High Court Upholds Conviction for Defamatory Social Media Posts Under IPC Sections 504 and 509 - 2025-01-02

Madras High Court Upholds Conviction in High-Profile Social Media Defamation Case

In a significant verdict for digital accountability, the Madras High Court has upheld the conviction of former Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) S.Ve. Shekar for his role in circulating a disparaging social media post targeting women journalists. The order, pronounced by Justice P. Velmurugan on January 2, 2025, solidifies the stance that individuals cannot escape criminal liability for defamatory content simply by claiming they were not the original author or by issuing a post-facto apology.

The Backdrop of the Dispute

The case originated from a controversial Facebook post shared by the petitioner, which contained derogatory remarks directed at women journalists. The prosecution argued that the action was a deliberate attempt to demean the feminine gender and destabilize public tranquility. While the petitioner contended that he had merely forwarded the message without reading its contents and had subsequently deleted it, the trial court initially found him guilty under Sections 504 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Women Act, 2002.

Arguments from the Bench and Bar

The petitioner’s legal team mounted a multi-pronged defense, citing the prosecution’s inability to produce a certificate under Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act for the digital screenshot and claiming that the failure to seize the petitioner’s electronic devices crippled the case. They further argued that the petitioner’s unconditional apology demonstrated a lack of mens rea (criminal intent).

Conversely, the State countered that the petitioner’s apology itself served as an admission of awareness. The prosecution emphasized that by sharing the content, the petitioner amplified its reach, and the subsequent public outcry against the victim necessitated legal intervention.

Legal Reasoning: The Limits of Revisional Jurisdiction

Justice P. Velmurugan observed that the scope of a revision petition is limited and should not involve re-appreciating evidence unless there is clear perversity in the lower court’s findings. The Court held that the petitioner’s argument about not reading the content was "unbelievable" given the circumstances. The Court reasoned that once defamatory content is disseminated, subsequent apologies cannot undo the psychological and professional harm caused to the victims.

Addressing the technical objection regarding the 65-B certificate, the Court noted that the evidentiary materials, coupled with the petitioner’s own admission of sharing, were sufficient to establish the charges.

Key Observations

The judgment offers several poignant insights into the responsibility of social media users:

• On Intentional Dissemination: "Knowing fully well and knowing the consequences only, he had forwarded the same. Since there was agitation against the contents, he had tendered apology and removed the message from Facebook."
• On the Sufficiency of Apology: "Mere tendering apology itself would not be sufficient. When once the contents are released and it is also seen by various persons, certainly, the image of the de-facto complainant and other journalists would be degraded and subsequent tendering apology will not remove the image from the public."
• On Evidentiary Claims: "A thorough perusal and reading of the cross-examination of P.W.2 that the offence(s) against the petitioner, is made out and the prosecution also has proved its case beyond all reasonable doubts."

A Final Ruling

The High Court dismissed the Revision Petition, confirming the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court. In a procedural act of leniency, the Court directed the respondent police not to execute the sentence for 90 days, allowing the petitioner a window to file a Special Leave Petition (SLP) before the Supreme Court. This ruling serves as a stern reminder that digital actions carry real-world consequences and that legal protection for free speech does not extend to the circulation of content intended to insult the modesty of women.