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Interim Maintenance Orders Under S.24 Hindu Marriage Act Not Appealable Under Family Courts Act or HM Act: Madras HC - 2025-04-27

Subject : Legal - Family Law

Interim Maintenance Orders Under S.24 Hindu Marriage Act Not Appealable Under Family Courts Act or HM Act: Madras HC

Supreme Today News Desk

Interim Maintenance Orders Not Appealable Under S.19 Family Courts Act or S.28 Hindu Marriage Act, Rules Madras High Court

Chennai: In a significant ruling, the Madras High Court has clarified that orders granting interim maintenance or litigation expenses under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, are not appealable under either Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, or Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The court held that such orders are interlocutory in nature and therefore fall outside the scope of these statutory appeal provisions.

A Division Bench of Justices M. Sundar and K. Govindarajan Thilakavadi delivered the judgment, which addressed a batch of Civil Miscellaneous Appeals (CMAs) arising from orders passed by Family Courts under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The central legal question before the court was the maintainability of these appeals, specifically concerning the phrase "...not being an interlocutory order..." in Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act.

The issue gained prominence in a divorce petition filed by a husband ( K. Somasundaram ) against his wife ( S. Chitra ) in Erode Family Court in 2017. Pending the divorce proceedings, the wife filed an application under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act seeking interim maintenance of Rs. 40,000 per month and Rs. 1,00,000 towards litigation costs. The Family Court granted interim maintenance of Rs. 20,000 per month. Aggrieved by this order, both the husband and the wife filed cross-appeals before the High Court. This brought the core question of maintainability to the forefront, affecting numerous similar pending appeals.

Arguments Presented:

Senior counsel representing parties arguing for maintainability of the appeals contended that an order under Section 24, while interim in the main suit, conclusively determines the right to receive maintenance and costs for a specific period, and thus should be considered a 'judgment' or a non-interlocutory order for the purposes of appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act. They cited previous rulings, including a single judge decision in P.T. Lakshman Kumar vs. Bhavani (2013) and a division bench reference to it in Dr. Rajiv Verghese vs. Rosy Chakkrammakkil Francis (2023), which had held such orders appealable. They also referred to the interpretation of 'judgment' in the context of Letters Patent appeals ( Shah Babulal Khimji ) and the application of CPC provisions to Family Courts.

Conversely, senior counsel arguing against maintainability submitted that orders under Section 24 are purely interlocutory, temporary in nature, subject to variation, and do not finally determine the rights of the parties in the main proceedings. They relied on an earlier Division Bench judgment of the Madras High Court in N. Balasubramanian vs. V. Chitra (1992), which had categorically held that an interim maintenance order under Section 24 is an interlocutory order and not appealable under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act. They highlighted that Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, post-amendment in 1976 based on a Law Commission report, deliberately restricted appeals to decrees and non-interim orders under Sections 25 (permanent alimony) and 26 (custody), specifically excluding Section 24 orders.

The court also benefitted from the assistance of an amicus curiae, Mr. Sharath Chandran , who presented arguments covering both perspectives.

Court's Reasoning and Decision:

The Division Bench meticulously examined the relevant provisions and precedents. It addressed the apparent conflict between P.T. Lakshman Kumar and N. Balasubramanian , and the reference to P.T. Lakshman Kumar in Dr. Rajiv Verghese .

Applying principles of precedent and tests like the Wambaugh inversion test (which determines if an observation is part of the ratio decidendi), the court concluded that Dr. Rajiv Verghese (dealing with the Divorce Act, 1869, which has different appeal provisions) was distinguishable and not a binding precedent for appeals under the Hindu Marriage Act or Family Courts Act.

The bench found the reasoning in the earlier Division Bench case N. Balasubramanian to be sound. It held that an order under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act is fundamentally an interlocutory order because: * It is temporary, valid only during the pendency of the main proceedings. * It can be modified or varied based on change in circumstances. * It is decided based on affidavits (Affidavits of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities, as per Supreme Court guidelines in Rajnesh v. Neha ), not a full trial, distinguishing it from final or even preliminary judgments. * It does not conclusively determine the rights of the parties regarding the main dispute (e.g., divorce, restitution of conjugal rights).

The court emphasized that Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act explicitly excludes appeals against "interlocutory order[s]". Furthermore, Section 2(e) of the Family Courts Act imports the definitions from the CPC, where 'order' and 'decree' are mutually exclusive. The outcome of a Section 24 application is an 'order', not a 'decree'.

Regarding Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the court traced its history, noting the 1976 amendment (based on the 59th Law Commission Report) which intentionally limited appeals to decrees and non-interim orders under Sections 25 and 26, thereby implicitly excluding orders under Section 24 from the statutory appeal route.

The bench also noted the potential anomaly where a Section 24 order passed by a non-Family Court (Senior Civil Judge) would be appealable to a District Judge, while the same order by a Family Court Judge (District Judge cadre) would, if held appealable under Section 19, go before a Division Bench of the High Court, regardless of the amount. This highlighted a procedural inconsistency if appeals were allowed.

Remedy via Article 227:

While holding that statutory appeals are not maintainable, the court clarified that aggrieved parties are not left without remedy. The orders passed by Family Courts under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act remain amenable to judicial review under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before a Single Judge of the High Court.

The court explicitly stated:

"...a revision under Article 227 of the Constitution of India will be maintainable as the orders made by Family Courts under Section 24 of the HM Act cannot be left to be final without further judicial review by High Court."

The court directed that appellants in the dismissed CMAs could seek withdrawal to file revisions under Article 227, and the time spent pursuing the statutory appeals would be excluded when considering delay or laches in the revision petitions.

Consequently, the court dismissed the batch of CMAs challenging interim maintenance orders under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act as not maintainable. However, three CMAs dealing with orders under the Divorce Act, 1869 (Section 36) and Hindu Marriage Act (Sections 26 and 27) were detagged for separate consideration of their maintainability.

This judgment provides much-needed clarity on the appealability of interim maintenance orders in family law proceedings originating from the Hindu Marriage Act before Family Courts.

#FamilyLaw #MadrasHC #MaintenanceLaw #MadrasHighCourt

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