The High Court of Karnataka has quashed criminal proceedings against a former Bharatiya Janata Party election candidate, ruling that the provisions of the Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988 , do not apply to individuals simply attending an event at a religious location. Justice Venkatesh Naik T, presiding over the Dharwad Bench , determined that Section 3 of the Act is intended to regulate managers or those in control of religious premises rather than the politicians or visitors who use them for campaigning. The order provides significant relief to the petitioner, Chikkarevanna, who had been facing a criminal case for his alleged participation in a commemoration ceremony at a mutt during the 2023 Assembly election period.

Electioneering and the Limits of Religious Premises

The legal dispute stemmed from an incident occurring on April 20, 2023 , during the general elections for the Karnataka Legislative Assembly. A Flying Squad , appointed by the District Election Officer to monitor the Ramdurg constituency, initiated a complaint against the candidate after he participated in a holy commemoration ceremony at the Shree Revayyajjana Mutt in Obalapur village. The program was held to mark the third death anniversary of Sri Shivayya Swami. According to the prosecution’s case, the candidate’s active participation in the stage program and the subsequent raising of slogans in his favor by supporters constituted a violation of the Model Code of Conduct .

Furthermore, the prosecution alleged that the petitioner had made promises to the villagers regarding the construction of a new building adjacent to the Durgamma Temple in Obalapur village, conditioned on the outcome of the elections. Based on these allegations, the Ramdurg police registered an FIR , which later culminated in a charge sheet filed before the Senior Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate First Class at Ramdurg . The charges included offences under Section 171E of the Indian Penal Code , relating to bribery, and various sections of the Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988 .

In the proceedings before the High Court, the defense counsel argued that the criminal action was fundamentally flawed as the statutory provisions cited were not applicable to the candidate. Specifically, it was contended that the candidate was neither the manager nor an official of the Mutt and therefore could not be held liable under the provisions designed to govern the management of religious institutions.

Justice Venkatesh Naik T, upon reviewing the statutory language, agreed with the defense. The court observed that the legislation places a specific burden on the institution itself to prevent misuse. The court remarked, “It implies that it is the person in control of such religious institutions who is prohibited from allowing such religious institutions to be used for the purposes as prohibited therein. The said provision does not make any reference to the person using the Religious Institutions or the premises for the prohibited purposes.”

Determining the Scope of Electoral Bribery Allegations

The second aspect of the case concerned the charge of bribery under Section 171E of the Indian Penal Code . The prosecution maintained that the candidate’s promises to the villagers regarding future construction projects amounted to an attempt to unduly influence the electorate. However, the High Court emphasized that the legal definition of bribery in an electoral context requires a more complex set of interactions than simply making broad promises of public welfare or development.

To clarify the threshold for such offences, the Court relied on the interpretation provided by a coordinate bench in a previous, similar case. That precedent established that for an act to qualify as bribery, there must be a definitive exchange—a giver who offers gratification and a receiver who accepts it in return for the exercise of an electoral right. General declarations of public policy or promises of public action do not fall under the strict ambit of criminal bribery under Section 171B of the Indian Penal Code .

The Court held that in the present case, the allegations regarding the construction of a building near the temple did not satisfy the essential ingredients required to sustain a criminal charge. Without evidence of actual gratification or a specific quid pro quo involving individual voters, the invocation of Section 171E was considered legally unsustainable. The bench noted that the prosecution’s case lacked the necessary factual foundation to link the candidate’s public address at the event to a criminal act of bribery.

Judicial Precedent and Procedural Oversight

The High Court also addressed the procedural irregularities in how the case was handled by the local authorities. Since the initial case included both non-cognizable and potentially cognizable offences , the failure to adhere to the requirements under Section 155 of the Code of Criminal Procedure further weakened the validity of the investigative process. Given the clear lack of applicability of the Religious Institutions Act and the insufficient grounds for the bribery charge, the court determined that continuing the criminal proceedings would be an abuse of the legal process .

By invalidating the charges, the Court effectively restored the rights of the petitioner to move forward without the shadow of this ongoing criminal litigation. The ruling underscores the judiciary’s role in ensuring that electoral disputes, particularly those involving public political speech and attendance at religious functions, are not converted into criminal investigations without sufficient legal justification or evidence of corruption.

The High Court of Karnataka has accordingly allowed the criminal petition and ordered the quashing of all proceedings in C.C. No. 784/ 2023 , pending against the petitioner before the Senior Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate First Class at Ramdurg . With the case dismissed, the petitioner is no longer required to face trial for these specific offences, bringing the matter to a definitive close. Any pending applications associated with the original criminal petition were also disposed of as a result of this final order.