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Karnataka HC Refuses Notice on DIGIPUB SAHYOG Plea
In a procedural setback for digital rights advocates, a division bench of the on declined to issue notice on a writ appeal filed by and journalist Abhinandan Sekhri. The plea challenges a single judge's order upholding the Central government's authority to issue content blocking directives through the SAHYOG Portal under . Instead, Chief Justice Vibhu Bakhru and Justice C. Poonacha opted to list the matter alongside a similar appeal by (formerly Twitter), which is scheduled for hearing on . This development keeps the spotlight on a pivotal debate: whether government officers can independently order intermediaries to remove "unlawful" content via Section 79, risking their '' immunity, or if such actions are confined to the more safeguarded framework of Section 69A.
The single judge's ruling, a comprehensive 351-page judgment by Justice M. Nagaprasanna, has emerged as a flashpoint in India's evolving digital regulation landscape. By affirming the constitutional validity of , it expands the toolkit available to authorities for content moderation without the procedural hurdles of Section 69A. For legal professionals tracking intermediary liability, this case underscores the tension between platform protections and state enforcement powers.
The Underlying Single Judge Ruling
The controversy traces back to Justice Nagaprasanna's detailed decision, which rejected the argument that information blocking orders are exclusively governed by . Section 69A empowers the government to direct intermediaries to block public access to information threatening national security, sovereignty, integrity, foreign relations, public order, or incitement to cognizable offenses. Crucially, it incorporates statutory safeguards, including pre-decisional hearings and review mechanisms by a committee.
In contrast, the single judge interpreted Section 79(3)(b)—a provision within the '' exemption for intermediaries—as a standalone empowering tool. Post the IT Act amendments, Section 79 grants network service providers immunity from liability for third-party content, provided they exercise . Subsection (3)(b) strips this protection if intermediaries fail to observe court or "appropriate government agency" directives to remove objectionable material upon gaining "."
Reading this alongside Rule 3(1)(d) of the IT Rules —which mandates intermediaries to remove content flagged as unlawful within 36 hours—the court concluded that Central government officers can issue takedown notices via platforms like SAHYOG (a government portal for grievance redressal and content flagging). Non-compliance invites loss of , exposing platforms to potential liability under other laws.
The judgment dismissed constitutional challenges, holding that such mechanisms align with restrictions on free speech and do not violate principles of or . This stance directly counters appeals from and DIGIPUB, who intervened below arguing that equating Section 79 notices with binding 'blocking orders' circumvents Section 69A's safeguards.
Division Bench Hearing: No Notice for Now
During the hearing, DIGIPUB's counsel sought urgent consideration, citing a 17-day delay in filing and prior rejection of their intervention application by the single judge. The bench, however, was unmoved. As reported, Chief Justice Bakhru orally remarked,
"Your intervention application was rejected by the single judge bench."
The counsel countered:
"I was heard on merits and then rejected. I have made an application for leave.. Also the delay of 17 days may be condoned."
Undeterred, the bench stated,
"We are not issuing notice in the matter now. Notice was issued in a similar matter. We are simply listing it along with it."
When pressed for a merits hearing, the court clarified it could not proceed immediately, aligning the plea (WA 1804/2025: ) with 's earlier appeal. Earlier this month, notice had been issued on 's challenge, setting the stage for a consolidated adjudication on . This procedural bundling signals judicial efficiency but delays relief for appellants wary of expanded government oversight.
Clash Over Sections 79 and 69A
At heart, the appeals pivot on statutory interpretation. Appellants like and DIGIPUB assert that
"only the designated officer under
can issue information blocking orders to intermediaries."
They argue Section 79 is defensive—a shield lost upon inaction—not proactive authority for blocking. Bypassing Section 69A, they claim, erodes due process, echoing the 's
mandate for procedural fairness in takedowns.
The respondents, backed by the single judge, counter that Section 79(3)(b)
"envisions that the said shield will be lost if the intermediaries fail to take down objectionable content even after receiving
from the appropriate government authority."
Rule 3(1)(d) operationalizes this via SAHYOG, distinguishing it from Section 69A's broader national security blocks. The judgment posits Section 79 as complementary, targeting "unlawful content" beyond emergencies, without needing Section 69A's high threshold.
This dichotomy raises nuanced questions: Does "" via government notice suffice for takedown obligations? Can SAHYOG orders trigger forfeiture without judicial oversight?
Implications for Intermediary Liability
For legal practitioners, the single judge's expansive reading of Section 79(3)(b) recalibrates risk assessments. Intermediaries must now vigilantly monitor SAHYOG directives, implementing 36-hour takedown protocols under IT Rules. Failure risks not just immunity loss but suits under IPC provisions or consumer laws.
Constitutionally, challenges invoke (free speech) and (equality). Critics argue ad hoc officer directives lack the Section 69A committee's neutrality, potentially enabling overreach. The 351-page ruling addresses this by analogizing to global standards like the EU's Digital Services Act, where platforms bear proactive moderation duties.
Yet, precedents like (affirming intermediary duties) support the view, while (pending SC on traceability) hints at pushback. If upheld, this could standardize SAHYOG as a takedown conduit, pressuring platforms amid India's 900M+ internet users.
Wider Ramifications for Digital Regulation
The fallout extends to practice areas. Tech lawyers advising platforms (e.g., Meta, Google) face heightened compliance audits, drafting SAHYOG response SOPs. Media entities like DIGIPUB risk self-censorship, chilling investigative journalism.
Policy-wise, it bolsters MeitY's enforcement post-IT Rules amendments, amid elections and misinformation drives. Globally, it aligns India with '' regimes but diverges from U.S. DMCA's counter-notice rights.
For the justice system, consolidated hearings may yield clarity, potentially escalating to . Intermediaries' non-compliance already looms:
"If the intermediaries fail to comply, they risk losing the '
' protection granted to them by virtue of Section 79 of the IT Act."
Looking Ahead
As approaches, the division bench's scrutiny could refine or reinforce the single judge's framework. For now, intermediaries navigate uncertainty—bolstering defenses while challenging overreach. This saga exemplifies India's tightrope between digital openness and regulatory zeal, demanding vigilant legal stewardship.
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