Party Disputing Compromise Decree Must First Approach Trial Court, Not File Appeal: Supreme Court - 2025-07-04

Party Disputing a Compromise Decree Must First Approach Trial Court , Holds Supreme Court

New Delhi: In a significant ruling clarifying a long-standing procedural debate, the Supreme Court has held that a party to a lawsuit who disputes the validity of a compromise decree must first challenge it before the same court that recorded it. A direct First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure ( CPC ) is not maintainable for such a party. The bench, led by Justice Prasanna B. Varale , affirmed a Gujarat High Court Larger Bench judgment, settling the appropriate remedy for parties alleging fraud or lack of consent in a compromise.

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Background of the Case

The case originated from a complex property dispute involving Sakina Sultanali Sunesara (the appellant) over land parcels in Siddhpur, Gujarat. The core of the legal battle began when two civil suits against the appellant were settled through compromise decrees in 2016.

The appellant contended that she had no knowledge of these compromises, which were allegedly entered into fraudulently by her Power of Attorney holder. She claimed the decrees were obtained without her consent and challenged them by filing Appeals from Order (AOs) in the Gujarat High Court.

Noting conflicting Division Bench precedents on the matter, a Single Judge referred the issue to a Larger Bench. The Larger Bench concluded that a party to the suit disputing a compromise must first approach the Trial Court under the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC . It held that a First Appeal under ** Section 96 of the CPC ** is a remedy available only to a person who was not a party to the original suit. Consequently, the appellant's appeals were dismissed, prompting her to approach the Supreme Court.

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Arguments Before the Supreme Court

Appellant's Submissions: Senior Counsel Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, appearing for the appellant, argued that the 1976 amendment to the CPC , which deleted Order XLIII Rule 1(m) and introduced Rule 1-A, was intended to allow challenges to a compromise to be raised in a First Appeal against the decree. He contended that the High Court's interpretation created an unfair distinction, limiting a party's options while providing non-parties with broader remedies. Citing the Banwari Lal case, he asserted that an appeal under Section 96 (1) is permissible when the very factum of the compromise is disputed.

Respondents' Submissions: Mr. Rakesh Uttamchandra Upadhyay, for the respondents, countered that ** Section 96 (3) of the CPC ** explicitly bars an appeal against a consent decree. He argued that the only remedy available to a party is to apply to the court that recorded the compromise, as established in the case of Pushpa Devi Bhagat . He submitted that subsequent judgments have consistently affirmed this position, clarifying that the Trial Court is the proper forum to examine the validity of a compromise.

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Court's Analysis and Key Precedents

The Supreme Court undertook a detailed analysis of the CPC provisions as amended in 1976. The bench highlighted the coherent scheme established by the amendments:

- Proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3: Obliges the Trial Court to decide any dispute regarding the lawfulness of a compromise.

- Rule 3-A of Order XXIII: Bars a separate suit to set aside a compromise decree.

- ** Section 96 (3): Prohibits appeals from decrees passed with the consent of parties.

- Order XLIII Rule 1-A:** Allows an appellant in a competent appeal to challenge the recording of a compromise, but does not create an independent right of appeal.

The Court held that these provisions create a clear and sequential path. A party that denies a compromise must first raise the issue before the Trial Court. The bar on appeals in Section 96 (3) is absolute when the fact of compromise is not in dispute. However, when the compromise itself is challenged, the challenge must originate at the trial stage.

The judgment heavily relied on the principles laid down in Pushpa Devi Bhagat vs. Rajinder Singh , quoting a key passage: > "The only remedy available to a party to a consent decree to avoid such consent decree, is to approach the court which recorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of it, and establish that there was no compromise."

The Court clarified that the remedy under the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3 is not optional but is the "exclusive first port of call" for a party disputing a compromise. It stated that allegations of fraud or lack of authority are precisely the issues the Trial Court is empowered to investigate under this proviso.

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Final Decision and Implications

Dismissing the appeals, the Supreme Court affirmed the Gujarat High Court's decision. The bench concluded: > "The path is therefore settled: the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3 is not optional; it is the exclusive first port of call for any party on record who denies the compromise."

The Court clarified the distinction between the remedies available to parties and non-parties:

- A Party to the Suit: Must approach the Trial Court under the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3. An appeal can be filed only after the Trial Court decides on the validity of the compromise.

- A Non-Party: Can, with leave of the court, file a First Appeal under Section 96 (1) if their rights are adversely affected by the decree.

While dismissing the appeals, the Court left it open for the appellant to approach the Trial Court under the correct legal provision, making no comment on the merits of her claim. This judgment provides definitive guidance on civil procedure, streamlining the process for challenging disputed compromise decrees and preventing the misuse of appellate forums.