Judicial Oath vs. Divine Guidance: Nariman's Critique Stirs Debate on Constitutional Fidelity

New Delhi – Former Supreme Court Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman has ignited a significant debate within the Indian legal fraternity by asserting that any judge claiming to have sought or received "divine intervention" while delivering a judgment is in direct violation of their constitutional oath. His remarks, made during a public lecture, have brought the fundamental principles of judicial conduct, secularism, and the sanctity of the oath of office into sharp focus.

The controversy stems from Justice Nariman's response to an audience question at the 16th K.M. Bashir Memorial Lecture in Thiruvananthapuram. The question alluded to a statement made by former Chief Justice of India, D.Y. Chandrachud, who had previously remarked that he prayed for a solution while adjudicating the sensitive Ayodhya-Babri Masjid dispute.

Justice Nariman’s response was unequivocal. "Whether divine or bovine intervention, or any other kind of intervention, if a judge delivers a judgment, he is violating his oath to the Constitution," he stated. "You are only to live by the oath of the Constitution and the laws and when you live by the oath to the Constitution and the laws, you certainly bring your own morality. That's about as far as it goes."

This statement goes to the heart of a judge's commitment under the Third Schedule of the Constitution of India, which mandates an oath to "bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India" and to perform duties "without fear or favour, affection or ill-will." Justice Nariman's argument posits that reliance on any authority beyond the constitutional framework and established laws constitutes a breach of this solemn pledge.

Context: The Ayodhya Judgment and Judicial Faith

Justice Nariman's comments were widely interpreted as a direct critique of former CJI Chandrachud's 2023 disclosure about the 2019 Ayodhya verdict. Justice Chandrachud, part of the five-judge bench that delivered the unanimous judgment, had said, "I sat before the deity and told him he needed to find a solution. If you have faith and pray regularly, then God will find a way."

This admission had previously drawn criticism from legal luminaries like Senior Advocate Indira Jaising, who labelled it "anti-constitutional." Justice Nariman’s recent remarks have revitalized this discussion, compelling legal professionals to confront the delicate boundary between a judge’s personal faith and their public duty. The core legal question is whether personal spiritual practices, when cited as influential in the decision-making process, undermine the perceived objectivity and secular foundation of the judiciary.

While a judge’s personal morality is an inescapable part of their human and intellectual makeup, Justice Nariman's formulation suggests a clear line: morality informs perspective, but external "intervention"—divine or otherwise—as a basis for a decision is an impermissible departure from the judicial mandate.

The "Bovine" Controversy and Allegations of Bias

Justice Nariman’s choice of the phrase "divine or bovine intervention" has itself become a flashpoint. Some media outlets and commentators have characterized the term "bovine"—referring to an animal held sacred in Hinduism—as a deliberate and dismissive slight against the faith, framing his critique as evidence of "anti-Hindu bias" within the judiciary.

These critics point to other recent events, including a remark by current Chief Justice of India, B.R. Gavai, who reportedly told a petitioner seeking the restoration of a desecrated idol to "go and pray to God instead." For these observers, such incidents collectively signal a troubling pattern of judicial insensitivity or hostility towards Hindu religious sentiments.

However, from a legal and rhetorical standpoint, Justice Nariman's use of "bovine" can be interpreted as an emphatic, almost hyperbolic, extension of his core argument. By juxtaposing the sacred ("divine") with the earthly ("bovine"), he may have intended to stress that any extra-constitutional influence, regardless of its source or nature, is equally invalid in the eyes of the law. The purpose, in this view, was not to mock a specific faith but to create a powerful rhetorical device to underscore the exclusivity of the Constitution as the sole guide for a judge.

Broader Critique of the Ayodhya Verdict and the Places of Worship Act

Justice Nariman's critical examination of the judiciary extends beyond the issue of divine intervention. In separate remarks made in December 2024, he delivered a scathing critique of the Ayodhya verdict itself, particularly its handling of the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991. He termed the judgment a "mockery of justice" that violated the basic structure of secularism.

The 1991 Act freezes the religious character of all places of worship as they existed on August 15, 1947, with the Ayodhya site being the sole exception. The Supreme Court, in its 2019 Ayodhya judgment, had affirmed the constitutionality and secular credentials of this Act, stating that "in preserving the character of places of public worship, Parliament has mandated in no uncertain terms that history and its wrongs shall not be used as instruments to oppress the present and the future."

Justice Nariman expressed alarm at the proliferation of new lawsuits seeking to alter the status of other religious sites, which he described as "hydra heads popping up all over the country." He argued that the Supreme Court's own reasoning on the Places of Worship Act within the Ayodhya judgment should be used to summarily dismiss such suits. "This very Constitution Bench spends five pages on it and says that in secularism... you cannot look backwards, you have to look forward," he reminded his audience, advocating for a stringent application of the 1991 Act to prevent further communal disharmony.

Implications for the Judiciary and Legal Profession

Justice Nariman's multi-pronged critique raises fundamental questions for the Indian legal system:

• Defining the Limits of Judicial Discretion: His statements force a re-examination of the sources a judge can legitimately draw upon. While legal precedent, statutes, and constitutional principles are paramount, the role of inherent morality and, more contentiously, personal faith remains a grey area.
• Upholding Secularism in Practice: As a basic feature of the Constitution, secularism requires the state, including the judiciary, to maintain a principled distance from all religions. Comments linking judicial outcomes to divine guidance, even if made post-facto, can erode public confidence in this neutrality.
• The Sanctity of the Judicial Oath: The debate reinforces the oath not as a mere formality but as a binding code of conduct. It serves as a constant reminder that a judge's ultimate allegiance is to the Constitution, superseding all other personal or ideological commitments.
• The Role of Former Judges in Public Discourse: Justice Nariman's willingness to openly critique a landmark judgment and the statements of his former colleagues highlights the evolving role of retired judges as public intellectuals. While such critiques can foster accountability, they can also fuel political controversy and potentially undermine the institution's authority.

As the legal community grapples with these issues, the debate sparked by Justice Nariman serves as a crucial stress test for the principles that underpin India's constitutional democracy. It is a stark reminder that in a diverse and often fractious republic, the judiciary's legitimacy rests not on appeals to a higher power, but on its unwavering fidelity to the rule of law.