Revanth Reddy’s ‘Cash-for-Vote’ Case: Counsel Argues Pre-FIR Trap and Outdated Law Vitiate Prosecution

NEW DELHI – The Supreme Court is currently examining a challenge that strikes at the heart of investigative procedure and the retrospective application of anti-corruption laws. In the 2015 "Cash-for-Vote" case involving Telangana Chief Minister Revanth Reddy, his counsel has mounted a formidable two-pronged legal assault, arguing that the entire prosecution is foundationally flawed due to both procedural illegalities and a misapplication of the substantive law as it existed at the time of the alleged offence.

The matter, heard on Wednesday by a bench comprising Justice JK Maheshwari and Justice Vijay Bishnoi, centers on Reddy's plea to quash the proceedings against him. The case stems from allegations that in 2015, Reddy, then a member of the Telugu Desam Party (TDP), attempted to bribe a nominated MLA, Elvis Stephenson, to secure his vote in the Legislative Council elections.

Representing Reddy, Senior Advocate Mukul Rohatgi presented arguments that could have significant implications for how anti-corruption cases, particularly those predating the 2018 amendment to the Prevention of Corruption Act (PC Act), are adjudicated. The hearing remained inconclusive and is set to continue.

The Procedural Challenge: Was the ACB Trap Legally Valid?

The primary procedural argument advanced by Rohatgi was the alleged illegality of the trap laid by Telangana's Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB), which led to Reddy's arrest on May 31, 2015. Rohatgi contended that the entire operation was conducted before the registration of a First Information Report (FIR), a move he described as a fatal flaw that renders the subsequent investigation void.

"A trap was set up before an FIR was registered. The trap is completely illegal because no investigation can commence before registration of FIR under the CrPC. There was no general diary entry and no FIR," Rohatgi submitted to the bench.

This argument invokes a fundamental principle of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), which mandates the registration of an FIR as the starting point for any formal police investigation. The defense's position is that a 'trap' is not a preliminary inquiry but an integral part of the investigation itself. By conducting it without the legal sanction of a registered FIR, the ACB allegedly bypassed mandatory procedure, thereby tainting all evidence collected during the operation, including audio-visual recordings and the recovery of cash. This raises a critical question for the Court: Can an investigative action like a trap, designed to catch an accused red-handed, precede the very document that legally initiates an investigation?

The Substantive Challenge: Prosecuting a ‘Bribe Giver’ Under the 2015 Law

Beyond the procedural arguments, Rohatgi launched a robust attack on the substantive legal basis of the prosecution. He argued that Reddy, prosecuted as an alleged bribe giver, was charged under a statutory provision that, in 2015, did not criminalize his alleged actions.

Reddy is being prosecuted under Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which deals with the abetment of certain offences. Rohatgi meticulously deconstructed the legal framework as it existed nine years ago, before the significant 2018 amendment to the Act.

He explained that the pre-amendment Section 12 specifically punished the abetment of offences falling under Sections 7 and 11 of the PC Act. Critically, Rohatgi pointed out that in 2015, Sections 7 and 11 exclusively targeted the bribe taker —the public servant who accepts or attempts to accept an undue advantage. The act of offering a bribe by a private citizen was not explicitly covered under these sections.

"I am being prosecuted under Section 12 of the PC Act as it stood in 2015. It relates to abetment of offences under Sections 7 and 11. But in 2010, bribe givers were not covered under those provisions, only bribe takers were," Rohatgi asserted.

The legal lacuna, he argued, was only plugged by the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018. The amendment comprehensively restructured the Act, introducing specific provisions to penalize bribe givers and expanding Section 12 to cover the abetment of any offence under the entire Act. Rohatgi acknowledged this change was "logical" but stressed that it could not be applied retrospectively to an alleged offence from 2015, a cornerstone principle of criminal jurisprudence.

This line of reasoning presents the prosecution with a significant hurdle: proving that the act of offering a bribe in 2015 could be construed as abetting an offence that was legally defined at the time as being committed solely by the public servant accepting it.

Defining ‘Official Duty’: Is Voting an Act Covered by the PC Act?

A third, nuanced argument was also put forward: even if the Court were to find the procedural and substantive hurdles surmountable, the very act at the center of the allegation—voting in a Legislative Council election—does not qualify as an "official duty" of a public servant under the PC Act. Rohatgi contended that Sections 7 and 11 applied to acts done by a public servant in the discharge of their official functions. He argued that casting a vote, or abstaining from it, is a constitutional or representative function, distinct from the administrative or executive duties typically conceived as "official acts" under anti-corruption law.

This argument invites the Supreme Court to delineate the scope of "official duty" for legislators, a question with far-reaching consequences for cases involving parliamentary or legislative privileges and conduct.

Context and Future Implications

The arguments in A Revanth Reddy v. State of Telangana are not occurring in a vacuum. The Supreme Court has recently shown a willingness to engage with the intricacies of this case. Last month, the Court approved a Telangana High Court judgment that quashed the case against another co-accused, Jerusalem Mathai, lending some credence to the legal challenges being raised.

For legal practitioners, the outcome of this hearing will be closely watched. A ruling in favor of Reddy could reinforce the procedural sanctity of the FIR as an non-negotiable prerequisite for covert operations like traps. Furthermore, it would serve as a definitive interpretation of the pre-2018 PC Act, potentially impacting other pending corruption cases from that era that involve alleged bribe givers. The Court's deliberation on the definition of "official duty" could also set a new precedent for the prosecution of elected officials.

As the arguments are set to continue, the legal community awaits a decision that will clarify the boundaries of investigative power and the precise scope of India's anti-corruption framework, both past and present.