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Supreme Court Grapples with Religious Customs in Landmark Sabarimala Reference
NEW DELHI – In a high-stakes constitutional showdown, a nine-judge Constitution Bench of the has begun dissecting the fragile balance between religious freedom and gender equality, centering on the contentious Sabarimala temple entry dispute. Hearings commenced on , with senior advocates mounting a robust defense of ancient customs, arguing that explicitly preserves pre-constitutional practices from judicial erasure. While Chief Justice Kant expressed tentative inclination toward these views, other justices voiced sharp skepticism, setting the stage for a verdict that could redefine the contours of faith-based rights across the nation.
The reference stems from the polarizing five-judge bench decision in , which by a 4:1 majority struck down the exclusion of women aged 10-50 from the Sabarimala shrine as violative of . Justice Indu Malhotra's dissent emphasized , cautioning against "interlopers" meddling in devotees' practices. Review petitions led to this larger bench referral, tasked with resolving core questions on Articles 25 and 26's interplay with equality provisions.
Background to the Sabarimala Saga and Reference
The Sabarimala temple, dedicated to Lord Ayyappa as a "Naisthik Brahmachari" (celibate deity), has long barred women of menstruating age based on a -endorsed custom rooted in tantric texts and pilgrimage ethos. Devotees view this as integral to the deity's identity, not discrimination. The ruling, however, invoked " " to prioritize individual rights, igniting nationwide protests and petitions.
This reference addresses seven pivotal issues: the meaning of " "; under ; limits of "morality" in ; and whether religious customs constitute protected "law." With submissions wrapping on , the Centre, via , urged secular courts to abstain from theological judgments, lacking "scholarly competence."
Decoding Article 25(2): Do Customs Qualify as 'Existing Law'?
, representing parties opposing women's entry, opened fire on reformist interpretations. He contended that
–
"Nothing in this Article shall affect the operation of any existing law"
– safeguards customs violating anti-discrimination norms.
"'Law' in
, in my humble submission, must be read as defined in
,"
Datar argued, insisting this encompasses "customs and usages."
Justice B.V. Nagarathna countered sharply, citing
's narrower definition of "existing law" excluding customs.
"The term used in
is 'existing law', not 'law',"
she noted. Justice Joymalya Bagchi suggested the clause preserved pre-constitutional statutes like Sati bans, not usages. Justice M.M. Sundresh was blunter:
"On the face of it, customs will not come under this... Existing law is that which is made by an authority, not custom."
Datar persisted:
"If the exclusion of women in a particular temple... were prevalent, they are all protected. They don't
become invalid."
Chief Justice Kant found "some force" in this, saying,
"I am personally inclined... that what you are saying is correct statement of law."
This exchange underscores a definitional fault line: (a) broadly includes customs for Part III invalidity tests, but does (a)'s savings clause import it? Legal scholars note this could validate myriad temple exclusions if affirmed.
Mounting Assault on 'Constitutional Morality'
Echoing across arguments was a fierce repudiation of "
" as a judicial super-tool.
, for the
, dissected
's restrictions – public order, morality, health – invoking
.
"The threshold of 'morality' must meet a similar threshold as its companions... viewed through the lens of religion,"
he urged, citing Digambara monks' nudity, beef/pork taboos, and temple dress codes.
"Why cover your head? Why go bare-chested? ... To give the government a handle... based on 'morality' as commonly understood would not be appropriate,"
Rohatgi warned. On
, he invoked Ambedkar:
"It was never meant to create a restriction... you are diluting the content of Articles 25 and 26. Therefore,
has no place as a restriction in our Constitution."
Datar aligned:
"The founding fathers would never have contemplated the 'morality' (in Articles 25, 26) to be '
' (going by Constituent Assembly debates)."
Mehta echoed, calling for its "total abandonment."
Religion's Historical and Associational Primacy
framed religion as "inherently associational," predating the Constitution.
"Religion existed before the Constitution; it is not a gift of the Constitution,"
he asserted, crediting denominations for India's civilizational continuity amid invasions. Unlike Europe's "clash of civilizations," India's evolution was debate-driven, from Shankaracharya-Mandana Misra discourses.
(b)'s "throwing open" to "classes and sections" targets historical untouchability (Poona Pact legacy), not general reform, Dwivedi argued. Justice Nagarathna agreed:
"Throw open is for entry... does not mean throw open for management... Opening the institution will not impact the religious affairs."
Locus Standi, Judicial Restraint, and State Limits
emerged as a bulwark. Rohatgi invoked Malhotra's dissent against PILs by non-devotees. Justice Nagarathna highlighted the challenge by
, sans devotee ties. Dwivedi urged "slow & light touch" review:
"Unless there is some malfunction or a fraud... courts should not interfere."
, for , argued State codification doesn't judicialize sacred practices. stressed worship syncing with deity character; deemed exclusion "valid classification."
rebutted eclipsing individual rights:
"Individual freedom of conscience cannot defeat the freedom of community."
Bench's Probing Interventions
The bench actively engaged. CJI Kant leaned sympathetic, but Sundresh dismissed customs broadly, Nagarathna parsed definitions meticulously, and Bagchi eyed legislative intent. advocated a "broad plane" view beyond case facts.
Legal Analysis: Balancing Faith and Equality
Analytically, counsels' thrusts challenge the essentiality test's evolution, post- Sabarimala . Including customs as "law" under harmonizes with Article 13's voiding mechanism, preventing automatic invalidity. Yet, justices' reliance on suggests a textualist curb, preserving reform leeway.
Rejecting aligns with originalism – Ambedkar's "spirit" guarded democracy, not policed pujas. fortifies high thresholds, shielding sects from majoritarian mores. Associational theory bolsters , distinguishing management (defer) from access (limited reform).
Risks abound: Affirm devotees' stance, and equality yields to esoterica; reverse, and courts ethnographize faiths.
Impacts on Legal Practice and Justice System
For practitioners, outcomes ripple. Constitutional litigators face recalibrated PIL thresholds – locus no longer symbolic? Endowment lawyers gain ammunition for in suits. Human rights advocates decry gender regression, but faith groups celebrate.
Nationally, parallels loom: Hijab bans, Shani Shingnapur chains, mosque surveys. A pro-customs ruling could federalize temple laws, spurring State notifications under . Judiciary-wise, it mandates "light touch," curbing overreach amid 40%+ religious petitions.
PIL culture evolves – "interlopers" sidelined, devotees empowered. Amid rising communalism, it tests secularism's steel.
Looking Ahead
As arguments conclude, the bench holds religion's fate. Will Article 25 cradle customs or capitulate to ? India's plural tapestry awaits – a verdict blending reverence and reason, lest faith fracture fraternity.
