Dispatch from Bengaluru: Karnataka High Court Grapples with Political Misuse of Law and Digital Free Speech

BENGALURU – The Karnataka High Court has become a pivotal arena for two distinct but significant legal confrontations, both touching upon the delicate balance between state power, individual rights, and procedural propriety. In one courtroom, the judiciary is scrutinizing the alleged misuse of criminal law for political ends, while in another, a high-stakes battle is unfolding over the future of online free speech and the liability of social media giants in India. These cases, involving a BJP legislator and global tech firm X Corp (formerly Twitter), highlight the court's crucial role in adjudicating complex issues at the intersection of law, politics, and technology.

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Political Rancour or Criminal Offence? High Court Stays FIR Against BJP MLC

In a move underscoring the judiciary's gatekeeping function against potential abuse of legal processes, the Karnataka High Court has granted an interim stay on an FIR and all subsequent investigations against BJP Member of the Legislative Council (MLC), N Ravikumar. The legislator was accused of making "vulgar comments" against Karnataka's Chief Secretary, Shalini Rajneesh.

The bench, while passing the interim order, indicated that a detailed order with reasons would be provided later. This follows an earlier hearing where the court had lamented the state of political discourse, orally opining that “Politicians are going to a new low.”

The petitioner's case, argued by Senior Advocate Aruna Shyam, hinged on the assertion that the proceedings were a politically motivated attempt to weaponize the criminal justice system. The core arguments presented to the court painted a picture of a calculated legal manoeuvre rather than a genuine grievance.

Key Arguments and Legal Posture

The counsel for Ravikumar systematically dismantled the basis of the FIR, focusing on two primary contentions: the complainant's lack of standing ( locus standi ) and the clear political motivation behind the complaint.

1. Third-Party Complainant: It was emphatically argued that the individual who filed the FIR was a "third party and not a victim or affected person." The complaint was reportedly lodged by a social worker who learned of the alleged incident by watching television news, raising immediate questions about their direct knowledge and legal standing to initiate criminal proceedings in this context.

2. Politically Motivated Action: The petitioner's counsel detailed a sequence of events suggesting a concerted effort to embroil the MLC in a criminal case after a political route failed. It was submitted that a political party had first attempted to file a complaint on July 2, a day after the alleged incident. However, the police did not register an FIR based on this initial complaint. It was only after this that the "social worker" was brought in to file the FIR that was ultimately registered. This sequence, counsel argued, proves that "when the FIR was not registered through the political party, they brought a social worker to file the FIR."

This, the petitioner contended, was a classic case of an "abuse of the process of law," where a political dispute that ought to be settled in the legislative council or at the ballot box was being improperly dragged into the criminal courts. The court was urged to recognize that "political battles should be either fought in the council or at the electorate."

Persuaded by these preliminary arguments, the court stayed the FIR and the investigation, effectively pausing the criminal proceedings against Ravikumar pending a more detailed examination of the petition.

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X Corp vs. Union of India: A Defining Battle Over 'Safe Harbour' and Online Censorship

In a parallel, high-profile proceeding, the same High Court is hearing arguments from X Corp in its challenge against the Central Government's content-blocking regime. The tech giant alleges that the government is systematically circumventing the stringent procedural safeguards for blocking online content laid out in Section 69A of the Information Technology (IT) Act, 2000, by misusing Section 79(3)(b) of the same Act.

X Corp's counsel, Senior Advocate K.G. Raghavan, argued that this practice poses a grave threat to the "safe harbour" protection granted to intermediaries, effectively dismantling a cornerstone of India's internet law framework as established by the Supreme Court in the landmark Shreya Singhal v. Union of India case.

The Core of the Legal Challenge: Section 69A vs. Section 79

The dispute revolves around two key provisions of the IT Act:

• Section 69A: This is the specific provision granting the government the power to issue directions to block public access to any information online. It can only be invoked on specific grounds (e.g., sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, security of the State, public order). Crucially, its exercise is governed by the detailed, multi-step procedure laid down in the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009 (the "Blocking Rules"). These rules, upheld in Shreya Singhal , provide for a review committee and other checks and balances.

• Section 79: This section provides a "safe harbour" to intermediaries, shielding them from liability for third-party content on their platforms. However, Section 79(3)(b) states that this protection is lost if the intermediary, upon receiving "actual knowledge" from the government or its agencies that any information is being used to commit an unlawful act, fails to "expeditiously remove or disable access to that material."

X Corp's argument is that the government is using Section 79(3)(b) and the associated IT Rules (specifically Rule 3(1)(d)) as a direct source of power to issue takedown notices for the very same grounds covered by Section 69A, such as "public order" and "sovereignty." This, they contend, is an illegal shortcut that bypasses the procedural rigour of the Section 69A regime.

"The respondents use S.79(3)(b) and Rule 3(1)(d) as an empowering provision to circumvent S.69A," counsel argued.

The 'Accuser and Judge' Dilemma

A central pillar of X Corp's argument is that the government's interpretation allows any authorised officer to become the "accuser and judge" of what constitutes an "unlawful act." Counsel posed a stark hypothetical: "In this country, we have 890 Central statutes, so can the authority under any one of them say you have done an unlawful act and lost safe harbour? This is an absurd and shocking situation."

This practice, it was argued, creates an untenable situation where an executive officer's subjective satisfaction is sufficient to strip an intermediary of its statutory safe harbour protection. "This will be disastrous if the officer is allowed to be the accuser and judge, I lose safe harbour," Raghavan submitted, warning that this approach would have a chilling effect on free speech and violate fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution.

The petitioner emphasized that the Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal upheld Section 69A precisely because its procedural safeguards prevent the intermediary from having to apply its own mind to the legality of content. The government's current approach, they argue, directly contradicts this principle.

The case continues to be heard, with the next date set for July 29. Its outcome will have profound implications for how digital platforms operate in India and the extent to which online speech can be regulated by executive fiat.