SC Warns Judicial Interference Could Break Indian Civilization

In a poignant reflection on India's pluralistic ethos, a nine-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India, hearing the high-stakes Sabarimala reference on its thirteenth day, voiced profound apprehensions about the perils of judicial overreach into religious domains. Justices cautioned that if courts indiscriminately scrutinize every religious practice—from temple entry rules to excommunication powers—India's ancient civilizational fabric, deeply intertwined with faith, could unravel. Senior Advocate Raju Ramachandran, representing the Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community, countered that constitutional supremacy demands judicial intervention where fundamental rights are trampled, advocating for "judicial statesmanship" over a complete hands-off approach. The exchanges also revisited the locus standi of the original Sabarimala PIL filer, the Indian Young Lawyers Association (IYLA), underscoring evolving judicial wariness toward public interest litigation.

This hearing, part of a broader inquiry into the contours of religious freedom under Articles 25 and 26, highlights simmering tensions between individual dignity and denominational autonomy. With implications rippling across cases involving Parsi women in fire temples, mosque entries, and even female genital mutilation, the bench's deliberations could reshape the judiciary's role in a society where religion is not merely personal but civilizational.

The Sabarimala Reference: Context and Stakes

The Sabarimala saga traces back to a 2006 PIL by IYLA challenging the Kerala temple's age-old custom barring women of menstruating age (10-50) from entering the Lord Ayyappa shrine, rooted in the deity's celibate (naishtika brahmachari) status. In 2018, a 4:1 majority struck down the restriction as unconstitutional discrimination, igniting protests and review petitions. In 2019, another bench referred seven pivotal questions to a larger nine-judge panel, including: What constitutes an "essential religious practice"? How to reconcile individual rights under Article 25(1) with group rights under Article 26? And the scope of judicial review over denominational affairs?

The current bench—Chief Justice Surya Kant, Justices B.V. Nagarathna, M.M. Sundresh, Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Aravind Kumar, Augustine George Masih, Prasanna B. Varale, R. Mahadevan, and Joymalya Bagchi—is navigating interconnected pleas. These encompass the Dawoodi Bohras' challenge to their Dai's excommunication powers (revived from a 1986 writ against the 1962 Sardar Syedna judgment), Parsi women's temple access post-interfaith marriage, Muslim women's mosque entry, and more. A prior five-judge bench flagged doubts on Sardar Syedna , which upheld excommunication as integral to denominational discipline, prompting this reference.

Excommunication in Dawoodi Bohras: Ramachandran's Case

Central to Day 13 was Ramachandran's assault on excommunication as arbitrary "civil death," violating dignity under Article 21 and free practice under Article 25(1). He described Bohra youth pledging absolute allegiance to the Dai upon puberty, only to face ostracism for secular acts—like reading a magazine or forming a cooperative without permission. Such punishment severs social ties, dissolves marriages, bars mosque entry, and denies community burial, he argued, transcending "matters of religion" into social tyranny.

Ramachandran urged harmonious construction: Article 26(b)'s management rights cannot eclipse Article 25(1). Endorsing Chief Justice B.P. Sinha's 1962 dissent, he invoked a "living Constitution" and "constitutional morality"—an evolving ethos safeguarding vulnerables. "Article 21 right has been taken away, because my life has been impacted," he submitted, rejecting waiver of rights and insisting constitutional courts, not civil forums, must probe fundamental breaches.

Justices Voice Alarm Over Endless Litigation

The bench, however, emphasized restraint. Justice Nagarathna queried: if a religious head challenges excommunication bans while believers contest specific ousters, whose rights prevail? Ramachandran prioritized the individual as the Constitution's "core."

Her broader worry: "Once everyone starts questioning certain religious practices or matters of religion before a constitutional court, then what happens to this civilization, where religion is so intimately connected with Indian society? There will be hundreds of petitions questioning this right, that right, closure of the temple, right? We are very, very conscious of this."

Justice Sundresh echoed: "religions will break" if courts delve into every intra-faith dispute. "Everybody will question everything. It's more like an in-house setup... How can court (intervene) when the legislature has been given a conscious right under Article 25(2)?" He and Nagarathna stressed India's uniqueness—a civilization enduring via religious "constants" amid diversity—warning nine-judge precedents must preserve, not shatter, this.

Justice Amanullah probed proportionality: Can courts deem a religious head's action "disproportionate"? Ramachandran affirmed for dignity's sake, but the justice cautioned deference where religion tinges the act.

PIL Locus Standi Under Fire

Earlier sessions critiqued IYLA's 2006 PIL, filed on newspaper clippings by then-president Naushad Ahmed Khan (a non-devotee). Chief Justice Kant queried its fruits: "What good came from this PIL?" Justices Nagarathna and Sundresh questioned a non-believer's standing to challenge faith customs, the absence of IYLA resolutions authorizing it, and prioritization over lawyers' welfare.

Advocate Ravi Prakash Gupta cited threats post-filing (granting protection) and prior benches' merits-finding. Yet the bench deemed newspaper-based PILs threshold-dismissible, terming procedural lapses "abuse of process." Solicitor General Tushar Mehta had earlier flagged PIL misuse.

Historical Evolution of Public Interest Litigation

PILs revolutionized access, broadening locus standi from aggrieved parties to "public-spirited" actors. Pioneered in Hussainara Khatoon (1979) on Bihar prisons, formalized in S.P. Gupta (1981): "If public duties are to be enforced... we have to utilise the initiative... of public-minded persons." Bandhua Mukti Morcha (1984) empowered NGOs for marginalized voices.

Yet caution grew: Janata Dal (1992) barred "busybodies"; Balwant Singh Chaufal (2010) mandated credentials checks, public interest proof, and costs for frivolous claims. CJI Kant affirmed current rigor against "external agendas."

Constitutional Tensions: Individual vs. Denominational Rights

At heart: Art. 25(1)'s free practice vs. Art. 26's autonomy. Ramachandran's "civilization under a Constitution" invokes statesmanship to test violations sans floodgates. Justices lean toward internal reform or legislative override (Art. 25(2)), proportionality tricky in faith contexts. Justice Bagchi urged specific rights-tests over vague "constitutional morality"; Amanullah: slight religious tinge shields under Art. 26.

1962 Sardar Syedna looms—upholding excommunication for discipline—but dissent and evolutions (e.g., Sabarimala) signal flux.

Implications for Legal Practice and Religious Freedom

For litigators, expect heightened locus scrutiny, bolstering Art. 26 defenses in essential practices claims (hijab, talaq). PIL filers must substantiate bona fides, avoiding media triggers. Denominations may fortify "internal" mechanisms; states, legislate reforms.

This could curtail judicial activism, preserving pluralism but risking unchecked abuses. Impacts: fewer religion PILs, stronger group rights, redefining "proportionality" in faith.

Looking Ahead: Toward Judicial Restraint?

As hearings continue, the bench weighs preservation of India's "constant"—religion-humanity nexus—against constitutional rectitude. Ramachandran's plea: "There cannot be a judicial hands off approach." Yet justices' civilizational lens signals measured intervention. For legal professionals, this reference promises enduring precedent on faith's frontiers.

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