Making Scandalous Allegations Against a Judge in Pleadings Constitutes Criminal Contempt Under Contempt of Courts Act, 1971: Bombay High Court - 2025-09-17

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Bombay High Court Initiates Fresh Contempt Proceedings Against Advocate for "Scandalous" Pleadings in Application

Mumbai: The Bombay High Court has initiated a fresh suo motu criminal contempt case against advocate Nilesh C. Ojha, holding that the "scandalous and scurrilous" allegations made against a sitting judge in an interim application prima facie constitute criminal contempt of court. A five-judge bench dismissed Ojha's application seeking to implead the judge as a party to his ongoing contempt proceedings but took grave exception to the language used in his pleadings.

The bench, comprising Chief Justice Shree Chandrashekhar and Justices M. S. Sonak, Ravindra V. Ghuge, A. S. Gadkari, and B. P. Colabawalla, directed the registry to register a new Criminal Suo Motu Contempt Case against Ojha for the contents of his application.

Case Background

The matter originates from an earlier suo motu contempt petition (Criminal Suo Motu Contempt Petition No. 1 of 2025) initiated against Advocate Nilesh C. Ojha. The initial contempt action was taken after Ojha held a press conference on April 1, 2025, alleging that a Division Bench judge, Justice Revati Mohite-Dere, was disqualified from hearing a case involving his client. He claimed a conflict of interest due to the judge's sister being an accused in an FIR filed by his client.

In response to these proceedings, Ojha filed an Interim Application (No. 3297 of 2025) seeking to implead Justice Dere as a party-respondent in his application for discharge from the contempt case.

Arguments of the Contemnor

In his application, Advocate Ojha argued that it was necessary to make the judge a party so she could file an affidavit to affirm or deny the allegations he had made. He contended that his allegations of bias, mala fides, and fraud against the judge must be personally rebutted by her, failing which they should be considered "deemed admitted."

Ojha’s pleadings were extensive, accusing the judge of "forgery, perjury, and contempt of court," "hostile, biased, and discriminatory conduct," and acting with "mala fide intent." He alleged that the judge's actions constituted "grossest judicial dishonesty" and rendered her "disqualified to continue in the judicial office."

Court's Reasoning and Key Legal Principles

The High Court decisively rejected Ojha's application to implead the judge, clarifying a fundamental aspect of contempt jurisprudence.

1. A Judge Providing Information is Not a "Complainant"

The Court held that a judge or any person who brings contumacious conduct to the notice of the Chief Justice is merely an informant, not a "complainant" or a necessary party to the contempt proceedings.

"The person who supplies information to the Chief Justice regarding contumacious material and conduct of a person... cannot be added as a party-respondent for the purpose of his cross-examination. He is not treated as a complainant or considered a necessary or proper party in the contempt proceedings."

Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Biman Basu v. Kallol Guha , the bench reiterated that once facts are placed before the court, "it becomes a matter between the Court and the contemnor."

2. Scandalous Pleadings as a Separate Act of Contempt

While dismissing the application, the Court took suo motu cognizance of the contents of the application itself. The bench found the language used by Ojha to be a direct attack on the judiciary.

"The choice of words and the language used in this Interim Application are defamatory... The statements made by the applicant-contemnor seem to be intended at scandalizing the Court in such a way as to create distrust in the people’s mind and impair the confidence of the people in the Court and the Judge."

The Court concluded that the "scurrilous attack on the integrity and honesty" of the judge was a calculated attempt to cause embarrassment, deter the judge from discharging her duties, and obstruct the administration of justice. This, the bench held, squarely falls under the definition of "criminal contempt" under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

3. Professional Misconduct of Assisting Counsel

The Court also addressed the conduct of fifteen other advocates who appeared with Ojha, who was arguing in person. It noted that advocates are prohibited from appearing as "assisting counsel to a party in-person." While refraining from initiating contempt proceedings against them, the bench issued a stern warning:

"These advocates are let off with a warning to remain alive at all times to their professional duties and bearing in mind that what may be lawful and proper for a member of the society may still not be proper or rather improper for them."

Final Decision and Its Implications

The Court dismissed Interim Application No. 3297 of 2025 and directed the registration of a new suo motu criminal contempt case against Nilesh C. Ojha based on the scandalous pleadings. Ojha has been given four weeks to file his statement of defence as to why a charge should not be framed against him.

This judgment serves as a powerful reminder that while litigants and lawyers have the right to present their case, this right does not extend to making scurrilous, defamatory, and unsubstantiated attacks on judges within court pleadings. Such actions, far from being a legitimate defence, can constitute a fresh and independent act of criminal contempt.