Not Every Campaign Discrepancy Constitutes Corrupt Practice: Jharkhand High Court Upholds Election Victory

Introduction

In a significant ruling for electoral law, the Jharkhand High Court has upheld the election of Chandradeo Mahato from the Sindri Assembly Constituency in the 2024 Jharkhand Assembly elections, dismissing a petition that alleged various irregularities as grounds for invalidation. The single-judge bench, presided over by Justice Gautam Kumar Choudhary, emphasized that minor discrepancies in election campaigns do not automatically qualify as "corrupt practices" under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (RP Act), unless they demonstrably influence the election outcome. The petitioner, Hiralal Sankhwar @ Hiralal Mahato, an independent candidate who secured only 737 votes, challenged Mahato's victory—won with 1,05,136 votes against the BJP runner-up's 1,01,688—on grounds including improper security deposits, unstamped affidavits, misleading campaign materials, and non-compliance with criminal disclosure requirements. This decision, pronounced on February 3, 2026, reinforces the high threshold for election petitions and protects elected representatives from frivolous challenges based on peripheral issues.

The case, titled Hiralal Sankhwar @ Hiralal Mahato v. Chandradeo Mahato (E.P. No. 01 of 2025), was heard under Sections 80 and 81 read with Section 100(1)(a), (b), and (d)(i) & (iv) of the RP Act. It highlights the judiciary's role in safeguarding the integrity of elections while preventing abuse of the petition process. By rejecting the petition at the threshold and imposing costs of ₹50,000 on the petitioner, the court sent a clear message about the need for substantive evidence of material impact in electoral disputes.

Case Background

The dispute arose from the October-November 2024 Jharkhand Legislative Assembly elections for the 38-Sindri Assembly Constituency in Dhanbad district. Chandradeo Mahato, the returned candidate affiliated with the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation (CPI(ML) Liberation), emerged victorious with a narrow margin of 3,448 votes over the BJP's candidate. The petitioner, Hiralal Sankhwar, representing the All India Forward Bloc, polled a mere 737 votes, placing far behind in the race.

Sankhwar filed the election petition shortly after the results, invoking provisions of the RP Act to challenge Mahato's eligibility and the validity of the electoral process. The core events leading to the dispute included Mahato's nomination filing, campaign activities, and post-nomination disclosures. Specifically, Sankhwar alleged four key violations: (1) the security deposit of ₹10,000 was deposited with the Nazir instead of the Returning Officer or government treasury, contravening Section 34(2) of the RP Act; (2) the affidavit accompanying the nomination papers lacked required stamps, such as the ₹30 Advocate Welfare Fund Ticket and ₹5 Advocate Clerk Stamp; (3) campaign pamphlets omitted the word "Liberation" from the party's name, projecting Mahato as a CPI(ML) candidate and potentially misleading voters; and (4) disclosures regarding Mahato's pending criminal cases were inadequate and misleading, as required under the RP Act, with a newspaper publication in Hindustan (Hindi) allegedly falsifying details of a conviction.

The legal questions at the heart of the petition were whether these alleged non-compliances constituted grounds under Section 100 of the RP Act to void the election, particularly if they amounted to corrupt practices under Section 123 or materially affected the result under Section 100(1)(d)(iv). The timeline began with the elections in late 2024, nomination scrutiny, and culminated in the petition's filing in early 2025, with the interlocutory application for rejection under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, heard and decided in January-February 2026. This case underscores the post-election scrutiny process in India's democratic framework, where minor procedural lapses are weighed against the broader mandate of voter will.

The parties' relationship was adversarial, typical of election disputes: Sankhwar, a distant third-place finisher, sought to overturn the results to potentially trigger a re-election, while Mahato defended his narrow but legitimate win. No prior interactions between the parties were noted, but the constituency's industrial backdrop in Dhanbad, known for political rivalries, added contextual tension.

Arguments Presented

The petitioner, represented by advocates Arvind Kumar Lall and Shiwam Lath, advanced detailed contentions rooted in strict compliance with electoral laws. On the security deposit, they argued that Section 34(2) mandates deposit with the Returning Officer or treasury, citing Charan Lal Sahu v. Fakaruddin Ali Ahmad (1975) 4 SCC 832, where a cheque payment led to candidature rejection. They claimed the deposit with the Nazir was invalid, potentially disqualifying Mahato under Section 100(1)(a). Regarding the affidavit, Sankhwar highlighted the absence of stamps as a fatal flaw, arguing it rendered the nomination improper and violated Section 33's requirements.

The campaign materials allegation focused on voter deception: by omitting "Liberation," pamphlets misled voters into believing Mahato represented a different faction of CPI(ML), constituting a corrupt practice under Section 123(4) for false statements. Sankhwar asserted this qualitatively influenced results, prejudicing other candidates. On criminal disclosures, they pointed to a January 3, 2024, Hindustan publication as misleading, concealing convictions like one in U.R. Case No. 1177 of 2014 (allegedly in Cr. Appeal No. 39 of 2020). They argued non-compliance with disclosure rules under the RP Act materially affected the election under Section 100(1)(d)(iv). Referencing a similar case, Santosh Hembram v. Ravindra Nath Mahto (Election Petition No. 06/2020), upheld by the Supreme Court, they urged against threshold rejection, claiming triable issues required evidence.

In response, the respondent, represented by Senior Advocate V.P. Singh and a team including Arshad Hussain, Rakesh Kumar Samarendra, Parth Sarthi, and Vishnu Kumar Sharma, sought outright dismissal under Order VII Rule 11 CPC read with Section 86(1) RP Act. They contended the petition failed to disclose a cause of action, lacking specific pleadings on material impact as required by Sections 81, 82, and 83 RP Act. Non-compliance with Section 83(1)—no concise material facts or separate affidavit in Form-25 for corrupt practices under Rule 94(A) of Conduct of Election Rules, 1961—was fatal.

On merits, they dismissed the security deposit issue as "peripheral," noting it was deposited (albeit with Nazir) and caused no prejudice, unlike Charan Lal Sahu . The stamp omission was the notary's fault, not Mahato's, and irrelevant to validity. The "Liberation" omission was inconsequential, not misleading or prejudicial under Section 123(4), citing Ajhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi (1986 Supp SCC 315) and C.P. John v. Babu M. Palissery (2014) 10 SCC 547—no evidence of voter confusion or impact on results. For disclosures, they produced a certified copy showing no conviction or even accusation against Mahato in the cited case, labeling para 26 of the petition a false affidavit, warranting dismissal per C.P. John . They relied on Supreme Court precedents like Kanimozhi Karunanidhi v. A. Santhana Kumar (AIR 2023 SC 2366) and Bhagwati Prasad Dixit v. Rajeev Gandhi (1986) 4 SCC 78, arguing election petitions cannot be "fanciful" or based on incomplete causes of action, and must tie to Section 100 grounds without fishing expeditions.

Both sides clashed on procedural rigor: the petitioner viewed allegations as substantive triable issues, while the respondent framed them as vexatious, lacking affidavit support and material averments on prejudice.

Legal Analysis

Justice Gautam Kumar Choudhary's reasoning was methodical, grounding the dismissal in the stringent framework of the RP Act and Supreme Court precedents. The court reiterated that elections can only be voided on specific Section 100 grounds: disqualification (100(1)(a)), corrupt practices (100(1)(b)), improper nomination rejection (100(1)(c)), or material effect from improprieties (100(1)(d)). For non-compliance under 100(1)(d)(iv), the petitioner must plead and prove material impact on results, supported by affidavit per Section 83(1)(b).

Drawing from Kanimozhi Karunanidhi v. A. Santhana Kumar (2024) 18 SCC 592, the court outlined dismissal grounds under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC: omission of material facts leading to incomplete cause of action, or failure to state facts constituting Section 100 violations. Material facts include positive assertions and negative averments necessary for relief, but the petition here was "sketchy" and lacked prima facie assertions of corrupt practice or prejudice.

On the security deposit, the court deemed the Nazir deposit "peripheral," as no non-deposit was alleged—unlike Charan Lal Sahu , where no valid tender occurred. The stamp issue was "flippant," attributable to the notary, not invalidating nomination under Section 33. The "Liberation" omission did not qualify as corrupt practice under Section 123(4), which requires statements "reasonably calculated to prejudice" prospects by misleading voters. Citing Dhartipakar Madan Lal Agarwal v. Rajiv Gandhi (1987 Supp SCC 93) and Ajhar Hussain , the court held discrepancies must "qualitatively influence" results; this one was "inconsequential," with no evidence of voter detriment to the petitioner.

The disclosure plea collapsed on falsity: no conviction existed, as proven by the judgment in U.R. Case No. 1177/2014, where Mahato was not accused. This false averment in para 26, unverified, mirrored C.P. John , justifying dismissal. Overall, per Bhagwati Prasad Dixit and Karim Uddin Barbhuiya v. Aminul Haque Laskar (AIR 2024 SC 2193), pleadings failed Section 83 requirements—no Form-25 affidavit for corrupt practices—and disclosed no cause of action.

The analysis distinguished peripheral errors (e.g., deposit mode) from substantive ones (e.g., non-disclosure of assets), emphasizing no "fishing expedition" without precise facts. It applied RP Act principles to prevent frivolous petitions, balancing electoral purity with stability.

Key Observations

The judgment is replete with pivotal excerpts underscoring the court's strict interpretive approach:

• “Each and every discrepancy in election campaign, cannot by itself be said to come within meaning of corrupt practice so as to make it a ground to declare the election as invalid. Discrepant statement during election campaign should have the effect or potential to qualitatively influence the election result.”

This quote encapsulates the core principle, rejecting blanket invalidation for minor lapses.

• “In order to call it a discrepant and misleading statement so as to be called corrupt practice under Sub-section 4 of Section 123 of the Act, 1951, it should be reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of the other contesting candidates in the election, by misleading the voters. This Court is of the view that the omission was inconsequential and cannot be said to have in any way influenced the election result.”

Here, the court directly addresses the campaign pamphlet allegation, applying the materiality test from precedents.

• “The pleadings raised in the instant election petition, does not disclose a cause of action for the relief claimed so as to lead the election petition to any meaningful result. There is no assertion of fact on which a prima facie inference can be drawn that the petitioner had given a false statement on affidavit or that corrupt practice has been committed by him or by Election Agent or by any other person with his consent.”

This observation justifies threshold rejection, highlighting procedural deficiencies.

• “Election petition is a serious matter and elected candidate cannot be dragged into a litigation on such sketchy pleadings.”

Emphasizing the gravity of electoral challenges, this warns against abuse.

These observations, drawn verbatim from the judgment, illuminate the judiciary's commitment to evidence-based scrutiny in election matters.

Court's Decision

The Jharkhand High Court unequivocally allowed the respondent's interlocutory application (I.A. No. 12722 of 2025), rejecting the election petition under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC. The plaint was dismissed as it failed to disclose a cause of action, with costs of ₹50,000 imposed on the petitioner. Pending applications were disposed of, and the election of Chandradeo Mahato stands validated.

Practically, this upholds Mahato's legislative seat, averting a potential re-poll in Sindri and affirming the 2024 results. It deters baseless petitions by imposing financial penalties, streamlining judicial resources for genuine disputes. For future cases, the ruling sets a precedent: election challenges must demonstrate tangible prejudice under Section 100, not mere technicalities. This could reduce litigation in closely contested seats, promoting electoral finality while upholding RP Act standards. In a landscape of rising petition filings, it guides lawyers to plead material facts meticulously, potentially influencing how parties approach disclosures and campaigns. Broader implications include stronger protections for winners against post-hoc nitpicking, fostering trust in India's electoral process, though critics might argue it risks overlooking subtle manipulations in low-literacy areas.