No FIR Can Be Ordered Under S.156(3) CrPC For Offences Committed in Judicial Proceedings Due To Bar Under S.195 CrPC: Himachal Pradesh High Court - 2025-07-04

High Court Upholds Dismissal of FIR Plea, Cites Absolute Bar U/S 195 CrPC for Offences in Judicial Proceedings

Shimla, Himachal Pradesh – The Himachal Pradesh High Court has reinforced a crucial procedural safeguard in criminal law, ruling that a Magistrate cannot direct the police to register an FIR under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. for offences allegedly committed in judicial proceedings. In a judgment delivered by Hon’ble Mr. Justice RakeshKainthla , the court held that such matters are barred by Section 195 of the Cr.P.C., which mandates that a complaint must originate from the concerned court or authority itself.

The Court dismissed a petition filed by Ashish Sharma , who sought to quash lower court orders that had refused his plea to register an FIR against an individual for allegedly filing a false affidavit before the State Human Rights Commission.

---

Background of the Case

The petitioner, Ashish Sharma , had approached the Judicial Magistrate in Shimla with an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. He alleged that the respondent No. 3 had committed offences of impersonation, forgery, and perjury by falsely describing herself as a school Principal in an affidavit submitted to the Himachal Pradesh Human Rights Commission.

The Trial Court dismissed his application, finding no substantive proof that the affidavit was intentionally false or that it had wrongfully influenced the Commission's opinion. This decision was upheld by the Additional Sessions Judge (Revisional Court), who noted that the alleged offences were non-cognizable and that the Human Rights Commission had itself treated the matter as a "typographical error," allowing it to be corrected upon payment of a minor cost.

Aggrieved by these concurrent dismissals, Mr. Sharma filed the present petition before the High Court, appearing in person to argue his case.

Arguments Before the High Court

Petitioner's Submissions : Mr. Sharma , arguing in person, contended that the lower courts had erred by not directing an investigation. He claimed a fundamental right to file a complaint against the submission of a false affidavit and impersonation, and argued that the bar under Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. (now Section 215 of BNSS) did not apply to his case.

State's Submissions : The learned Additional Advocate General, Mr. Jitender Sharma , supported the reasoned orders passed by the lower courts, arguing they were legally sound.

Court’s Analysis: A Triad of Legal Barriers

Justice Kainthla conducted a thorough analysis, ultimately finding that the petitioner's plea was blocked by three significant legal hurdles.

1. The Absolute Bar of Section 195 Cr.P.C.

The cornerstone of the judgment was the application of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. The court highlighted that under the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, proceedings before the Commission are deemed "judicial proceedings."

“Every proceeding before the Commission shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228, and for the purposes of section 196, of the Indian Penal Code, and the Commission shall be deemed to be a civil Court for all the purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.”

Given this, the court concluded that the bar under Section 195(1)(b) was squarely attracted. This provision prohibits any court from taking cognizance of offences like perjury (Sections 193-200 IPC) or forgery of documents used in evidence (Sections 471, 475 IPC) when committed in relation to a court proceeding, except on the written complaint of that court . The High Court affirmed that this bar prevents a private party from initiating an FIR for such offences.

2. Prohibition on Ordering FIRs for Non-Cognizable Offences

The court further observed that many of the offences alleged by the petitioner, such as those under Sections 199, 200, and 205 of the IPC, are classified as non-cognizable. Citing the Supreme Court's ruling in Om Prakash Ambadkar v. State of Maharashtra , the judgment reiterated that a Magistrate's power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is limited to ordering investigations for cognizable offences only.

3. Impermissibility of Splitting a Composite Complaint

While some of the alleged offences (e.g., Section 420 IPC) were cognizable, they were inextricably linked to the non-cognizable offences committed during the same transaction (the filing of the affidavit). Relying on its own precedent in State of Himachal Pradesh versus Hirda Ram , the court held:

“[I]n cases where in the course of the same transaction an offence for which no complaint by the court is necessary under Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and an offence for which such a complaint to the Court is necessary, are committed, it is not possible to split up and hold the prosecution of the accused for the offences not mentioned in Section 195... should be upheld.”

Therefore, the entire application was treated as disclosing non-cognizable offences, for which the Trial Court could not have ordered an investigation.

Final Decision and Admonishment

The High Court concluded that there was no "grave miscarriage of justice" or procedural flaw in the lower courts' orders that would warrant intervention under its limited inherent jurisdiction (Section 482 Cr.P.C.).

The Court also strongly deprecated the petitioner's act of impleading the Revisional Court Judge as a respondent in the petition, calling it an impermissible practice. Citing the Supreme Court's judgment in Savitri Devi v. District Judge, Gorakhpur , the court stated that judicial officers should not be made parties to litigation challenging their orders. It refrained from imposing costs only because the petitioner was a party-in-person.

Ultimately, finding no merit in the petition, the High Court dismissed it.