals identified Harpreet Singh as the supplier of the contraband. While the other two involved parties were processed through the Juvenile Justice Board, the petitioner faced ongoing legal proceedings for nearly six years. The High Court determined that because the primary incriminating material against the petitioner relied on disclosure statements made to police officers—and lacked any independent corroboration—the trial was bound to end in an acquittal, making its continuation an unnecessary ordeal for the accused.

A Prosecution Built Solely on Inadmissible Statements

The legal challenge centered on the reliance placed by the State of Haryana on statements that, under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, cannot be legally admitted into evidence. The court emphasized that the disclosure statements made by co-accused individuals while in police custody are fundamentally barred by Section 25 of the Evidence Act. Furthermore, the court noted that even the confession of a co-accused under Section 30 of the Evidence Act requires a joint trial for the same offence to be considered. Since the co-accused who initially implicated the petitioner had passed away and proceedings against him had abated, there was no active joint trial that would permit the court to even consider his statement.

Justice Batra pointedly observed the lack of substantive evidence, stating, “A confession cannot be treated as evidence which is substantive evidence against a co-accused person. The court cannot start with the confession of a co-accused person; it must begin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution.” Despite the prosecution’s reliance on the petitioner’s own disclosure statement and his act of demarcating the alleged scene of the sale, the court found these actions insufficient to overcome the strictures of the Evidence Act.

Why Pointing Out Known Facts Fails Legal Discovery Standards

A pivotal aspect of the court's reasoning was the application of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, which governs the discovery of facts through information provided by an accused in custody. The State contended that the petitioner’s assistance in identifying the location of the sale and producing ₹1,500 constituted a discovery of facts related to the crime. However, the High Court dismantled this argument by noting that the site had already been identified by the police during the initial investigation months prior.

The court clarified that merely pointing out a location already known to law enforcement does not meet the threshold for a "discovery" under the law. Referring to established legal precedents, Justice Batra noted, “The petitioner pointing out the same place six months later did not bring to light anything which was not already known to the police. Even if this act is treated as conduct under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, it would show no more than the petitioner pointing out a particular spot. It does not show possession or sale of any contraband by him.” The court further dismissed the significance of the ₹1,500 produced by the petitioner, noting that it lacked any clear link to the alleged drug transaction and failed to satisfy the legal definition of a discovered fact that would justify prosecution.

The Long Ordeal of Facing Unjustified Legal Proceedings

The petitioner had long argued that he was falsely implicated, citing the complete absence of independent evidence such as call detail records or verified financial trails that could link him to the drug trafficking activities. Although the State of Haryana opposed the quashing of the FIR by emphasizing the commercial quantity of the contraband, the court clarified that the gravity of the offence does not override the fundamental requirement for admissible evidence. The court concluded that proceeding with a trial where the core allegations are unsupported by legal proof would result in a miscarriage of justice.

In its final analysis, the court highlighted that the petitioner had already endured significant personal hardship due to the pendency of the case, which had prevented him from joining his wife, who has been working in Canada. By applying the criteria laid down in the landmark Bhajan Lal and Rajiv Thapar cases, the court found that the prosecution’s material was insufficient to form a prima facie case. The ruling establishes that even at the stage of a pending trial where charges have already been framed, the High Court retains the inherent power to intervene if the material on record is legally incapable of supporting a conviction.

The court’s order effectively terminates the criminal proceedings against the petitioner. With the quashing of the FIR and the related charge framed in January 2024, the bail and surety bonds furnished by Harpreet Singh were declared discharged. This judgment reinforces the judiciary's protective role in preventing the misuse of the legal system, ensuring that criminal charges are founded on robust, admissible evidence rather than on confessionary statements obtained under police custody that lack independent validation. The decision serves as a significant affirmation of the evidentiary standards required to sustain complex prosecutions under the NDPS Act.