Orissa High Court Champions Parity: Girls' Schools Staff Entitled to 1994 Grant-in-Aid Benefits

Cuttack , Odisha – In a significant ruling dated June 23, 2025, the Orissa High Court, presided over by Justice Biraja PrasannaSatapathy , directed the State of Odisha to extend Grant-in-Aid (GIA) benefits under the GIA Order, 1994, to the teaching and non-teaching staff of numerous unaided Girls' High Schools. The decision, rooted in the principle of parity, came while disposing of a batch of appeals, with State of Odisha vs. Sadhana Pradhan (FAO No. 281 of 2018) as the lead case.

The Court upheld decisions of the State Education Tribunal that favored the employees and overturned Tribunal orders that had rejected similar claims, emphasizing that staff in these schools could not be discriminated against when others similarly situated had already received these benefits.

Background of the Dispute: A Long Road for Grant-in-Aid

The core issue revolved around the eligibility of teaching and non-teaching staff of certain Girls' High Schools for GIA under the 1994 Order. These schools had become eligible for GIA effective June 1, 1994. However, the 1994 GIA Order was subsequently repealed by the GIA Order, 2004 (notified February 5, 2004), which introduced a Block Grant system. A 2007 amendment further refined this for 100 Girls' High Schools.

Many of the respondent institutions and their staff were initially brought under the Block Grant scheme as per a notification dated September 22, 2007, with their services notionally approved from June 1, 1994, but financial benefits of the Block Grant flowing only from September 22, 2007. The employees argued for the more comprehensive benefits under the original 1994 GIA Order.

Key Arguments in Court

State of Odisha 's Contentions: The State, as the appellant in many cases, argued: * The release of GIA is contingent on the State's economic capacity (Section 7-C of the Odisha Education Act, 1969) and is not an automatic right upon fulfilling eligibility. * The repeal of the 1994 GIA Order by the 2004 Order barred new claims under the former, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Anup Kumar Senapati vs. State of Odisha (2019) 19 SCC 626 , which held that repeal obliterates the statute and mere hope or expectation of a benefit does not survive. * There was no vested right to GIA from the date of eligibility, referencing Laxmidhar Pati and Others Vs. State of Orissa and Others (1996 (I) OLR 152) . * The institutions had accepted the Block Grant under the 2004/2007 Orders and raised claims for 1994 benefits belatedly.

Respondents' (Employees/Institutions) Contentions: The employees and institutions countered that: * Their eligibility under the 1994 Order was established (w.e.f. June 1, 1994) before its repeal, with proposals submitted by the Director of Secondary Education. * Crucially, the State itself had extended GIA benefits under the 1994 Order to several other similarly situated Girls' High Schools. Initially, 9 such schools received these benefits. Later, following court orders affirmed up to the Supreme Court, another 29 schools (from the list of 100 covered by the 2007 notification) were granted 1994 GIA benefits via a government notification dated June 24, 2017. * This created a clear case of discrimination against the remaining schools. * They cited several Supreme Court judgments, including State of Uttar Pradesh & Others Vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastav and Others and Rushibhai Jagdishchandra Pathak Vs. Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation , emphasizing the duty of a model employer to treat similarly situated employees equally and extend the benefits of judicial pronouncements uniformly. * They also argued, referencing a previous High Court decision (FAO No.509 of 2014), that Anup Kumar Senapati was not an absolute bar where eligibility and recommendations predated the 1994 Order's repeal.

High Court's Rationale: Parity Prevails

Justice Satapathy found merit in the respondents' arguments, particularly concerning parity. The Court noted the established history: * 109 Girls' High Schools were initially identified as eligible under the 1994 Order. * 9 of these schools received 1994 GIA benefits. * Subsequently, 100 schools (including the respondents' institutions) were notified for Block Grants under the 2007 Amendment Order. * However, 29 of these 100 schools, plus others in separate cases, were later granted the 1994 GIA benefits, largely due to judicial interventions.

The Court stated:

"This Court placing reliance on the decision in the case of Arvind Srivastav , C. Lalita as well as Rushibhai Jagdishchandra Pathak , Khunjamayum Bimoti Devi and Ram Gopal as cited (supra) is of the view that the respondents herein being similarly situated as like the 29 schools who were extended with the benefit in terms of similar order passed by the Tribunal, cannot be discriminated." (Para 6.5 of the judgment)

The High Court also implicitly supported its earlier stance that the Anup Kumar Senapati decision might not be a "complete Bar" if eligibility and recommendations were processed before the 1994 GIA Order was repealed, especially when considered alongside the State's own actions in granting benefits to a select group.

The Verdict and Its Implications

The Orissa High Court delivered the following verdict: * Dismissed all appeals filed by the State where the Education Tribunal had allowed claims for GIA under the 1994 Order. * Allowed appeals filed by employees/institutions where the Tribunal had rejected such claims, setting aside those unfavorable orders. * Directed the State authorities to extend the benefits of Grant-in-Aid under the GIA Order, 1994, to the employees and/or institutions involved in the present batch of appeals, consistent with the benefits extended via the government notification dated June 24, 2017. * The State has been given four months from the date of receipt of the order to complete this exercise.

This judgment reaffirms the strong legal principle of parity and non-discrimination. It underscores that even with legislative changes and superseding orders, the State cannot arbitrarily pick and choose beneficiaries from a similarly situated group, especially when a precedent has been set by its own actions or through confirmed judicial directives.