The Punjab and Haryana High Court has set aside a trial court order that erroneously declared an accused person a " proclaimed offender " in a case involving allegations of cheating and criminal breach of trust . Justice Shalini Singh Nagpal, presiding over the matter, ruled that the trial court failed to comply with the mandatory procedural safeguards stipulated under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 . Beyond the procedural lapses, the Court emphasized that the specific offenses charged—namely Sections 406, 420, and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code —do not carry a sentence of ten years or more, rendering the " proclaimed offender " designation legally impermissible under Section 84(4) of the BNSS .

The petitioner, Baldev Singh Bajwa, had approached the High Court seeking to quash the orders dated April 16 , 2026, and September 29, 2026 , passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class at Kharar . In those orders, the trial court had canceled the petitioner’s bail and subsequently declared him a proclaimed offender after he failed to appear for hearings on March 12 and April 16 of the same year. The High Court’s intervention highlights the necessity of strict adherence to judicial procedures when restricting personal liberty , particularly during the transition to new procedural codes.

Procedural Flaws in Proclamation Process

A significant portion of the High Court's scrutiny focused on the failure of the serving officer, Assistant Sub-Inspector Parminder Singh, to execute the proclamation in accordance with the law. Section 84(2)(i)(a) of the BNSS mandates that a proclamation must be publicly read in a conspicuous place within the town or village where the accused ordinarily resides, in addition to being affixed to their residence and the court-house.

The Court observed that the statutory requirements for publication are cumulative rather than optional. The record revealed that while the notice was affixed at certain locations, it was never publicly read aloud in the petitioner's area of residence. Justice Nagpal noted, "The three sub-clauses (a)-(c) in Section 84(2)(i)(a) BNSS are conjunctive and not disjunctive , which means that there would be no valid publication of the proclamation unless all the three modes of publication are proved." This oversight, according to the Court, nullified the proclamation and all subsequent proceedings.

Furthermore, the trial court was found to have acted prematurely in its declaration. After the proclamation was issued for August 5, 2026 , the case was adjourned on several occasions to record the statement of the serving official. The Court held that when the trial court adjourned the matter to September 29, 2026 , it failed to issue a fresh, valid proclamation or provide proper notification for this new date of appearance. This failure to notify the accused effectively breached the mandates of Section 84(1) of the BNSS , as there was no legally recognized publication for the actual date on which the petitioner was declared an offender.

Statutory Misapplication of BNSS

Perhaps the most critical aspect of the ruling concerns the classification of the accused under the current criminal legal framework. Section 84(4) of the BNSS permits a court to declare an individual a " proclaimed offender " only if they are accused of specific, serious offenses punishable by ten years or more of imprisonment. Because the charges against the petitioner did not meet this threshold, the Court ruled that the trial judge acted beyond their statutory authority.

"The offences invoked against the petitioner i.e. Sections 406, 420 and 120-B IPC are not punishable with imprisonment of 10 years or more as per Section 84(4) BNSS. Therefore, petitioner could not have been declared proclaimed offender but a ' proclaimed person ' or ' absconder ,'" Justice Nagpal observed in the judgment. This distinction, while technical, carries significant legal weight, as the label of " proclaimed offender " imposes harsher consequences and stigma than that of a " proclaimed person ." The Court clarified that the impugned order was fundamentally vitiated by this misapplication of the law.

The High Court further noted that the order declaring the petitioner a proclaimed offender lacked the necessary " prima facie satisfaction " that the accused had intentionally absconded or concealed himself to evade the service of warrants. The Court reasoned that judicial discretion in this regard cannot be exercised as a matter of routine simply upon the request of the police or the prosecution. The judge must be convinced, through evidence or reasonable diligence, that the accused is actively avoiding the judicial process.

Directions and Future Compliance

While granting the petition and setting aside the impugned orders, the High Court imposed conditions to ensure the petitioner remains accountable to the trial court. The order stipulates that the petitioner must pay costs amounting to ₹30,000, to be deposited into the Poor Patient Welfare Fund at the Postgraduate Institute of Medical Education and Research (PGIMER) in Chandigarh. This payment must be completed within 30 days.

The petitioner has been directed to surrender before the Judicial Magistrate First Class at Kharar within the same 30-day window to file an application for regular bail . The High Court explicitly instructed the trial court to decide the bail application expeditiously and independently, without being influenced by the observations made during the writ petition .

Crucially, the Court clarified that these directions are binding; should the petitioner fail to surrender within the specified timeframe or fail to deposit the required costs, the petition will be deemed dismissed. By quashing the flawed order, the High Court has reinforced the principle that procedural regularity is paramount, particularly when courts are navigating the application of the updated Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita. The ruling serves as a reminder that the status of a proclaimed offender is a significant legal disability that requires exact statutory compliance and cannot be bypassed through procedural shortcuts or misinterpretations of sentencing categories. The matter will now return to the trial court, where the proceedings will resume in compliance with the High Court’s directives.