Karnataka High Court Rejects Bail in Two Major UAPA Cases Involving PFI and ISIS: Strict Adherence to Terror Law Standards Upheld

Introduction

In two significant rulings delivered on January 23, 2026, a division bench of the Karnataka High Court, comprising Justice H.P. Sandesh and Justice Venkatesh Naik T, dismissed bail applications filed by individuals accused of ties to banned organizations—the Popular Front of India (PFI) and the Islamic State (ISIS). The decisions underscore the stringent application of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA), particularly Sections 17 (punishment for raising funds for terrorist acts), 18 (punishment for conspiracy), and 45 (cognizance of offences requiring sanction).

In the first case, Shahid Khan v. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 1475 of 2025), the court rejected bail for Shahid Khan, a district president of PFI's Davanagere zone, accused of conspiring to radicalize Muslim youth and raise funds for terrorist activities. The second, Reeshaan Thajuddin Sheikh v. National Investigation Agency (Criminal Appeal No. 1548 of 2025), denied relief to Reeshaan Thajuddin Sheikh, an alleged ISIS recruit involved in reconnaissance, arson, and cryptocurrency-based terror funding. These outcomes, stemming from appeals against NIA trial court rejections, emphasize that procedural irregularities do not automatically entitle accused to bail in terror-related prosecutions, reinforcing the high threshold under Section 43D(5) UAPA for granting liberty during trial.

The bench's analysis highlights the balance between individual rights and national security, dismissing contentions on sanction lapses and investigation flaws while affirming prima facie evidence of involvement in proscribed activities. These verdicts, arising from cases registered in 2022, reflect ongoing scrutiny of radicalization networks in Karnataka, potentially influencing bail jurisprudence in similar UAPA matters nationwide.

Case Background

The two cases share thematic similarities, involving allegations of radicalization, conspiracy, and terror financing under UAPA, but differ in their organizational affiliations and specific acts. Both were investigated by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) and heard by special NIA courts before escalating to the High Court.

In Shahid Khan v. State of Karnataka , Shahid Khan, aged about 40 and residing in Shivamogga, was arrested on September 22, 2022, as Accused No. 14 in Crime No. 328 of 2022 by Kadugondanahalli Police Station. He and 18 other co-accused—office bearers, members, and cadres of the banned PFI—are charged under Sections 153A (promoting enmity between groups) and 120B (criminal conspiracy) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), alongside UAPA Sections 13 (unlawful activities), 17, 18 (conspiracy), 18A (organizing terrorist camps), 18B (recruitment for terrorist acts), and 22B (offences by societies or trusts).

The prosecution alleges that the accused, enraged by laws like the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 (CAA), National Register of Citizens (NRC), the Hijab row, and the Babri Masjid judgment, conspired to radicalize Muslim youth through indoctrination, form service teams, train them in arms handling, and execute violent acts such as murders and bomb blasts. PFI is portrayed as an unlawful association aiming to create religious disharmony, eliminate Hindu leaders, and wage war against the government. Khan, as Davanagere zone president since 2019, is accused of participating in meetings, events, training camps, and fundraising, with the group allegedly collecting over Rs. 9.1 crore between 2011 and 2022 across Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu. Entities like the Freedom Educational and Charitable Trust in Bantwala were used as fronts. The trial court rejected Khan's bail on May 2, 2025, citing prima facie proof under UAPA and the bar under Section 43D.

The second case, Reeshaan Thajuddin Sheikh v. NIA , centers on Sheikh, arrested on January 5, 2023, as Accused No. 4. He faces charges under IPC Sections 120B and 121A (waging war against India), UAPA Sections 16 (terrorist act), 17, 18, 20 (membership in terrorist organization), 38 (membership offence), 39 (support to terrorist organization), and 40 (raising funds), plus provisions of the Karnataka State Prevention of Destruction and Loss of Property Act. Sheikh, a college mate of co-accused No. 2, was allegedly radicalized and recruited to ISIS via videos and PDFs. He participated in reconnaissance of targets like electric substations, boatyards, gas stations, and oil tankers in Mangaluru, and arson attacks on an Innova car and a paint shop in Brahmavar.

Prosecution evidence includes a seized mobile phone with SIM and micro SD card containing FSL-analyzed images of reconnaissance sites and arson evidence. Sheikh's voluntary statement admitted receiving cryptocurrency from an online handler "Colonel" into his Zebpay account, converting it to cash for co-accused, and purchasing a Honda Activa for operations. The NIA trial court rejected bail, finding reasonable grounds to believe the accusations prima facie true, invoking the UAPA bail bar. Both cases trace back to 2022 FIRs amid heightened national security concerns over radicalization post-CAA protests and other events.

The legal questions common to both include: whether procedural lapses in investigations vitiate bail eligibility; the necessity and scope of sanction under Section 45 UAPA for specific offences; and the sufficiency of prima facie evidence to sustain the bail bar under Section 43D(5), given delays in trials with voluminous charge sheets (e.g., 707 witnesses in the PFI case).

Arguments Presented

In Shahid Khan , appellant's counsel, Sri Mohammed Tahir, argued that PFI was not declared unlawful or scheduled under UAPA at FIR registration, rendering Section 16 inapplicable. He contended Khan's alleged acts—training service teams and fundraising—fall under Sections 18, 18A, and 18B, punishable by up to five years, not justifying prolonged detention. No allegations of murder or life-imprisonment offences under Section 17 were leveled against Khan, and his seized cash (from real estate business) was illegally taken without Section 25 UAPA compliance, weakening Section 17 charges.

Absence of sanction for Section 18 was pivotal: without it, the trial court could not frame charges or proceed. Successive bail rejections were challenged due to changed circumstances, including over two years' custody and trial delays. Counsel urged bail as a rule, citing precedents like Mohammad Tapseer v. State of Karnataka (SLP CrL 12446/2025) for successive applications and Vernon v. State of Maharashtra ((2023) 15 SCC 56) for procedural safeguards. An interlocutory application sought the case diary under Section 482 CrPC to expose investigation vagueness and coerced witness statements.

The State, via Special Public Prosecutor Sri P. Prasanna Kumar, countered that material evidenced Khan's active PFI role in radicalization, recruitment, and fundraising, linked to trusts like Freedom Educational and Charitable Trust for camps indoctrinating youth toward Islamic rule by 2047. Sanction for Section 17 existed, and cognizance is offence-specific, not accused-tied. Procedural lapses were irregularities, not fatal, with prima facie links to terror funding. Successive applications lacked changed circumstances, and the case diary request was impermissible, as courts alone may reference it under Section 172(2) CrPC. Citing Girish Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh ((2018) 15 SCC 192), the SPP emphasized Section 43D(5)'s bar where accusations appear true.

In Reeshaan Thajuddin Sheikh , the appellant's arguments mirrored procedural and evidentiary challenges, contesting radicalization claims, cryptocurrency transfers, and reconnaissance involvement. Counsel highlighted the voluntary statement's reliability, absence of direct violence, and FSL evidence's ambiguity, seeking bail due to custody duration and trial delays.

The NIA, represented similarly, stressed Sheikh's close association with radicalizer co-accused No. 2, evidenced by device recoveries showing arson and target images. Funds from "Colonel" via crypto wallets were converted for operations, establishing prima facie UAPA violations. The trial court's detailed scrutiny (paragraphs 35 and 57) confirmed the conspiracy to wage war, barring bail. Both sides invoked UAPA's special provisions overriding general bail norms.

Legal Analysis

The Karnataka High Court's reasoning in both cases meticulously applies UAPA's rigors, distinguishing between trial-stage merits and bail thresholds. In Shahid Khan , the bench clarified Section 45's sanction requirement: "The term 'cognizance' refers that, it has to be taken in respect of offences and not against an individual. Thus, Section 45 of UAP Act mandates that sanction is pre-condition for the Court to take cognizance of an offence and not necessarily tied to a particular accused." Absent sanction for Section 18 did not halt proceedings if cognizance for other offences (like Section 17) was sanctioned, preventing fragmented prosecutions.

On seizure under Section 25 (Chapter V UAPA), the court deemed non-compliance an "irregularity" not undermining the core case: "Any procedural lapse in the seizure of cash may, at best, be treated as an irregularity and does not go to the root of the case of the prosecution. There are specific allegations and supporting material to show that the appellant has been involved in raising funds for the commission of terrorist activities. The ingredients of Sections 17 and 18 of UAP Act are complied or not is a matter of trial. Hence, at this juncture, the Court cannot conduct a mini-trial." This echoes Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali v. NIA (2019) 5 SCC 1, prioritizing prima facie evidence over procedural niggles in terror bail.

The rejection of summoning the case diary reinforced judicial exclusivity: under Section 172(2) CrPC, it aids courts, not accused, avoiding "forum hunting." Successive bails required "demonstrable change in circumstances," absent here despite new grounds (non-compliance, sanction absence, delay). Precedents like Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan ((2004) 7 SCC 528) supported this, balancing liberty with justice administration.

In Reeshaan Thajuddin Sheikh , the analysis focused on evidential sufficiency: FSL reports and device recoveries established reconnaissance and arson, with crypto transfers linking to ISIS handlers. The bench noted, "It is evident that accused No.2 played a pivotal role in radicalising and recruiting accused No.4... Both accused No.2 and accused No.4 are actively involved in conducting reconnaissance and arson activities... accused No.4 received funds through Crypto-currency from online handler affiliated with the terrorist outfit and these funds were subsequently utilized to carry out the terrorist activities." Citing Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam (2011) 3 SCC 377 (distinguished for context), the court upheld the trial court's finding of prima facie truth under Section 43D(5), refusing a "mini-trial."

Distinctions were drawn: UAPA's bail bar applies where reasonable belief exists in accusations, unlike general CrPC bail. Cryptocurrency's role in terror funding was novel, treating it akin to cash under Section 17, impacting evolving financial crime jurisprudence. No precedents directly on crypto-UAPA were cited, but the ruling aligns with NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali , emphasizing material's weight over technicalities. Delays were acknowledged but insufficient absent acquittal likelihood, per Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713, where UAPA trials' complexity justifies continued custody if evidence is robust.

These analyses integrate other sources' details, such as PFI's alleged post-CAA radicalization agenda and ISIS's Mangaluru operations, providing fuller context without speculation.

Key Observations

The judgments yield several pivotal excerpts illuminating the court's stance on UAPA's application:

• On sanction and cognizance: "Section 45 of UAP Act mandates that sanction is pre-condition for the Court to take cognizance of an offence and not necessarily tied to a particular accused. Thus, the absence of sanction in respect to particular accused specifically does not by itself preclude the framing of charges or continuation of the proceedings, if cognizance has been taken for the offences alleged." ( Shahid Khan v. State of Karnataka )

• Regarding procedural lapses: "In the present case, the Investigating Officer did not strictly comply with the procedure prescribed under Section 25 of UAP Act at the time of seizure. However, the failure to follow this procedural formality does not, by itself, constitute a sufficient ground for granting bail to the appellant, particularly, when there is material on record connecting him to the offence under Section 17 of UAP Act." ( Shahid Khan v. State of Karnataka )

• On case diary access: "The appellant is not entitled to call for the case-diary to examine it... it cannot be summoned at the instance of the appellant and it is only for the purpose of reference of the Court." ( Shahid Khan v. State of Karnataka )

• Evidentiary threshold in terror cases: "Thorough examination of material on record reveals that accused No.4 was a close associate of accused No.2 and 6. It is evident that accused No.2 played a pivotal role in radicalising and recruiting accused No.4 to further the agenda of the proscribed organisation, Islamic State." ( Reeshaan Thajuddin Sheikh v. NIA )

• Overall bail bar: "Facts when taken together provide reasonable grounds to believe that the accusations levelled against the appellant are prima facie true." ( Reeshaan Thajuddin Sheikh v. NIA )

These observations, drawn verbatim, highlight the judiciary's reluctance to dilute UAPA safeguards through bail, prioritizing substantive evidence.

Court's Decision

In both appeals, the Karnataka High Court unequivocally dismissed the petitions, affirming the trial courts' orders. In Shahid Khan , the bench held: "Considering the material available on record and the fact that the trial Court has dealt with all aspects of the material in its order and has rightly rejected the bail application of the appellant, the same does not require interference at the hands of this Court. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed." Interlocutory Application No. 2 of 2025 for case diary was also rejected.

Similarly, in Reeshaan Thajuddin Sheikh , the court ruled it "not a fit case for setting aside the trial court order since it had discussed the material collected against the appellant in detail which substantiated the prima facie case against him. The appeal [is] dismissed."

These decisions maintain the accused in custody, barring bail under Section 43D(5) UAPA pending trial. Practically, they signal to NIA courts the robustness of rejecting bail where terror allegations are supported by digital, financial, and confessional evidence, even amid procedural hiccups. For legal practitioners, the rulings clarify that sanction lapses for individual sections do not derail prosecutions if offence-level cognizance is secured, and crypto-based funding qualifies as "raising funds" under Section 17.

Broader implications include heightened deterrence for radicalization networks, as seen in PFI's alleged statewide operations and ISIS's local recruitment via peers. Future cases may cite these for denying bail in delayed UAPA trials, unless exceptional circumstances like health or minimal involvement arise, per Najeeb . However, they also invite scrutiny on trial expedition, given voluminous evidence, potentially pressuring legislative reforms for faster resolutions. For the justice system, these verdicts fortify UAPA's constitutionality against liberty challenges, balancing Article 21 rights with security imperatives in India's counter-terror framework.