Karnataka High Court Strikes Down Rule Permitting Direct Complaints to Human Rights Courts, Cites Legislative Overreach

Bengaluru, India – In a significant ruling that redefines the procedural pathway for addressing human rights violations in Karnataka, the High Court has declared Rule 6 of the Karnataka State Human Rights Courts Rules, 2006, as unconstitutional and inconsistent with its parent legislation, the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 (PHRA). The judgment, delivered by Justice S Rachaiah, effectively closes the door on victims directly filing private complaints with designated Human Rights Courts, mandating that such grievances must first be channeled through the State Human Rights Commission.

The court held that the state rule impermissibly expanded the scope of the central act, creating a parallel mechanism that bypassed the statutory scheme envisioned by Parliament. This decision, while quashing the specific proceedings against police officials that gave rise to the petition, has been given prospective effect, ensuring that past judgments and concluded cases remain unaffected.

The case, Vijay Mahantesh Mathapati & Others v. State of Karnataka & ANR , clarifies the jurisdictional hierarchy and reinforces the principle that state-level subordinate legislation cannot contradict or override a central statute.

The Impugned Rule and the Factual Matrix

At the heart of the legal challenge was Rule 6 of the Karnataka State Human Rights Courts Rules, 2006. This rule empowered a victim of a human rights violation, their legal representative, or an NGO to directly file a private complaint against a public servant before a designated Human Rights Court (a Court of Sessions). Upon receiving such a complaint, the court could either order an investigation or conduct its own inquiry as per the procedure for private complaints under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).

The matter reached the High Court after nine police officials were named in a private complaint filed on January 19, 2024, before the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Vijayapura, which is also the designated Human Rights Court. The complainant, who had been arrested in May 2023 on charges including rioting and murder, alleged that the police officials had violated his human rights. The Sessions Court, acting under Rule 6, directed the Superintendent of Police, Vijayapura, to investigate the matter and submit a report.

The police officials (petitioners) challenged this order, seeking to quash the entire proceedings. Their core contention was twofold: first, they challenged the validity of the proceedings themselves, and second, they mounted a constitutional challenge against Rule 6.

Arguments Before the Court: A Clash of Central and State Powers

The petitioners argued that the PHRA, a central legislation, establishes a clear and comprehensive framework. It creates Human Rights Commissions at both the central and state levels to serve as the primary bodies for inquiry into human rights violations. They contended that the legislative intent was for these Commissions to act as the first port of call. A complaint, once investigated by the Commission, could then be forwarded to the appropriate court for adjudication if a prima facie case was established.

Crucially, the petitioners pointed to Section 41 of the PHRA, which delineates the State Government's rule-making power. They argued that this power is limited to administrative and ancillary matters such as salaries, allowances, and accounting procedures. It does not, they asserted, grant the state the authority to create substantive procedural rules that are inconsistent with the main Act, especially a rule that bypasses the Commission entirely.

In opposition, the counsel for the complainant (respondent) argued that the state rules were enacted to further the objective of the PHRA—the protection of human rights. It was submitted that since the Act itself aims to provide robust mechanisms for redressal, a rule enabling direct access to a specialised court could not be deemed ultra vires or contrary to the central enactment.

The High Court's Findings: Upholding the Legislative Scheme

Justice S Rachaiah undertook a detailed analysis of the PHRA's procedural scheme, referencing key provisions related to the Commission's powers of inquiry (Section 13), investigation (Section 14), and the steps to be taken following an inquiry (Sections 17 and 18).

The court noted that these provisions collectively establish a specific procedural pipeline. The Commission conducts a preliminary inquiry and, if it finds evidence of a human rights violation, it is empowered under Section 18(a)(ii) to recommend that the government or relevant authority "initiate proceedings for prosecution or such other suitable action."

Based on this, the court made a pivotal observation:

“The striking down of Rule 6 of the Karnataka State Human Rights Courts Rules, 2006 is justified in law and principle for the reason that, the Rule impermissibly expands the scope of Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 by enabling the private party or victim to file a complaint directly by invoking the jurisdiction of the Court established under Section 30 of the Act, by bypassing the provisions of the Act. This would lead to not only disrupting the legislative intent and scheme, but also invading the Central Act.”

Distinction from Other Special Statutes The court further distinguished the PHRA from other special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. It emphasized that those acts create stand-alone offences that can be tried directly by designated courts. The PHRA, in contrast, does not create new offences but rather provides a mechanism for addressing violations of rights that are often linked to offences already defined in the Indian Penal Code or other laws. The PHRA's focus is on inquiry and recommendation through the Commission, not direct prosecution initiated by a victim in a special court.

The Doctrine of Eclipse and Ultra Vires The judgment invoked the "doctrine of eclipse," reasoning that any state rule made contrary to the provisions of the main central act is vitiated to the extent of its inconsistency. The court concluded that Rule 6 was not only inconsistent with the PHRA but also ultra vires the rule-making power conferred on the state under Section 41. The state had exceeded its legislative authority by creating a procedural shortcut that the central Parliament had not intended.

The court also highlighted a potential conflict with the principle against double jeopardy. It reasoned that since the Commission is empowered to recommend prosecution after its inquiry, allowing a parallel direct complaint to a court on the same facts could lead to a situation akin to double jeopardy.

Conclusion and Prospective Application

In conclusion, the High Court held that Rule 6 of the Karnataka State Human Rights Courts Rules, 2006, is unconstitutional and invalid. Consequently, the proceedings initiated against the petitioner police officials, including the FIR registered pursuant to the trial court's order, were quashed.

Significantly, the court directed that its judgment would operate prospectively. This decision safeguards the finality of cases already adjudicated under the now-defunct rule, preventing a floodgate of litigation seeking to reopen past matters. From this point forward, however, any individual in Karnataka seeking redress for a human rights violation by a public servant must approach the State Human Rights Commission as the mandatory first step.