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Complainant in Section 138 NI Act Case Qualifies as Victim, Has Statutory Right to Appeal Acquittal, Not Revision:
Introduction
In a significant ruling for cheque dishonour cases, the has held that a complainant under qualifies as a "victim" under the , granting them a statutory right to directly appeal an acquittal without needing special leave. Justice K. Babu delivered the judgment on , dismissing two criminal revision petitions filed by Liji against the acquittal of accused Somy Kuriakose by the . The decision underscores the victim's unconditional appeal rights, placing them on par with those of the accused.
Case Background
The case originated from two private complaints filed by Liji, aged 46, from Ernakulam district, before the , under read with , alleging offences under Section 138 against Somy Kuriakose, aged 33, from Idukki district. These complaints arose from the dishonour of cheques, causing financial loss to Liji as the payee. The trial court convicted Kuriakose in both cases (ST Nos. 999/2018 and 803/2018) and sentenced him accordingly. Kuriakose appealed to the , which acquitted him on , in Crl. Appeal Nos. 94/2022 and 93/2022. Instead of filing appeals, Liji approached the via criminal revision petitions under (Crl. Rev. Pet. No. 58/2026 and an unnumbered petition). The core legal question was the maintainability of these revisions against acquittals in NI Act complaint cases, particularly whether the complainant qualifies as a "victim" entitled to appeal under the .
Arguments Presented
The revision petitioner, Liji, through her counsel, challenged the Sessions Court's acquittal judgments directly via revisions, arguing that the High Court's revisional powers under provided an appropriate remedy to scrutinize the acquittal for errors. No detailed substantive arguments on the merits of the acquittal were presented, as the focus shifted to procedural maintainability. The Registry flagged a defect questioning whether a revision was the proper remedy against an acquittal in a complaint case.
On the other side, the , represented by , and the accused did not file extensive counter-affidavits, but the court independently examined the legal framework. The respondents implicitly supported the position that revisions are barred when a direct appeal lies, emphasizing the statutory hierarchy of remedies. The court heard arguments from Liji's counsel but found the revisions unsustainable due to the availability of appeal as the primary remedy, highlighting that bypassing appeal via revision undermines the CrPC's structure.
Legal Analysis
The meticulously analyzed the interplay between Sections 372, 378, 397, and 401 CrPC, and Section 138 NI Act, determining that revisions are not maintainable when an appeal is available. Central to the reasoning was the definition of "victim" under , introduced by the 2008 amendment, which includes a person suffering loss or injury from the accused's act—directly applicable to cheque payees facing financial harm from dishonour.
The court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's precedent in M/s Celestium Financial v. A. Gnanasekaran (2025 (4) KHC 189), which clarified that NI Act complainants are victims entitled to appeal under the without the special leave requirement under . This proviso, added by Act 5 of 2009, grants victims an unconditional right to appeal acquittals, lesser convictions, or inadequate compensation, appealing to the court that handles conviction appeals. The High Court distinguished this from pre-amendment scenarios where complainants needed special leave, noting the amendment's intent to equate victims' rights with accused's under .
The judgment emphasized that explicitly bars revisions if an appeal lies, preventing . It also referenced the , successor to CrPC, maintaining the same principles under . The analysis rejected revisions as an "alternative remedy," reinforcing that NI Act cases, being private complaints under , do not involve state prosecution, thus amplifying the complainant's victim status without diluting procedural rigor.
Key Observations
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"Undoubtedly a complainant under Section 138 of the NI Act is a victim as defined in Section 2(wa) of the Cr.PC as the expression 'victim' includes not only the person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of any act or omission for which the accused person has been charged, but also includes his or her guardian or legal heir."
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"In the case of an offence alleged against an accused under S.138 of the Act, the complainant is indeed the victim owing to the alleged dishonour of a cheque. Therefore, the complainant in a private complaint alleging offence under Section 138 of the NI Act can proceed to prefer an appeal as provided in the proviso to Section 372 Cr.PC."
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"The right of a victim of a crime must be placed on par with the right of an accused who has suffered a conviction, who, as a matter of right can prefer an appeal under S.374 of the CrPC."
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"If a victim who is a complainant, proceeds under S.378, the necessity of seeking
would arise, but if a victim whether he is a complainant or not, files an appeal in terms of proviso to S.372, then the mandate of seeking
would not arise."
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"The result of the above discussion is that a person who files a complaint alleging offence under Section 138 of the NI Act has the right to prefer appeal under Section 378 or proviso to Section 372 of Cr.PC."
Court's Decision
The dismissed both revision petitions as not maintainable, holding that since a direct appeal lies under the (or Section 378 with special leave), revisions under Sections 397 and 401 are barred by Section 401(4). The court granted Liji liberty to file appeals within the limitation period, excluding the time spent in revisions, and clarified that this applies under both CrPC and BNSS equivalents.
This ruling has broad implications for NI Act litigation, empowering complainants as victims with streamlined appeal access, reducing procedural hurdles, and preventing misuse of revisional jurisdiction. It promotes efficiency in cheque bounce cases, which constitute a significant portion of criminal dockets, ensuring financial remedies for aggrieved parties while maintaining appellate parity. Future cases will likely see increased direct appeals, potentially expediting justice in economic offences.
