Limitation Under S.468 CrPC Runs From Complaint Filing, Not Cognizance: Madras HC Upholds Trial Court, Citing Sarah Mathew - 2025-04-26

Limitation Period in Criminal Cases Begins From Complaint Filing, Madras High Court Reaffirms Citing Supreme Court Precedents

Chennai: The Madras High Court has dismissed a batch of criminal revision petitions, reiterating the established legal principle that the period of limitation for taking cognizance of certain offences under Section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) is computed from the date of filing the complaint or institution of prosecution, not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance.

Justice P. Velmurugan , presiding over the cases, upheld the decision of the Judicial Magistrate No. 2, Tiruppur, which had dismissed discharge petitions filed by the accused in cases dating back to 2001. The petitioners had sought discharge primarily on the ground that the charge sheets were filed and taken cognizance of beyond the stipulated limitation period.

Case Background

The cases originated from complaints filed on December 20, 2001, concerning alleged offences under Sections 406 (criminal breach of trust) and 424 (dishonest or fraudulent removal or concealment of property) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), later including Sections 120-B (criminal conspiracy) and 109 (abetment). The allegations stemmed from the alleged fraudulent hypothecation and removal of machinery discovered by the de-facto complainant (officials of a financial institution) through inspections in June and July 2000.

Investigation followed, and charge sheets were filed by the police. While signed in November 2003 according to the prosecution, they were filed in court on various dates, including in 2007, and cognizance was taken over different periods, including as late as 2019 for one case (C.C.No.523 of 2019). The cases were initially numbered differently (like C.C.Nos.192, 193, etc., of 2007) and later re-numbered (C.C.Nos.523 and 529 of 2019) before the Judicial Magistrate No. 2, Tiruppur.

The petitioners had previously approached the High Court with quashing petitions under Section 482 CrPC, some of which were dismissed with liberty granted to raise the issue of limitation before the trial court, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Sarah Mathew Vs. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases (2014). Following this, the petitioners filed discharge petitions under Section 239 CrPC before the Magistrate, which were subsequently dismissed.

Arguments Presented

Petitioners' Contentions: The petitioners argued that the offences under Section 406 IPC are punishable with a maximum of three years imprisonment. According to Section 468 CrPC, a court cannot take cognizance of such an offence after the expiry of three years from the date of the offence. They contended that since the charge sheets were filed and taken cognizance of well beyond the three-year period from the initial complaint date (2001), the cases were time-barred. They also submitted that there was no prima facie case against them.

Respondent's Contentions: The Additional Public Prosecutor for the State countered that the complaints were filed on December 20, 2001, within three years of the date the de-facto complainant gained knowledge of the offences (June/July 2000). Relying on Supreme Court judgments, particularly Sarah Mathew and Amritlal Vs. Shantilal Soni (2022), it was argued that the relevant date for limitation under Section 468 CrPC is the date of filing the complaint or institution of prosecution, not the date of filing the charge sheet after investigation or the date of the Magistrate taking cognizance. The prosecution maintained that there were sufficient prima facie materials to proceed with the trial.

Court's Analysis and Decision

Justice Velmurugan meticulously examined the arguments and the relevant legal provisions and precedents. The Court noted that the core issue revolved around the interpretation of Section 468 CrPC and the date from which the limitation period should be calculated.

Referencing the binding Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Sarah Mathew and the subsequent reaffirmation in Amritlal Vs. Shantilal Soni , the High Court held that the law is settled: the limitation period under Section 468 CrPC commences from the date of filing the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution, irrespective of when the Magistrate takes cognizance or when the charge sheet is subsequently filed after investigation.

The Court observed that the alleged offences came to the de-facto complainant's knowledge in June/July 2000, and the complaint was filed on December 20, 2001. This date falls well within the three-year limitation period from the date of knowledge, and also arguably from the dates of the alleged offences themselves (between 1998 and 2000).

The delay in filing the charge sheet or the Court taking cognizance many years later (2007 or 2019) was deemed irrelevant for the purpose of determining limitation under Section 468 CrPC based on the clear pronouncements of the Supreme Court.

On the question of prima facie material, the High Court reviewed the complaint and charge sheets and concluded that there were sufficient allegations and materials to proceed against the accused. The Court noted that the petitioners' contentions regarding the merits of the case were matters of defence that could only be properly agitated and decided during the course of the trial, not at the stage of discharge.

Conclusion

Finding no merit in the grounds raised by the petitioners, the Madras High Court dismissed the criminal revision petitions. The judgment reinforces the principle that a diligent complainant who files a complaint within the prescribed time cannot be prejudiced by delays occurring at the stage of investigation or by the court's administrative process of taking cognizance. The cases will now proceed to trial before the Judicial Magistrate No. 2, Tiruppur.

The order was pronounced on April 22, 2025.