S.52A Waqf Act Bar on Private Complaints Doesn't Apply to IPC/PC Act Offences for Illegal Property Alienation: Madhya Pradesh High Court - 2025-09-29

S.52A Waqf Act Doesn’t Bar Private Complaints for IPC/PC Act Offences in Property Alienation Cases, Rules MP High Court

Indore, MP – The Madhya Pradesh High Court has delivered a significant ruling, clarifying that the procedural bar under Section 52A(3) of the Waqf Act, 1995—which restricts cognizance of illegal property alienation to complaints by the Waqf Board or an authorized officer—does not extend to separate offences registered under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the Prevention of Corruption (PC) Act.

A Division Bench of Justice Vivek Rusia and Justice Binod Kumar Dwivedi dismissed a petition filed by Mr. Shabbir Bhai Palanpurwala, the former manager of 'Mazar-e-Najmi Waqf' in Ujjain, seeking to quash an FIR lodged against him for allegedly selling Waqf property using a forged permission letter. The court held that while the Waqf Act creates a specific offence for illegal alienation, it does not oust the applicability of general criminal laws like forgery, cheating, and corruption.

Background of the Case

The case originates from an FIR registered by the State Bureau of Investigation of Economic Offences (EOW) against Mr. Palanpurwala. The allegations state that in 2015, while serving as the manager (Mutawalli) of the Mazar, he executed a sale deed for a Waqf property for a sum of ₹11,00,000. The sale was purportedly based on a permission letter from the Madhya Pradesh Waqf Board.

However, a subsequent complaint filed in 2024 alleged that this permission letter was forged and that Mr. Palanpurwala, being a "public servant" under the Waqf Act, had misused his position. Consequently, an FIR was registered under various sections of the IPC, including 409 (Criminal breach of trust by public servant), 420 (Cheating), 467 (Forgery of valuable security), and 120B (Criminal Conspiracy), along with provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Arguments Before the Court

Petitioner's Submissions

Senior Counsel Shri Surendra Singh, representing Mr. Palanpurwala, argued for the quashing of the FIR on several grounds: * Good Faith: The petitioner acted in the bona fide belief that the Waqf Board's permission letter was genuine. * No Personal Gain: The sale consideration was deposited directly into the Mazar's bank account, and the petitioner received no personal benefit. * Corrective Action: Upon realizing the permission letter was questionable in 2016, he promptly cancelled the sale deed, returned the entire consideration to the buyers, and ensured possession of the property remained with the Mazar. * Locus Standi: The primary argument was that under Section 52A(3) of the Waqf Act, 1995, a court can only take cognizance of an offence of illegal alienation based on a complaint from the Waqf Board or a state-authorized officer. Since the current FIR was based on a private complaint, it was legally barred.

State and Complainant's Counter-Arguments

Shri Anand Soni, Additional Advocate General for the State, and Shri Ibrahim Kannodwala, counsel for the complainant, vehemently opposed the petition: * Forgery is a Separate Offence: They contended that the bar under Section 52A of the Waqf Act is limited to the offence defined within that section (illegal alienation). It does not prevent police from investigating distinct cognizable offences under the IPC and PC Act, such as forgery, cheating, and criminal conspiracy. * Cancellation No Absolution: The cancellation of the sale deed was argued to be a tactic to feign innocence and does not erase the initial criminal act of using a forged document. * Ongoing Investigation: The State informed the court that the investigation was active, with the former administrator of the Waqf Board, Shri Akshay Singh, having denied issuing the said permission letter. Handwriting samples were being analyzed to identify the forger.

Court's Analysis and Precedents

The High Court meticulously analyzed the scope of Section 52A of the Waqf Act, 1995. The bench observed that the provision creates a specific, cognizable, and non-bailable offence for alienating Waqf property without sanction, but its procedural bar on cognizance is limited to offences "under this section."

The court found this legal question analogous to the one decided by the Supreme Court in State of NCT of Delhi vs. Sanjay (2015) . In that case, the Apex Court held that the prohibition on private complaints under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, did not bar police from prosecuting individuals for the distinct offence of theft under the IPC.

Applying this principle, the High Court reasoned:

"From perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is apparent that bar imposed on Court to take cognizance of any offence under this section (Section 52A of the Act, 1995) is only with respect to the complaint if filed under Section 52A of the Act against alienation or purchases or taking possession of Waqf property. This bar does not operate when separate offences under IPC or other Act as Prevention of Corruption Act in the instant case has been registered."

The court further noted that the investigation had revealed prima facie evidence, including the categorical denial by the former Waqf Board administrator that he signed the permission letter. Therefore, the defences raised by the petitioner, including his claim of bona fide action, could not be evaluated at the preliminary stage of quashing an FIR.

Final Decision and Its Implications

Ultimately, the High Court concluded that no case was made out for exercising its inherent powers to quash the FIR. Citing the guidelines laid down in the landmark case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal , the bench held that the allegations, if taken at face value, constitute cognizable offences requiring a full investigation.

The petition was dismissed as being bereft of merit. However, the court clarified that the dismissal would not prevent the petitioner from raising these grounds at the stage of framing charges. This judgment reinforces the principle that special statutes creating specific offences do not automatically grant immunity from prosecution under general criminal laws for related but distinct crimes.