‘Right to Shortlist’ Clause Allows Setting Mid-Process Cut-Offs If Advertisement Permits: Delhi High Court - 2025-08-31

Delhi HC Upholds Supreme Court's Decision to Impose Mid-Recruitment Cut-Off, Cites 'Right to Shortlist' Clause in Advertisement

New Delhi: The Delhi High Court, in a significant ruling on service law, has held that a recruiting body can set a merit-based benchmark or cut-off mark at an intermediate stage of a selection process, provided the original recruitment advertisement expressly reserves the right to shortlist candidates.

Justice Prateek Jalan dismissed a batch of writ petitions filed by five candidates who were excluded from the Descriptive Test for the post of Junior Court Assistant (JCA) in the Supreme Court of India, despite having qualified the preceding Typing Speed Test. The court ruled that the Supreme Court Registry’s action did not amount to unlawfully “changing the rules of the game mid-way” as it was covered by a specific clause in the job advertisement.

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Background of the Case

The dispute arose from the 2025 recruitment drive for 241 JCA posts in the Supreme Court. The petitioners—Pramiti Basu, Anuj Chauhan, Shahid Ahmed, Taru Pant, and Saurabh Nishad—successfully cleared the initial objective and computer knowledge tests. They were then called for a Typing Speed Test, which, according to the advertisement, required a minimum speed of 35 words per minute with mistakes allowed up to 3%.

All five petitioners met this criterion and were declared “Qualified” in the results published on July 14, 2025. However, a notification stated that only candidates who scored 43.18 marks or more (equivalent to committing three or fewer mistakes) would be called for the next stage, the Descriptive Test. The petitioners, having scored between 38.64 and 40.91 marks, were consequently excluded. Aggrieved, they approached the Delhi High Court.

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Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Contentions:

Appearing for the petitioners, Dr. Amit George argued that imposing a new cut-off was a classic case of changing the rules after the game had begun. Key arguments included:

* The original advertisement only laid down minimum qualifying criteria for the typing test, not a merit-based benchmark for shortlisting.

* Once a candidate met the advertised qualifying conditions, they had a legitimate expectation to proceed to the next stage.

* Clause 18 of the advertisement, which reserved the right to shortlist, could not be used to introduce a new merit criterion retrospectively, especially after the test was concluded.

* The decision was arbitrary, as there was no compelling administrative reason to reduce the number of qualified candidates from 3,731 to 2,661 for the Descriptive Test.

Respondent's Defence:

Additional Solicitor General (ASG) Chetan Sharma, representing the Supreme Court, defended the decision by arguing:

* Clause 18 of the advertisement explicitly empowered the Registry to shortlist candidates "in any manner as may be considered appropriate."

* The cut-off of 43.18 marks was applied uniformly to maintain a 1:10 candidate-to-vacancy ratio, which was a rational and non-arbitrary administrative decision.

* Shortlisting had already been applied at an earlier stage of the same recruitment process, making the petitioners aware of this possibility.

* The action was consistent with the law laid down by the Supreme Court and was necessary for administrative efficiency.

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Court's Analysis and Application of Precedent

Justice Prateek Jalan centered his analysis on the recent Constitution Bench judgment in Tej Prakash Pathak & Ors. v. Rajasthan High Court & Ors. , which clarified the doctrine against changing selection rules midway.

The court observed that while the general rule is that eligibility criteria cannot be altered post-advertisement, the Tej Prakash Pathak judgment carves out an exception. It states that if the advertisement or the extant rules permit the recruiting authority to set benchmarks at different stages, such benchmarks can be set anytime before that specific stage is reached.

Justice Jalan reasoned that Clause 18 of the advertisement fell squarely within this exception. He stated:

"Applying the judgment of the Constitution Bench, I am of the view that the key to this case lies in a cohesive interpretation of both, Clause 18 of the advertisement, and of the 'Scheme of Examination' provided therein... Such a provision would therefore fall within the permissible discretion to the employer, as provided in paragraph 52 of Tej Prakash Pathak , subject to the test of Article 14 of the Constitution."

The court distinguished between "qualifying criteria" (like 35 wpm speed) and a "shortlisting benchmark" (the 43.18 cut-off). It held that the latter was a permissible exercise of the power reserved under Clause 18 to filter candidates based on merit for the subsequent stage.

The court also rejected the petitioners' argument that the decision was arbitrary. It noted from the official record that the 1:10 ratio was deemed "appropriate" in the context of the number of vacancies and the logistical requirements of conducting and evaluating a Descriptive Test for a large number of candidates.

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Final Decision

Finding the Supreme Court Registry's action to be a lawful, consistent, and rational exercise of administrative discretion explicitly provided for in the recruitment advertisement, the Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petitions. The court concluded that the shortlisting process was neither arbitrary nor a retrospective change in rules, but was a valid procedure to ensure efficiency in selecting the most meritorious candidates.