Misconduct as Sarpanch Can Be Probed Under Municipalities Act Post Upgradation, But Delayed Suspension Unjustified: Rajasthan High Court - 2025-08-20

Rajasthan HC Upholds Inquiry Against Municipal Chairperson for Past Sarpanch Role, But Quashes "Unjustified" Suspension

Jodhpur, Rajasthan – The Rajasthan High Court has ruled that an inquiry for alleged misconduct committed by an individual as a Sarpanch can be initiated under the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009, after the Gram Panchayat is upgraded to a Municipal Board. However, in a significant check on administrative power, the court quashed the subsequent suspension of the elected representative, deeming it arbitrary and unjustified.

The single-judge bench of Justice Sunil Beniwal delivered the judgment in a writ petition filed by Sarla Devi, who challenged her suspension as the Chairperson of the Municipal Board, Napasar. The court allowed the state to proceed with the inquiry but revoked the suspension, directing that she be reinstated forthwith.

Case Background: From Sarpanch to Chairperson

The case originates from Sarla Devi's tenure as the Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Napasar. In 2020, the Gram Sabha resolved to temporarily appoint three individuals to address a staff shortage. These appointments were later flagged as irregular for lacking prior approval from the Panchayat Samiti, leading to disciplinary proceedings against Sarla Devi under Section 38 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994.

Notably, while this inquiry was pending, no suspension order was issued. A pivotal change occurred on November 7, 2024, when the Napasar Gram Panchayat was upgraded to a Class IV Municipality. By virtue of this transition, Sarla Devi assumed the position of Chairperson of the new Municipal Board.

Subsequently, the state initiated fresh proceedings for the very same allegations under Section 39 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009. This time, however, the authorities not only referred the matter for a judicial inquiry but also suspended her from her post as Chairperson via an order dated June 19, 2025. This dual action prompted the present writ petition.

Arguments at the Bar

Petitioner's Stance: Senior Advocate Mr. Rajesh Joshi, representing Sarla Devi, argued that: -

The proceedings under the 2009 Municipalities Act were without jurisdiction, as the alleged misconduct occurred when she was a Sarpanch, governed by the 1994 Panchayati Raj Act. -

Initiating a new inquiry for the same charge amounted to double jeopardy. -

The suspension was a "colourable exercise of power," being arbitrary and excessively delayed, especially since the authorities had not deemed it necessary during the initial proceedings under the 1994 Act. -

Once the inquiry was entrusted to a Judicial Officer, the apprehension of tampering with evidence became baseless.

State's Defence: Senior Advocate-cum-AAG Mr. Rajesh Panwar, for the State, contended that: -

The appointments, made without mandatory prior approval, constituted clear misconduct and caused a financial loss of over ₹5 lakhs to the public exchequer. -

Section 3 of the 2009 Act dictates that upon upgradation of a local area, its liabilities devolve onto the new municipality. This legally permits continuing the action under the new Act. -

The inquiry under the 1994 Act effectively merged into the new proceedings, negating the double jeopardy claim. -

The suspension was warranted given the gravity of financial loss and the risk of the petitioner influencing the inquiry.

Court's Analysis and Verdict

Justice Beniwal dissected the legal tangle into three key issues: whether the act constituted misconduct, the legality of the inquiry under the 2009 Act, and the justification for the suspension.

On Jurisdiction and Continuity of Inquiry: The Court found that the State was competent to proceed under the Municipalities Act, 2009. The judgment highlighted Section 3(8)(f) of the 2009 Act, which states that once a village area is included in a municipality, the rules of the Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 cease to apply.

The Court reasoned, “If the argument of the petitioner that proceedings cannot be continued under Section 39 of the Act of 2009 is accepted, it would leave the State Government with no legal recourse to conclude the inquiry. This would result in an untenable situation... effectively allowing the misconduct to go unaddressed.”

The bench held that liabilities, including those arising from alleged financial misconduct, transfer to the new municipal body, empowering the state to use the corresponding legal framework (the 2009 Act) to ensure accountability.

On the Suspension Order: While upholding the inquiry, the Court came down heavily on the suspension order. It observed that the state was aware of the allegations since 2021 and had initiated proceedings under the 1994 Act without resorting to suspension, suggesting the charge was not initially considered grave enough for such a step.

“...there appears to be no valid reason for invoking the power of suspension while initiating a subsequent inquiry under Section 39(1) of the Act of 2009, especially when the charge remained unchanged,” the Court noted.

The bench also concurred with the petitioner’s reliance on the Meena Vyas precedent, stating that once an inquiry is referred to a Judicial Officer, "the relevant records come under the custody and supervision of the Judicial Officer, thereby significantly reducing, if not eliminating, the risk of any interference or tampering by the petitioner."

Final Order and Implications

The writ petition was partly allowed. The court set aside the suspension part of the impugned order dated June 19, 2025, and directed Sarla Devi's immediate reinstatement as Chairperson. However, it granted the state liberty to conclude the judicial inquiry under Section 39 of the 2009 Act expeditiously, within a three-month timeframe.

This judgment clarifies the legal continuity of disciplinary proceedings when a local governing body's status changes. It establishes that accountability for past actions is not erased by administrative restructuring. At the same time, it reinforces the principle that the power of suspension must be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily, particularly when delayed without fresh cause.