The in Thrissur has held accountable for a , ordering the financial institution to refund ₹4,22,000 that was transferred from an NRI customer’s Non-Resident External (NRE) account without his authorization. The ruling emphasizes the legal duty of banks to rigorously verify electronic transaction instructions, particularly when account holders immediately flag suspicious activity as fraudulent. The commission’s decision underscores that mere reliance on electronic communication does not absolve a bank of its responsibility to secure a customer’s funds.
The dispute originated in 2014, when the complainant, Gopinathan, an NRI, discovered a significant from his account. While he had authorized a legitimate transfer of ₹1,00,000 to an individual known to the bank on , he claimed to have no knowledge of a subsequent transfer of ₹4,22,000 executed on . This larger amount was moved to an account maintained at a branch in Shillong, held by an entity identified as . Upon learning of the transfer on , the complainant immediately contacted the bank to dispute the transaction and demand the restoration of his funds.
Scrutiny of Bank Procedures and Evidence
During the proceedings, the bank’s legal representatives contended that the disputed transaction was supported by an email received on , and a follow-up telephonic confirmation on . However, the commission found these claims insufficient to justify the debit. The bank failed to produce robust evidence, such as comprehensive server logs, authentication records, or clear recordings of the alleged telephonic confirmation that would prove the complainant had explicitly authorized the specific transaction.
The Commission noted that while the bank provided a photocopy of a telephone bill, such documentation proved only that a call had been placed, not the content of the conversation or the identity of the recipient. Furthermore, the bank’s failure to subject its primary evidence to by the complainant left its version of events unsubstantiated. The commission observed that in cases where an account holder categorically denies authorizing a substantial transfer, the —as the custodian of electronic and banking records—to demonstrate the authenticity of the instruction through unimpeachable evidence.
Contradictory Conduct by Financial Institution
A pivotal point in the Commission's reasoning was the bank's own contemporaneous behavior following the incident. Immediately after the complainant protested the transaction, the bank had itself initiated a police investigation, leading to the registration of Crime No. 2356/2014. The bank also wrote to the
, characterizing the event as a case of
"email hacking and fraudulent transaction."
The Commission highlighted this inconsistency in its final order, stating,
"The bank’s own conduct therefore materially contradicts the suggestion that the disputed transaction was an ordinary, unquestionable transaction voluntarily authorised by the complainant."
By formally treating the incident as a fraud in its initial communications with law enforcement and the beneficiary bank, the respondent bank effectively invalidated its later defense that the transaction was a legitimate, customer-authorized event. The commission clarified that while the bank was justified in reporting the suspected fraud to the authorities, this action could not replace its
to protect the customer’s money or serve as a valid excuse for withholding the funds indefinitely during a criminal investigation.
Ensuring Protection for Electronic Banking Users
In its assessment, the Commission emphasized that the banking relationship carries an inherent duty of care. By failing to exercise the expected in managing an NRE account, the bank failed in its service obligations. The commission drew upon prevailing legal principles, including those upheld by the , which have consistently held that the mere occurrence of an electronically authenticated transaction is not conclusive proof of customer consent.
The commission specifically addressed the bank's allegation of between the complainant and the beneficiary, noting that such a serious charge requires substantive proof. Because the bank failed to support this assertion with evidence or provide a representative to testify and face , the commission formally dismissed the claim as an . It further invoked the principle that when a party withholds material knowledge and fails to submit their evidence to examination, an may be drawn against them.
Final Order and Compensation Directives
Concluding that the bank was fully responsible for the loss, the commission ordered the opposite parties—the Zonal Manager, the Branch Manager, the Head of Operations, and the Head of Branch Banking of IndusInd Bank—to restore the full amount of ₹4,22,000 to the complainant. Additionally, the commission directed the payment of ₹50,000 to cover the mental agony, inconvenience, and hardship the complainant suffered over the years of legal struggle, along with ₹10,000 for litigation costs.
The total amount is to be paid with 9% interest per annum calculated from the date the complaint was filed until the date of realization. The bank is required to comply with these directions within 30 days of receiving a copy of the order. This judgment serves as a stern reminder to banking institutions regarding their accountability in the era of digital banking, reinforcing the necessity of strict verification and the severe financial consequences of failing to protect customer accounts from unauthorized access.
unauthorized electronic transactions - deficiency in service