'Retweeting' Defamatory Content Amounts to 'Publication' Under S.499 IPC: Delhi High Court

Retweeting Defamatory Content Constitutes 'Publication' Under IPC, Rules Delhi High Court

New Delhi: In a significant ruling addressing the evolving landscape of defamation in the digital age, the Delhi High Court has held that 'retweeting' or 'reposting' allegedly defamatory content on social media platforms like Twitter (now 'X') will prima facie amount to 'publication' under Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

The judgment, delivered by Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma on February 5, 2024, came in a petition filed by Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal , challenging summoning orders issued against him in a criminal defamation complaint.

Case Background

The complaint was filed by Vikas Sankritayan (@ Vikas Pandey), who alleged that a YouTube video uploaded by one Dhruv Rathee contained defamatory statements against him, claiming he was the "Second-in-Command of the BJP IT Cell" and had offered bribes to defame Rathee. The video's URL was shared by Dhruv Rathee on Twitter. Arvind Kejriwal subsequently retweeted this post, including the video link.

Sankritayan, who runs a social media page "I SUPPORT NARENDRA MODI ," claimed the allegations were false and malicious and severely damaged his reputation, particularly given Kejriwal 's large following. A Metropolitan Magistrate had summoned Kejriwal for the offence under Section 500 IPC (punishment for defamation), and this order was upheld by the Sessions Court.

Arguments Presented

Appearing for the petitioner, Senior Advocate Manish Vashishth argued that retweeting a link, where the petitioner was neither the original author nor publisher of the video, does not constitute 'publication' under Section 499 IPC. He contended there was no intent to harm, and the summoning was mechanical without proper scrutiny of the alleged defamation. It was also argued that an earlier complaint filed by the respondent in a different court against Kejriwal was withdrawn, which should amount to an acquittal under Section 257 CrPC, barring a fresh complaint.

Counsel for the respondent, Raghav Awasthi, countered that the allegations were indeed defamatory. He argued that by retweeting the video, the petitioner, a public figure with vast reach, republished the defamatory content to a national and international audience, causing significant harm. He clarified that the earlier complaint was withdrawn solely due to lack of jurisdiction in that court to hear cases against MPs/MLAs, and thus, Section 257 CrPC did not apply.

Court's Analysis and Findings

The High Court first addressed the argument regarding the withdrawal of the earlier complaint. It noted that the withdrawal was made at the pre-summoning stage, before the accused was even before the court, and specifically stated it was for the purpose of filing a fresh complaint before a court of competent jurisdiction (as special courts were constituted for MPs/MLAs). The Court held that Section 257 CrPC, which applies to the trial of summons-cases and results in acquittal, was not applicable in this scenario, as the trial had not begun and the withdrawal was based on jurisdictional grounds.

Turning to the core issue of defamation and retweeting, the Court extensively discussed the definition of defamation under Section 499 IPC, emphasizing the requirement of 'making or publishing' an imputation with intent or knowledge that it will harm reputation. Citing Google India Private Limited v. Visakha Industries , the Court reiterated that the essence of 'publication' is the communication of defamatory imputation to persons other than the defamed person.

The judgment delves into the unique challenges posed by the digital age, where information spreads rapidly. Justice Sharma noted, "The Cyber World turns Whispers into Symphony." She stressed the need for law to adapt to address reputational harm in the context of social media posts and reposts, stating that digital content has potential for immediate and widespread dissemination, amplifying its impact.

Crucially, the Court held that retweeting defamatory content will amount to 'publication' for the purpose of Section 499 IPC.

"A person retweeting a defamatory content, which has the potential of causing reputational injury to a person, cannot wriggle out of his responsibility by merely contending that it was a retweet and not the original tweet," the Court stated. It reasoned that retweeting represents to the large public following that the retweeter believes the content to be true, especially when the retweeter has a larger following than the original author.

The Court emphasized that while all retweets may amount to publication, the extent of harm depends on the influence and reach of the person retweeting. A retweet by a public figure like a Chief Minister with millions of followers has a significantly greater impact than one by someone with few followers.

The Court illustrated this point, stating that the reputational harm caused by the petitioner's retweet would be "exponentially more" than that resulting from thousands of retweets by users with negligible followers. The argument that the petitioner, a political person of standing, was unaware of the content or its potential to harm reputation cannot be appreciated at the summoning stage, as this relates to the mens rea (intent or knowledge) which is a matter for trial.

Conclusion

The High Court found no infirmity in the summoning orders passed by the lower courts. It reiterated that at the summoning stage, the court only needs to see if there are sufficient grounds to proceed, not if guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.

"Retweeting a content, which is allegedly defamatory, on the Twitter account and projecting it to be as if his own views, will prima facie attract the liability under Section 499 of IPC, for the purpose of issuance of summons," the judgment concluded.

The petition challenging the summoning orders was accordingly dismissed. The Court clarified that its observations were made solely for the purpose of deciding the petition and should not be construed as an opinion on the merits of the case, which will be adjudicated during the trial.

The ruling sets a precedent regarding the legal responsibility of individuals, particularly public figures, when sharing content originated by others on social media platforms, establishing that amplifying defamatory statements constitutes publication under Indian criminal law.