Illegal Trap, Outdated Law: Revanth Reddy Challenges 'Cash-for-Vote' Prosecution in Supreme Court

New Delhi – The Supreme Court on Wednesday delved into a complex legal challenge with significant political undertones as it heard arguments in Telangana Chief Minister Revanth Reddy's plea to quash the nine-year-old "cash-for-vote" case against him. Senior Advocate Mukul Rohatgi, representing Reddy, mounted a two-pronged attack on the prosecution's case, arguing that it was built on a procedurally illegal foundation and was substantively untenable under the anti-corruption law as it existed in 2015.

The hearing before a bench of Justice JK Maheshwari and Justice Vijay Bishnoi centered on pivotal questions concerning the powers of investigating agencies under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) and the precise scope of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act), prior to its major amendment in 2018. The case, formally titled A Revanth Reddy v. State of Telangana , stems from allegations that Reddy, then a member of the Telugu Desam Party (TDP), attempted to bribe a nominated MLA, Elvis Stephenson, to secure his vote for a TDP candidate in the 2015 Legislative Council elections.

The Procedural Challenge: Was the Trap Itself Illegal?

The primary thrust of Mr. Rohatgi’s argument was that the entire case against his client was void ab initio . He contended that the trap laid by the Telangana Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB), which led to Reddy's arrest on May 31, 2015, was "completely illegal" because it was executed before the registration of a First Information Report (FIR).

"A trap was set up before an FIR was registered," Rohatgi submitted forcefully. "The trap is completely illegal because no investigation can commence before registration of FIR under the CrPC. There was no general diary entry and no FIR."

This argument strikes at the heart of criminal procedure, invoking the established principle that the FIR is the legally mandated starting point for any formal police investigation. By conducting a trap—an act of investigation—without a preceding FIR, Rohatgi argued, the ACB had subverted the procedural safeguards enshrined in the CrPC. This pre-FIR action, he suggested, rendered all evidence collected during the trap inadmissible and tainted the entire prosecution. The argument implies that allowing such a practice would grant investigative agencies unfettered power to initiate covert operations without the legal oversight and documentation that an FIR provides.

The Substantive Challenge: Did the 2015 Law Even Cover Bribe-Givers?

Beyond the procedural infirmities, Mr. Rohatgi presented a meticulous statutory argument, asserting that even if the allegations were taken at face value, Revanth Reddy could not be prosecuted under the specific provisions of the PC Act invoked against him. He is being prosecuted under Section 12 of the PC Act, 1988, which deals with the abetment of certain offenses.

Rohatgi explained that in 2015, Section 12 was narrowly tailored. It criminalized the abetment of offenses falling only under Sections 7 and 11 of the Act. He then took the bench through the text of those sections as they stood at the time of the alleged offense.

"I am being prosecuted under Section 12 of the PC Act as it stood in 2015. It relates to abetment of offences under Sections 7 and 11," he argued. "But in 2010, bribe givers were not covered under those provisions, only bribe takers were."

His analysis focused on the fact that the pre-2018 versions of Sections 7 and 11 were exclusively aimed at the "bribe taker"—the public servant who accepts or attempts to accept an undue advantage. Since the primary offenses under Sections 7 and 11 could only be committed by a bribe taker, Rohatgi contended that abetting these offenses under Section 12 was logically confined to actions that aided or instigated the bribe taker. The alleged "bribe giver," therefore, fell outside the statutory net.

He contrasted this with the legal landscape post-2018. The comprehensive amendments to the PC Act in 2018 not only introduced a specific provision (Section 8) to criminalize the giving of a bribe but also broadened the scope of Section 12 to cover the abetment of any offense under the Act. While acknowledging this change as "logical," Rohatgi was firm that this amended law could not be applied retrospectively to an incident from 2015, in line with the constitutional protection against ex post facto criminal laws.

Justice Maheshwari engaged with this point, observing, "So earlier it was abetment of Sections 7 and 11, and now…?" Rohatgi confirmed the limited scope of the older law, reinforcing his argument that the prosecution was attempting to apply a modern legal standard to a past event.

The Scope of 'Official Act'

As a tertiary argument, Rohatgi challenged whether the act of voting in a Legislative Council election qualifies as an "official act" or "official duty" within the meaning of the PC Act. He submitted that even if the court were to consider the applicability of Sections 7, 11, and 12, these provisions were historically linked to acts performed by a public servant in the discharge of their official duty. Casting a vote in an election, he proposed, is a constitutional or political function, not an administrative or official duty in the sense contemplated by the anti-corruption statute.

Context and Path to the Supreme Court

The case has navigated a long and winding legal path. In July 2015, the ACB filed a charge sheet against Reddy and others under the PC Act and for criminal conspiracy under the Indian Penal Code, claiming to possess "clinching evidence" from audio-visual recordings. The matter has since been a point of significant political contention in Telangana.

Notably, the Supreme Court last month upheld a Telangana High Court judgment that quashed the case against another accused, Jerusalem Mathai, lending potential weight to the arguments now being advanced by Reddy's counsel.

The hearing remained inconclusive on Wednesday and is set to continue, where the State's counsel will present its counter-arguments. The Court's eventual decision will not only determine the fate of a sitting Chief Minister but could also clarify crucial aspects of anti-corruption law, including the procedural prerequisites for investigative traps and the historical interpretation of liability for bribery.