Karnataka High Court Dismisses Prajwal Revanna’s Plea to Transfer Trials, Citing No Evidence of Judicial Bias

Bengaluru, India – The Karnataka High Court on Wednesday delivered a significant judgment reinforcing the high threshold for transferring criminal trials on grounds of judicial bias, as it dismissed two petitions filed by former Hassan MP Prajwal Revanna. Revanna, who was recently convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment in a rape case, had sought the transfer of two other ongoing trials for sexual harassment and rape from the Special Court for MPs/MLAs in Bengaluru, alleging a "reasonable apprehension of bias" from the presiding officer.

Justice MI Arun, presiding over the single-judge bench, held that harsh judicial observations and a court's insistence on a speedy, day-to-day trial do not constitute sufficient grounds for bias to warrant a transfer under Section 407 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). The ruling provides a crucial analysis for legal practitioners on the distinction between adverse judicial conduct and actual, demonstrable bias.

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Background of the Transfer Petitions

Prajwal Revanna, grandson of former Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda, is facing multiple criminal cases involving serious allegations of sexual assault. Following his conviction in one case by the Special MP/MLA court, he filed two writ petitions (WP 29258/2025 and WP 29290/2025) seeking the transfer of two other pending trials to any other competent court of sessions.

The petitions alleged that the presiding officer of the special court was biased against him, citing harsh language used in a previous judgment, the court's disapproval of adjournment requests, and an alleged failure to properly appreciate evidence. The plea was initially filed under Section 408 of the CrPC before the principal city civil & sessions judge in Bengaluru, who rejected it on the grounds of maintainability, noting that the special court was specifically designated to try offences against elected representatives and its cases could not be transferred.

Revanna’s counsel then escalated the matter to the High Court, arguing that the principal judge had failed to apply his mind to the merits of the bias allegations.

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Arguments Before the High Court

Counsel for the Petitioner: The Standard of "Reasonable Apprehension"

Revanna’s legal team built their case around the principle of "reasonable apprehension of bias." They argued that justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be done. The core submissions included:

• Harsh Judicial Language: The counsel contended that the trial court had castigated both Revanna and his legal counsel on record in a previous judgment, which they claimed demonstrated a prejudiced mindset.
• Improper Appreciation of Evidence: It was argued that the trial court had relied on evidence from other, separate cases while adjudicating, thereby tainting the fairness of the proceedings. The counsel claimed that when an objection was raised about the trial not being fair, it was not recorded in the court's order.
• Refusal to Acknowledge Fair Trial Concerns: "I am not going behind the back of the judge," the counsel submitted. "In such circumstances, I am seeking transfer." They stressed that an accused's subjective but reasonable fear of not receiving a fair trial is a valid ground for transfer.
• Jurisdiction of Special Courts: A novel argument was presented that the jurisdiction of the MP/MLA court is "person specific, not subject specific." This was meant to counter the argument that the special court's designation made its cases non-transferable. The counsel posited that in exceptional circumstances, such as a presiding officer being related to the accused, a transfer would be necessary, implying that severe bias should be treated similarly.

Submissions for the State: Delay Tactics and Post-Conviction Anxiety

The State prosecutor vehemently opposed the petitions, arguing they were a strategic move to delay the course of justice. The State's key arguments were:

• No Evidence of Bias: The prosecution maintained that a thorough review of the case documents and court orders revealed no demonstrable bias by the presiding officer.
• Consequence of Conviction: The State suggested that Revanna was "unnecessarily unnerved" following his life sentence in the first case and that the transfer petitions were a reaction to an unfavorable verdict rather than evidence of an unfair process.
• Delay Tactics: The court was reminded that the High Court itself had previously "come down heavily on the conduct of the counsel for delaying the trial." The State argued that the petitioner's attempts to prolong the case were rightfully "frowned upon" by the trial court, which does not amount to bias.

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The High Court's Reasoning and Judgment

Justice MI Arun meticulously dismantled the petitioner's arguments, establishing a clear line between judicial strictness and bias. The court's reasoning offers significant takeaways for the legal community.

On Harsh Language and Speedy Trials:

Justice Arun observed that the trial court's intention was to conduct the trial on a day-to-day basis, a mandate often encouraged by higher courts to ensure swift justice, particularly in cases involving public figures. In this context, the judge noted:

"It is seen that the trial court intended to take the trial on a day-to-day basis. In the process any adjournments sought by the petitioner was frowned upon. The observations in the judgement may sound a bit harsh, but the same cannot be construed as bias on part of the presiding officer."

The court acknowledged that Revanna had "tried to drag the case and resort to delay tactics," which justified the trial court's firm stance.

Setting a High Bar for Transfer Petitions:

The High Court cautioned against allowing such petitions to succeed easily, as it could open the floodgates for accused individuals to stall proceedings whenever they face an adverse order or a strict judge. Justice Arun stated:

"If that can be a ground for transfer, there would be such petitions in almost all criminal cases. This practise cannot be permitted."

The judgment clarified that allegations of "erroneous appreciation of evidence" are not grounds for a transfer petition. Instead, they are matters to be contested during an appeal against the final judgment. "The petitioner can always challenge the trial court judgement," the court affirmed.

Jurisdiction and the Power of the High Court:

While agreeing with the principal sessions judge that cases from the specially designated MP/MLA court are generally not transferable at the sessions level, Justice Arun clarified that the High Court retains the power to interfere under Section 407 CrPC if a compelling case for transfer is made out. However, in this instance, the petitioner failed to meet that high standard.

Legal Implications and Conclusion

The Karnataka High Court's decision serves as a robust affirmation of judicial independence and a bulwark against attempts to manipulate the legal process through accusations of bias. For legal professionals, the judgment underscores several key principles:

1. Bias Requires More Than Adverse Rulings: A judge’s strictness, refusal to grant adjournments, or use of strong language in a judgment does not, in itself, prove bias. There must be concrete evidence of a preconceived opinion or a partial mindset.
2. Appeals, Not Transfers, for Evidentiary Errors: Disagreements with a judge’s interpretation or appreciation of evidence must be addressed through the appellate process, not by seeking a transfer of the trial.
3. Special Courts' Sanctity: The verdict upholds the integrity of specially designated courts, reinforcing that transfers from such forums will only be granted in the most exceptional of circumstances.

By rejecting Prajwal Revanna’s plea, the High Court has sent a clear message that while the right to a fair trial is paramount, it cannot be used as a tool to engage in forum shopping or to subvert the swift administration of justice.