Mere Denial in S.313 CrPC Statement Not Enough to Rebut S.139 NI Act Presumption: Himachal Pradesh High Court - 2025-08-25

Legal Awareness & Information.

HP High Court Upholds Cheque Bounce Conviction, Affirms Accused Must Substantively Rebut S.139 Presumption

Shimla, Himachal Pradesh – The Himachal Pradesh High Court, in a recent judgment, has upheld the concurrent conviction of an individual in a cheque bounce case, reinforcing the principle that the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act) cannot be rebutted by a mere denial in the accused's statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).

The single-judge bench of Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rakesh Kainthla dismissed the criminal revision petition filed by Rangeen Kumar against his conviction for an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act, which was previously confirmed by the Sessions Judge, Chamba. The court also held that a complaint filed beyond the standard limitation period was maintainable due to the extension granted by the Supreme Court during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Case Background

The case originated from a complaint filed by Arun Dogra, who alleged that he had loaned ₹2,50,000 to Rangeen Kumar. To discharge this liability, Kumar issued a cheque which was subsequently dishonoured due to "insufficient funds." Despite a legal notice being served, Kumar failed to make the payment, leading to the criminal complaint.

Both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court found Kumar guilty, holding that he had admitted to issuing the cheque and failed to produce any evidence to rebut the presumption that it was issued for a legally enforceable debt. The courts sentenced him to six months of simple imprisonment and ordered him to pay ₹4,00,000 in compensation to the complainant.

Key Arguments in the High Court

Petitioner's (Accused) Contentions:

- The petitioner's counsel, Mr. Rupinder Singh Minhas, argued that the lower courts' judgments were based on conjectures and the uncorroborated testimony of the complainant.

- A key legal challenge was raised regarding the limitation period. It was contended that the complaint, filed on 10.07.2020 after the notice was served on 02.03.2020, was barred by time as it was filed beyond the prescribed 45-day period.

Respondent's (Complainant) Contentions:

- Mr. Munish Datwalia, representing the complainant, argued that since the issuance of the cheque and the signature were undisputed, the presumption under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the NI Act was correctly applied.

- He submitted that the burden was on the accused to rebut this presumption with credible evidence, which he failed to do, making the conviction sound.

Court’s Analysis and Legal Principles Applied

Justice Kainthla meticulously examined the legal principles governing cheque bounce cases and the limited scope of the High Court's revisional jurisdiction.

On Rebuttal of Presumption under Section 139

The Court observed that the accused's defence varied, claiming at one point that the cheque was stolen and at another that it was obtained by fraud. However, no evidence was led to substantiate these claims.

"The statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the Code is not substantive evidence of defence, but only an opportunity for the accused to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution's case against the accused. Therefore, there is no evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheques were issued for consideration." - Citing Sumeti Vij v. Paramount Tech Fab Industries .

The judgment further noted the accused's failure to put his defence theory (that the cheque was stolen) to the complainant during cross-examination. Citing established Supreme Court precedents like Browne v. Dunn , the Court held that this omission amounted to an abandonment of the defence.

On Limitation Period During COVID-19

Addressing the petitioner's argument on the complaint being time-barred, the Court relied on the Supreme Court's suo motu order in Cognisance for Extension of Limitation, in re . It highlighted that the apex court had explicitly excluded the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 for calculating limitation under various laws, including Section 138 of the NI Act.

"The limitation period w.e.f. 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022, is to be excluded. The complaint was filed before the expiry of the extended period of limitation, and the same cannot be said to be barred by limitation."

On the Scope of Revisional Jurisdiction

The Court began its analysis by reiterating the narrow scope of its revisional powers under Section 397 CrPC, citing multiple Supreme Court judgments including Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh . It emphasized that a revisional court cannot act as an appellate court to re-appreciate evidence unless there is a patent defect, error of jurisdiction, or perversity in the findings of the lower courts.

The Final Decision

Finding no perversity or legal error in the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Appellate Court, the High Court concluded that all ingredients of Section 138 of the NI Act were satisfied. The Court held that the conviction was justified and the sentence of six months' imprisonment, along with compensation of ₹4,00,000, was not excessive, considering the deterrent object of the law and the financial loss suffered by the complainant.

The revision petition was accordingly dismissed, and the conviction and sentence were upheld.