Karnataka High Court Quashes FIR Against Former University VC in Defamation Case Involving SC/ST Provisions

Introduction

In a significant ruling emphasizing procedural safeguards in criminal complaints involving defamation, the Karnataka High Court has quashed the First Information Report (FIR) registered against Professor Niranjana, the former Vice-Chancellor of Bengaluru North University. The decision, delivered by Justice M. Nagaprasanna on January 23, 2026, in Criminal Petition No. 7806 of 2025, highlights critical limitations on police investigations into defamation allegations, even when combined with cognizable offenses under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The court criticized the trial court's order directing a police probe without hearing the accused and remanded the matter for fresh consideration of the private complaint filed by a former part-time lecturer, Manjunatha R. This judgment reinforces the bar on police involvement in defamation matters, drawing from established precedents, and underscores the mandatory requirement for judicial scrutiny before cognizance under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023. The ruling has implications for handling mixed private complaints, ensuring that defamation disputes—primarily civil in nature—do not trigger unwarranted criminal machinery.

Case Background

The dispute traces back to internal disciplinary actions at Bengaluru North University, where Professor Niranjana served as Vice-Chancellor. Respondent No. 2, Manjunatha R., was employed as a part-time lecturer. Following certain allegations of misconduct against him, reportedly lodged by a co-employee, the university's Syndicate, under Professor Niranjana's leadership, resolved to terminate his services. This termination order sparked legal contention when Manjunatha R. challenged it before a coordinate bench of the Karnataka High Court. On July 8, 2025, that bench set aside the termination, remanding the matter to the university for a proper inquiry and affording Manjunatha R. an opportunity to respond in accordance with law.

Amid this ongoing writ petition, Manjunatha R. escalated the conflict by filing a private complaint on May 28, 2025 (registered as PCR No. 2/2025 on June 4, 2025, before the II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Kolar). The complaint accused Professor Niranjana of offenses under Sections 3(1)(q) and (u) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act—pertaining to insults and intimidation against members of Scheduled Castes/Tribes—and Section 356(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, which corresponds to defamation under the erstwhile Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The complainant alleged that the termination order contained defamatory statements humiliating him on caste lines.

On June 4, 2025, the sessions court took cognizance and directed the Gulpet Police Station in Kolar to investigate, leading to the registration of FIR No. 71/2025 on June 6, 2025. Professor Niranjana, facing potential arrest and investigation, approached the Karnataka High Court under Section 528 of the BNSS (equivalent to Section 482 CrPC) seeking quashing of the FIR and the referral order. The petition argued that the allegations did not substantiate the invoked provisions and that procedural lapses invalidated the police involvement. The state was represented by Additional State Public Prosecutor B.N. Jagadeesha, while Manjunatha R. was represented by counsel D. Aswathappa. This timeline illustrates how employment disputes can intersect with criminal law, particularly when sensitive issues like caste-based discrimination are alleged, but the High Court's intervention focused on procedural propriety rather than the merits of the substantive claims.

Arguments Presented

The petitioner's counsel, Sri Sammith S., mounted a robust challenge on both factual and legal grounds. Factually, he contended that the termination was a legitimate administrative action based on verified complaints of misconduct against Manjunatha R., and no elements of the SC/ST Act offenses—such as intentional insult in public view or caste-based intimidation—were present in the university's resolution or related communications. He emphasized that the complaint appeared as a retaliatory "counter blast" to the termination proceedings, lacking prima facie evidence to invoke the stringent SC/ST Act provisions, which are designed to protect marginalized communities from atrocities rather than routine employment disputes.

Legally, the petitioner highlighted two "snags": first, the impropriety of referring a defamation-inclusive complaint for police investigation, arguing that Section 356(2) BNS (defamation) is a non-cognizable offense requiring private prosecution under Section 222 BNSS (old Section 199 CrPC), not police probe. Even with cognizable SC/ST offenses mixed in, the bar on defamation investigations should prevail to prevent misuse of criminal machinery for personal vendettas. Second, the sessions court violated Section 223(1) BNSS by taking cognizance without affording the accused (Professor Niranjana) an opportunity to be heard, a mandatory procedural safeguard. Counsel cited Supreme Court precedents to argue that such lapses render the proceedings a nullity, urging complete quashing to avoid harassment of a public servant acting in an official capacity.

In response, counsel for Manjunatha R., Sri D. Aswathappa, defended the complaint's validity, asserting that the termination order itself embodied defamatory content, referencing the co-employee's complaint as evidence of misconduct allegations that humiliated the complainant on caste grounds. He argued that the SC/ST Act provisions were squarely applicable, as the university's actions allegedly perpetuated caste-based discrimination in a public institution. On procedure, he maintained that the sessions court's referral was justified under its powers to order investigation into cognizable offenses, downplaying the defamation aspect as ancillary. The state, through the Additional SPP, supported the investigation's initiation but deferred to the court's discretion on quashing, noting no overt misuse in the FIR registration. These arguments framed the case as a clash between administrative accountability and protections against caste atrocities, with procedural compliance emerging as the decisive battleground.

Legal Analysis

Justice M. Nagaprasanna's reasoning centered on two pivotal procedural infirmities, drawing from constitutional imperatives of fair hearing (audi alteram partem) and statutory bars on police overreach in private disputes. The court's analysis meticulously dissected the interplay between the BNSS provisions and defamation's unique status under criminal law.

Primarily, the judgment invoked the settled principle that defamation under Section 356(2) BNS—mirroring Section 500 IPC—is not amenable to police investigation. Citing Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India (2016) 7 SCC 221, the court reiterated that Section 222 BNSS (old Section 199 CrPC) mandates cognizance only upon a private complaint by the aggrieved party, prohibiting FIRs or Section 223 referrals for probe. Even when amalgamated with cognizable offenses like those under the SC/ST Act, the defamation component triggers the bar, as police involvement would undermine the private nature of the lis. The court distinguished this from pure cognizable cases, emphasizing that defamation's "amalgam of all other offences" character demands judicial, not investigatory, handling to prevent vendettas.

A prior Karnataka High Court ruling in Prashanth Sambargi v. State of Karnataka (Criminal Petition No. 349 of 2021) was referenced for reinforcement, where similar directions for police probe in a defamation-cum-Information Technology Act case were nullified. The Kerala High Court's decision in Suresh v. Sub-Inspector of Police (2019 (4) KLT 106) was also cited, clarifying that Section 222's embargo extends to mixed complaints, allowing police action only on non-defamation elements post-segregation. Justice Nagaprasanna clarified the distinction: while SC/ST offenses warrant investigation, bundling them with defamation invalidates the entire referral, preserving the complaint for judicial cognizance.

The second prong addressed the hearing opportunity under Section 223(1) BNSS proviso, which mandates examining the complainant under oath and hearing the accused before cognizance. Drawing from Kushal Kumar Agarwal v. Directorate of Enforcement (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1221), the court held this as an absolute embargo, absent in the old CrPC's Section 200, to curb frivolous prosecutions. The recent Karnataka precedent in Basanagouda R. Patil v. Shivananda S. Patil (2024 SCC OnLine Kar 96) outlined the "procedural drill": post-sworn statement, notice to the accused with complaint annexures for response, followed by cognizance. The sessions court's omission here was deemed a "go-by" to mandatory law, rendering proceedings void ab initio.

The analysis distinguished quashing under inherent powers (Section 528 BNSS) from merits review, focusing on abuse of process. It balanced SC/ST Act's protective intent—invoked here questionably, per the court—against procedural due process, cautioning against caste claims as shields for personal disputes. No direct evaluation of allegations occurred, but the remand ensures fresh scrutiny, potentially segregating offenses. This nuanced approach aligns with Supreme Court directives in Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate (1998) 5 SCC 749, stressing judicious process issuance to avoid oppression.

Key Observations

The judgment is replete with incisive observations underscoring procedural rigor. Key excerpts include:

• On the defamation probe bar: "If the issue is of defamation, the concerned Court could not have directed investigation to be conducted by the police as it is by now a settled principle of law that if defamation is an amalgam of all other offences, there cannot be an investigation by the police in the case of a defamation, which is between two individuals or entities...the concerned Court should have taken cognizance of the offences on the basis of the complaint, on the score that when cognizable offences are alleged along with the offence of defamation, the bar under Section 222 of the BNSS...would kick in."

• Regarding the hearing mandate: "In the light of the procedure prescribed under Subsection (1) of Section 223 of the BNSS, the concerned Court ought to have heard the accused prior to taking cognizance of the offences. The said procedure which is mandatory in terms of law and plethora of judgments rendered by the Apex Court and this Court is given a go-by."

• On consequences: "The aforesaid legal snags would undoubtedly lead to obliteration of the reference and the crime so registered by the learned Magistrate. What remains is the complaint."

• From Subramanian Swamy : "In case of criminal defamation neither can any FIR be filed nor can any direction be issued under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The offence has its own gravity and hence, the responsibility of the Magistrate is more."

• From Basanagouda R. Patil : "The proviso mandates that no cognizance of an offence shall be taken by the Magistrate without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard...notice shall be issued to the accused at that stage and after hearing the accused, take cognizance."

These observations crystallize the court's commitment to preventing procedural misuse, particularly in sensitive contexts blending private grievances with public welfare statutes.

Court's Decision

The Karnataka High Court partly allowed the petition, quashing the sessions court's order dated June 4, 2025, referring the complaint for investigation and the resultant FIR in Crime No. 71/2025. The operative order states: "The criminal petition is allowed in part. The order of reference dated 04.06.2025 and registration of the crime in Crime No.71/2025 stand quashed. The matter is remitted back to the hands of the concerned Court, to consider the complaint of respondent No.2, bearing in mind the observations made in the course of the order."

This decision halts immediate police action, shielding Professor Niranjana from investigatory harassment while preserving Manjunatha R.'s right to pursue the private complaint. Practically, it mandates the trial court to: (1) examine the complainant under oath per Section 223 BNSS; (2) issue notice to the accused with documents for a hearing; (3) take cognizance only post-hearing, potentially segregating SC/ST claims for probe if substantiated, while handling defamation judicially.

The implications are far-reaching for legal practice. It reinforces that defamation's private character trumps police involvement, even in hybrid complaints, curbing misuse of SC/ST Act in employment spats—a growing concern in Indian academia and public service. Future cases involving mixed offenses will demand vigilant segregation, promoting efficiency and fairness. For magistrates, it imposes stricter adherence to BNSS provisos, reducing quashing petitions and expediting justice. In educational institutions, it cautions against hasty terminations triggering criminal backlash, advocating robust inquiries. Broader societal effects include safeguarding free speech in administrative decisions while upholding atrocity protections, potentially influencing similar disputes nationwide. This ruling, by prioritizing procedure over expediency, bolsters the criminal justice system's integrity against personal vendettas.