Karnataka High Court Sets Aside Cognizance Against H.D. Revanna in Harassment Case, Remands Matter for Delay Condonation Review

Bengaluru, November 19, 2025 – The Karnataka High Court today partly allowed a petition filed by MLA H.D. Revanna, setting aside the trial court's order taking cognizance of an offence under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) against him in a sexual harassment case. The Hon’ble Mr. Justice M.I.Arun, while refusing to quash the First Information Report (FIR), remanded the matter back to the trial court to freshly consider whether the significant delay in filing the complaint can be condoned under law.

The Court clarified that the allegations in the complaint prima facie constitute an offence of 'sexual harassment' under Section 354A IPC, which has a three-year limitation period for taking cognizance, rather than 'assault to outrage modesty' under Section 354 IPC, which carries a higher punishment.

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Background of the Case

The petition, filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), sought to quash an FIR registered against Mr. Revanna on April 28, 2024, at the Holenarasipura Police Station. The complainant, a former domestic help at Mr. Revanna's residence, alleged that she was subjected to sexual harassment by him and his son. She stated that she had left her job approximately four years prior to lodging the complaint due to the harassment.

The FIR initially included charges under Sections 354(A), 354(D), 506, and 509 of the IPC. Subsequently, the Special Investigation Team (SIT) filed a charge sheet, accusing Mr. Revanna of offences under Sections 354 and 354A of the IPC.

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Arguments of the Petitioner and the State

Mr. Revanna's counsel, led by Senior Advocates Sri. C.V. Nagesh and Sri. Prabhuling K.Navadgi, argued that the complaint was barred by the law of limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. This section prohibits courts from taking cognizance of offences punishable with imprisonment up to three years if the complaint is filed after a three-year period. They contended that the allegations, at best, fall under Section 354A IPC, for which the limitation period had expired, rendering the FIR legally untenable.

Representing the State, Senior Advocate Prof. Ravivarma Kumar argued that the petition to quash the FIR had become infructuous since a charge sheet had been filed and cognizance was taken by the magistrate. He further submitted that Section 468 Cr.P.C. bars the taking of cognizance by a court, not the registration of an FIR by the police. He also invoked Section 473 Cr.P.C., which allows courts to extend the limitation period if the delay is properly explained or if it is in the interest of justice. The State maintained that the investigation revealed a graver offence under Section 354 IPC, which is not barred by limitation due to its higher punishment quantum (up to five years).

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Court's Reasoning and Legal Principles

Justice M.I.Arun delivered a detailed order addressing the key legal questions raised:

On Maintainability after Charge Sheet

The Court first dismissed the State's preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the petition. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi) , the bench affirmed that the High Court's inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse of process is not restricted to the FIR stage and can be exercised even after a charge sheet is filed.

On Distinction between S.354 and S.354A IPC

The Court meticulously analyzed the allegations in the original complaint. Justice Arun observed: > "Reading of the complaint in entirety, one cannot attribute intent to outrage the modesty of a woman as against the petitioner, which is required to fulfill the conditions as contemplated in Section 354 of IPC. However, it satisfies the requirement of sexual harassment as contemplated under Section 354A of IPC."

This distinction was crucial, as it brought the case within the ambit of the three-year limitation period prescribed under Section 468 Cr.P.C.

On Limitation Bar under S.468 Cr.P.C.

The Court clarified a vital point of law: Section 468 Cr.P.C. imposes a bar on the court from taking cognizance, not on the police from registering an FIR. > "A bare perusal of the aforementioned sections reveal that what is barred is taking cognizance of an offence after the period of limitation... No where it is stated that if a complaint is presented to the police... they cannot register the FIR."

Since the trial court had taken cognizance based on the charge sheet which included the non-time-barred Section 354 IPC, it had not examined the question of delay.

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Final Decision and Its Implications

Given that the High Court found the appropriate charge to be under the time-barred Section 354A IPC, it concluded that the trial court must first decide on the condonation of delay. The judgment stated: > "Now, as this Court is of the opinion that the allegations made in the complaint attract the provision of Section 354A of IPC and not Section 354 of IPC, I am of the opinion that it is a fit case to remand the matter back to the trial court to consider afresh as to whether it is a fit case for condonation of delay or not..."

The Court, therefore, issued the following order: 1. The criminal petition was partly allowed. 2. The trial court's order taking cognizance against Mr. Revanna under Section 354 IPC was set aside. 3. The case was remanded to the trial court to consider condoning the delay under Section 473 Cr.P.C. and thereafter pass appropriate orders regarding taking cognizance for the offence under Section 354A IPC.

This ruling underscores the procedural safeguards in criminal law, ensuring that while police can investigate complaints, judicial cognizance for time-barred offences must be preceded by a conscious application of mind regarding the reasons for the delay.