Karnataka High Court in Focus: Mallya's Plea Deemed 'Not Maintainable' as Court Stays Government Order on Public Assembly

BENGALURU – In a day of significant judicial pronouncements, the Karnataka High Court on Tuesday delivered two crucial orders, scrutinizing both the procedural propriety of a high-profile litigant's plea and the constitutional validity of a sweeping executive directive. In one courtroom, a bench questioned the very maintainability of a writ petition filed by fugitive businessman Vijay Mallya. Simultaneously, in another, a judge stayed a recent government order that curtailed the fundamental right to peaceful assembly, branding it a prima facie violation of the Constitution.

These two distinct cases, heard on the same day, underscore the High Court's role as a gatekeeper of judicial process and a guardian of fundamental rights. While one order directed a litigant to the appropriate legal forum, the other firmly checked executive overreach, reinforcing the supremacy of constitutional guarantees.

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Mallya's Petition for Financial Details Meets Jurisdictional Hurdle

In a sharp oral observation, the Karnataka High Court signaled its intent to dismiss a writ petition filed by Vijay Mallya, who sought detailed statements of account from a consortium of banks regarding debts owed by his defunct Kingfisher Airlines. Mallya, an ex-director of United Breweries Holdings Limited (UBHL), claimed that while the initial debt was around ₹6,200 crore, the banks had recovered nearly ₹14,000 crore from him and his entities.

The petition (WP 3357/2025) sought a comprehensive statement of all amounts realized by the banks, details of the original asset owners, and a list of assets still available but unutilized. Crucially, it also prayed for an interim stay on all further recovery actions, including the sale of his assets, pursuant to an amended recovery certificate issued by the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) in 2017.

However, Justice Lalitha Kanneganti expressed strong reservations about the petition's maintainability under the court's writ jurisdiction. The bench's remarks cut straight to the core procedural issue: the choice of an improper forum.

“How is this maintainable before this court? Why should this court entertain all this? The company petitions are there if you are interested to implead yourself and get all these details... on the face of it the prayer is not maintainable,” Justice Kanneganti observed.

This line of questioning highlighted the established legal principle that specialized tribunals and courts—in this case, the Company Court overseeing liquidation proceedings—should be the first port of call for matters falling squarely within their domain.

Senior Advocate Vikram Huilgol, representing the banks, reinforced this argument, characterizing Mallya’s plea as something akin to a Right to Information (RTI) application cloaked in a writ petition. He informed the court that liquidation proceedings are already underway before the Company Court, which would be the appropriate venue for Mallya to seek such information.

The counsel for the official liquidator, Advocate Krutika Raghavan, further complicated Mallya's position. She revealed that her office had filed a similar application for details from the State Bank of India before the Company Court and, more significantly, had initiated a misfeasance petition against Mallya and other ex-directors for a staggering ₹17,000 crore. This raised questions about Mallya's very locus standi to file the present petition. "I believe he does not have any locus to maintain this petition itself," she argued.

Interestingly, it was submitted that Mallya required this information for ongoing insolvency proceedings against him in the United Kingdom. Counsel for the banks alleged that Mallya had recently withdrawn those proceedings pending the outcome of this very petition, suggesting a strategic use of the Indian judicial system to aid his foreign legal battles.

The court, however, remained focused on the threshold issue of maintainability, stating that the petitioner's motive was irrelevant. Refusing to entertain arguments on merits, Justice Kanneganti was unequivocal:

“You cannot file this petition before this court. Whatever you want, any details, you can go before the company court. Let your Senior counsel come. We will dismiss this in his presence.”

The matter has been adjourned to November 4, with the court’s preliminary observations leaving little doubt about the likely fate of the petition. The case serves as a stark reminder for legal practitioners about the critical importance of selecting the correct judicial forum and the judiciary's unwillingness to permit litigants, regardless of their profile, to bypass established legal pathways.

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Court Upholds Fundamental Rights, Stays Order Restricting Peaceful Assembly

In a resounding defense of civil liberties, the High Court granted an interim stay on a controversial government order issued by the Home Department on October 18, 2025. The order declared that any gathering of ten or more people for civic, social, or cultural activities in public spaces like roads, parks, and playgrounds would be treated as an "unlawful assembly" and could attract penalties under the new Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023.

Hearing a petition (WP 107929/2025) filed by Punashchetana Seva Samaste, Justice M. Nagaprasanna found that the executive order, on its face, infringed upon the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

Senior Advocate Ashok Haranhalli, arguing for the petitioners, launched a two-pronged attack on the order's legality. He contended that it directly violated the right to assemble peaceably under Article 19(1)(b) and that the executive branch had no authority to unilaterally criminalize such gatherings.

“Article 19 (1) (b) is squarely affected in this. In exercise of executive power, can the rights conferred Article 19 (1) (b) be taken away?” Haranhalli questioned. “Suppose I am doing a laughter club in a park, or a walking group, how does it become an unlawful assembly?”

He further argued that public spaces like parks and streets fall under the jurisdiction of local municipal authorities, not the state Home Department, thereby challenging the very source of the order.

The bench found compelling merit in these submissions. Justice Nagaprasanna's observations underscored a foundational tenet of constitutional law: fundamental rights cannot be curtailed by mere executive fiat.

“Prima facie the government order takes away the right which has been conferred upon citizens/citizens mentioned in Chapter III of the Constitution of India,” the bench remarked. “It is trite law that a right conferred under Chapter III of the Constitution of India can be taken away only by a law promulgated, not by a government order.”

The court's reasoning hinged on Article 13(2) of the Constitution, which prohibits the state from making any "law" that takes away or abridges fundamental rights. The court clarified that an executive order does not qualify as "law" for this purpose.

“If this government order is left to stay, it would in effect would violate Article 13 (2) of the Constitution of India, which clearly indicates that a fundamental right conferred under Chapter III can be abridged only by a law,” the court added.

Granting the interim stay, the court ordered that the government order and all consequential actions arising from it shall remain suspended until the next hearing on November 17. The state government has been granted time to file its statement of objections.

This interim order is a significant victory for civil rights, reasserting the judiciary's role in protecting citizens from potential executive overreach and ensuring that restrictions on fundamental freedoms are subject to legislative scrutiny and constitutional reasonableness.