Judicial Appointments
Subject : Litigation - Judicial Process
Chandigarh - In a significant ruling that reinforces the High Court's authority in shaping the recruitment process for higher judicial services, the Punjab and Haryana High Court has upheld the validity of a rule mandating a minimum of 50% aggregate marks for candidates to qualify in the Superior Judiciary Examination for both states.
A division bench comprising Chief Justice Sheel Nagu and Justice Sanjiv Berry dismissed a writ petition filed by a candidate, Rushil Jindal, who challenged the rule as being arbitrary and contrary to the governing statutory service rules. The Court's decision underscores the principle that administrative instructions can supplement statutory rules to ensure the selection of the "best available talent" for the judiciary.
The case, RUSHIL JINDAL v. PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT AND OTHERS (2025 LiveLaw (PH) 388), stemmed from a challenge to Clause 8.4 of the notifications for the competitive examination for the post of Additional District and Sessions Judge in Punjab and Haryana. The petitioner, Rushil Jindal, had successfully secured more than the required 40% in each paper of the written examination. However, he was declared unsuccessful because his combined score from the written test (out of 750 marks) and the viva-voce (out of 250 marks) fell short of the 50% aggregate threshold, which amounts to 500 out of a total of 1000 marks.
Represented by Senior Advocate Aashish Chopra, the petitioner argued that this "minimum marks qualification" was arbitrary and unsustainable. The core of the argument was that the primary statutes—the Punjab Superior Judicial Service Rules, 2007, and the Haryana Superior Judicial Service Rules, 2007—do not prescribe any such aggregate cut-off. Therefore, the High Court, through an administrative notification, had effectively amended the statutory rules, an action contended to be beyond its powers.
The division bench, after hearing submissions from both sides, including Senior Advocate Munisha Gandhi for the High Court, systematically dismantled the petitioner's arguments. The Court's judgment hinges on the well-established legal principle that administrative bodies can issue instructions to fill gaps in statutory rules, provided such instructions are not contradictory to the parent rules.
The bench noted that the Superior Judicial Services Rules of both states stipulate the maximum marks for the written test (750) and viva-voce (250) but are silent on the specific method for determining final merit and suitability. This silence, the Court reasoned, grants the High Court the discretion to lay down a detailed scheme to achieve the overarching goal of selecting the most competent candidates.
In its judgment, the Court stated, "...the High Court by laying down the syllabus and format of examination, specified the scheme thereof by inserting the impugned Clauses in the notifications, has not done anything violative of the basic Rules but the same has been done in exercise of its powers in the light of the Constitutional Scheme so that the best available talent can be selected..."
The bench emphasized that setting a minimum aggregate score is not an irrelevant or arbitrary metric. Instead, it is a crucial tool to "adjudge the merit and suitability of any candidate for such post." The Court clarified that securing 40% in each paper merely makes a candidate eligible to be called for the viva-voce; it does not confer a right to be called, as the High Court retains the discretion to shortlist candidates up to three times the number of vacancies.
The High Court drew strength from a consistent line of Supreme Court jurisprudence. The bench highlighted the Apex Court's view that when rules are silent on the manner of determining merit, "then the administrative instructions can supplement the Rules in this regard, in order to fill up the gaps. Such instructions have a binding force providing their subservient to the statutory provisions."
Crucially, the Court relied on the precedent set in K.H. Siraj vs. High Court of Kerala and others, (2006) 6 SCC 395 . In that case, the Supreme Court had affirmed that it is "clearly open for the High Court to prescribe benchmarks for the written test and oral test in order to achieve the purpose of getting the best available talent." The Punjab and Haryana High Court found that there was nothing in the state rules that barred such a procedure from being adopted.
Based on this legal foundation, the bench concluded that the High Court's action was well within its administrative powers. The judgment held, "it is open to the High Court to prescribe the criteria including cut of marks and 'minimum marks qualification' as has been envisaged in clause 8.4 of the impugned notifications...to asses the merit and suitability of the candidates to be appointed in the Superior Judicial Services to perform the sacrocent duties of Judicial Officer."
This ruling has significant implications for the landscape of judicial recruitment in India. 1. Clear Benchmark for Aspirants: For candidates aspiring to join the Superior Judiciary in Punjab and Haryana, the judgment sets a clear and non-negotiable performance standard. It is no longer sufficient to merely pass individual papers; candidates must demonstrate a high level of overall competence to meet the 50% aggregate threshold. 2. Reinforcement of High Court Autonomy: The decision robustly defends the administrative autonomy of High Courts in managing their recruitment processes. It empowers them to implement measures they deem necessary to uphold the quality of the judiciary, even if those measures are not explicitly detailed in the parent legislation. 3. Precedent for Other States: The ruling serves as a persuasive precedent for other High Courts across the country facing similar challenges to their recruitment criteria. It reaffirms the legal validity of using administrative notifications to supplement statutory rules for the purpose of ensuring merit-based selections.
Ultimately, the judgment by Chief Justice Sheel Nagu and Justice Sanjiv Berry prioritizes the institutional integrity of the judiciary, framing the imposition of a minimum aggregate score not as an arbitrary barrier, but as a necessary filter to ensure that only the most meritorious and suitable individuals are entrusted with judicial responsibilities.
In a separate development, the Punjab and Haryana High Court Bar Association (HCBA) has unanimously passed a resolution opposing any move to relocate the High Court from its current location in Chandigarh. The resolution, passed on September 22, affirms that retaining the court at its present site is in the best interests of the legal fraternity.
The issue arose after a bench led by Chief Justice Sheel Nagu, in a Public Interest Litigation (PIL), took note of increasing footfall and space constraints at the iconic building. The bench had asked the Chandigarh UT Administration to explore alternative sites for a new High Court building. The current building, an "architectural marvel" designed by the renowned French architect Le Corbusier, is a significant landmark in the city. The HCBA's opposition signals a potential conflict between the need for infrastructural expansion and the desire to preserve the heritage and convenience of the existing location.
#JudicialRecruitment #HighCourt #AdministrativeLaw
Vague 'Bad Work' Can't Presume Penetrative Sexual Assault Under POCSO Section 4 Without Evidence: Patna High Court
28 Apr 2026
Limiting Crop Damage Compensation to Specific Wild Animals Excluding Birds Violates Article 14: Bombay HC
28 Apr 2026
Appeal Limitation in 1991 Police Rules Yields to Uttarakhand Police Act 2007 on Inconsistency: Uttarakhand HC
28 Apr 2026
Nashik Court Reserves Verdict on Khan's TCS Bail Plea
29 Apr 2026
Delhi Court Grants Bail to I-PAC Director in PMLA Case
30 Apr 2026
No Historic Record of Saraswati Temple Demolition, Muslim Body Tells MP High Court in Bhojshala Dispute
30 Apr 2026
No Absolute Bar on Simultaneous Parole/Furlough for Co-Accused Under Delhi Prisons Rules: Delhi High Court
30 Apr 2026
Rejection of Jurisdiction Plea under Section 16 Arbitration Act Not Challengeable under Section 34 Till Final Award: Supreme Court
30 Apr 2026
'Living Separately' Under Section 13B HMA Means Cessation Of Marital Obligations, Regardless Of Residence: Patna High Court
30 Apr 2026
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.