Karnataka High Court Navigates Jurisdictional Boundaries in High-Profile MLA Arrest and Bias Allegation Cases

BENGALURU – The Karnataka High Court has become the epicentre of two significant legal battles involving prominent political figures, each case testing the delicate boundaries of judicial power, procedural fairness, and the scope of investigative authority. In separate proceedings, Justice M.I. Arun is presiding over a petition challenging the arrest of a sitting Congress MLA under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) and another plea from a former MP seeking the transfer of his rape trials due to alleged judicial bias. These cases offer a compelling look into the court's interpretation of its inherent powers versus statutory limitations.

---

The Curious Case of Interim Release: MLA K.C. Veerendra's Detention

In a packed courtroom, the wife of Congress MLA K.C. Veerendra, R.D. Chaitra, has brought a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), not merely seeking bail, but challenging the very legality of her husband's arrest by the Enforcement Directorate (ED). The core of her plea argues that the arrest was arbitrary, illegal, and violated his fundamental rights under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution, particularly noting that no summons was issued prior to his detention in a sprawling illegal betting case.

The ED alleges that Veerendra is a key figure in a massive online betting racket that generated over ₹2,000 crore in proceeds of crime through a single gateway. The agency has detailed extensive operations, including searches across 31 premises in multiple states and the freezing of assets worth ₹55 crore. Additional Solicitor General (ASG) Arvind Kamath, representing the ED, vehemently defended the arrest, stating, "As a result of criminal activity huge amounts of proceeds of crime was generated... We have months of evidence." The ED maintains that Veerendra is in lawful custody pursuant to a valid remand order from a competent court, making the current petition to declare the detention illegal misguided.

The proceedings took an unusual turn when Senior Advocate Siddharth Dave, appearing for the petitioner, made an oral plea for Veerendra's temporary release for two to three days to observe the Dussehra festival. This request placed the court in a complex jurisdictional position.

ASG Kamath immediately objected, arguing that the High Court was not functioning as a bail court and that any plea for interim release must be directed to the appropriate trial court. He emphasized that the High Court had already concluded final arguments on the main petition challenging the arrest and had reserved its verdict for October 8.

It was at this juncture that Justice Arun intervened, carefully navigating the legal tightrope. Acknowledging the constraints of a Section 482 petition, the court proposed a conditional path forward, placing the onus squarely on the ED.

"We do appreciate that this is a 482 petition and this is not a bail court. But if you (ED) concede on that upon instructions not otherwise then we will consider passing an order for few days if it is permissible in law with the condition that he will re-surrender," Justice Arun orally observed.

This statement is a masterclass in judicial pragmatism. While affirming the procedural correctness of the ASG's objection, the court opened a narrow window for humanitarian consideration, contingent entirely on the prosecution's consent. The court stressed that while the investigation's integrity is paramount, "a person should be detained only when required prior to investigation." By asking the ASG to seek instructions from ED officials, the court transformed the issue from a contentious legal argument into a matter of prosecutorial discretion. The matter is scheduled for further hearing on this interim plea on September 26.

This case highlights the evolving jurisprudence around PMLA arrests and the strategic use of Section 482 CrPC. For legal practitioners, it serves as a critical reminder of the High Court's inherent power to mould relief, even in unconventional circumstances, while strictly adhering to the principle that such powers are not a substitute for statutory remedies like bail applications.

---

Upholding Judicial Integrity: Prajwal Revanna's Plea of Bias Rejected

In a separate but equally significant ruling on the same day, Justice M.I. Arun dismissed petitions filed by former Hassan MP Prajwal Revanna seeking the transfer of his ongoing rape and sexual harassment trials from the Special MP/MLA Court in Bengaluru. Revanna, who was previously convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment in another rape case by the same court, alleged a "reasonable apprehension of bias" from the presiding officer.

Revanna’s counsel argued that the trial judge’s harsh observations, refusal of adjournments, and alleged failure to appreciate evidence correctly demonstrated a prejudiced mindset. The plea contended that the principal city civil & sessions judge had wrongly rejected an earlier transfer petition on grounds of maintainability, arguing that the special MP/MLA court was a designated court from which cases could not be transferred.

Justice Arun, however, drew a firm line between judicial sternness and actual bias. The court noted that the trial judge's intent to conduct a day-to-day trial and frown upon delay tactics was not evidence of prejudice.

"Admittedly, the petitioner has tried to drag the case and resort to delay tactics, which has been frowned upon by the trial court. If that can be a ground for transfer, there would be such petitions in almost all criminal cases. This practise cannot be permitted," the court held.

The judgment reinforces a high threshold for proving judicial bias. The court clarified that an erroneous appreciation of evidence is a matter for appeal, not a ground for transferring the trial. While acknowledging that the High Court could interfere under Section 407 CrPC if a strong case was made, it found no such grounds here. The State's submission that Revanna was merely "unnerved" after his conviction in a related case appeared to resonate with the court's findings.

This decision has significant implications for cases tried in specially designated courts. It signals that allegations of bias must be substantiated with concrete evidence of a prejudiced mind, not merely by pointing to adverse rulings or a judge's strict case management style. For the legal community, it underscores the judiciary's reluctance to permit "forum shopping" or allow transfer petitions to become a tool for stalling criminal proceedings, thereby protecting the integrity and efficiency of the trial process.

Together, these two proceedings before the Karnataka High Court provide a rich and contemporary analysis of judicial discretion, the separation of powers between different court levels, and the fundamental principles underpinning criminal procedure in India.