Anti-Corruption Law
Subject : Litigation - Criminal Law & Procedure
New Delhi – The Supreme Court of India is currently seized with critical questions surrounding procedural law and the interpretation of anti-corruption statutes in a high-profile case involving Telangana Chief Minister A. Revanth Reddy. On Wednesday, a bench comprising Justice JK Maheshwari and Justice Vijay Bishnoi heard extensive arguments in Reddy’s plea to quash the 2015 "Cash for Votes" criminal case, with his counsel challenging the very foundation of the prosecution's case.
The proceedings, which remained inconclusive and are set to continue, centered on a two-pronged legal challenge articulated by Senior Advocate Mukul Rohatgi. The defense contends that the entire case is vitiated by a fundamental procedural illegality—an anti-corruption "trap" conducted before the registration of a First Information Report (FIR)—and is substantively untenable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act) as it existed at the time of the alleged offence.
The case, titled A Revanth Reddy v. State of Telangana , originates from events during the 2015 Telangana Legislative Council elections. On May 31, 2015, Revanth Reddy, then a prominent leader of the Telugu Desam Party (TDP), was arrested by the state's Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB). The prosecution alleges that Reddy was caught in a sting operation while attempting to offer a bribe of ₹50 lakh to Elvis Stephenson, a nominated MLA, to secure his vote for the TDP's candidate.
The ACB subsequently filed a charge sheet against Reddy and several others, invoking provisions of the PC Act and Section 120B (criminal conspiracy) of the Indian Penal Code. The agency claimed to possess "clinching evidence," including audio and video recordings of the transaction. The case has since traversed various legal forums, culminating in the current Special Leave Petition before the apex court seeking to quash the proceedings.
The primary argument advanced by Mukul Rohatgi was a direct assault on the legality of the investigation's inception. He asserted that the ACB's trap operation was "completely illegal" because it was executed prior to the registration of an FIR, which he argued is a mandatory prerequisite for the commencement of any investigation under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).
"A trap was set up before an FIR was registered," Rohatgi submitted emphatically. "The trap is completely illegal because no investigation can commence before registration of FIR under the CrPC. There was no general diary entry and no FIR."
This argument strikes at the heart of criminal procedure, positing that investigative actions like laying a trap cannot be undertaken in a legal vacuum. The defense's stance suggests that without the formal initiation of a case through an FIR, any evidence gathered through such a proactive measure is tainted by procedural impropriety and is inadmissible. This raises a significant question for the Court: does a preliminary inquiry or a "pre-trap" verification process fall outside the ambit of "investigation" as defined by the CrPC, or is an FIR an inviolable starting point for any coercive or evidence-gathering action by an agency?
The second, and equally critical, pillar of the defense's case rests on a nuanced interpretation of the PC Act as it stood in 2015. Rohatgi argued that Revanth Reddy, as an alleged bribe-giver , could not be prosecuted under the then-existing statutory framework.
His submissions focused on Section 12 of the PC Act, under which Reddy is being prosecuted. Rohatgi explained that in 2015, Section 12 exclusively dealt with the abetment of offences defined under Sections 7 and 11 of the Act.
"I am being prosecuted under Section 12 of the PC Act as it stood in 2015. It relates to abetment of offences under Sections 7 and 11. But in 2010, bribe givers were not covered under those provisions, only bribe takers were," he argued.
He meticulously walked the bench through the pre-amendment text, pointing out that Sections 7 and 11 were narrowly tailored to criminalize the act of a public servant accepting or attempting to accept an "undue advantage." Consequently, he contended, Section 12 only punished the abetment of bribe-taking by a public servant, leaving the bribe-giver outside its direct purview.
Rohatgi acknowledged that the law was significantly altered by the 2018 amendment to the PC Act, which explicitly criminalized the act of giving a bribe and broadened the scope of Section 12. Justice Maheshwari's query, "So earlier it was abetment of Sections 7 and 11, and now…?" prompted Rohatgi to clarify this distinction. He noted that the amended Section 12 now covers the abetment of any offence under the entire Act, which he described as "logical." However, he stressed the cardinal legal principle that such substantive changes to criminal law cannot be applied retrospectively.
Beyond the two main challenges, the defense raised an additional point concerning the nature of the act itself. Rohatgi argued that even if the sections were applicable, they pertained to acts done by a public servant "in the discharge of official duty." He submitted that casting a vote in a Legislative Council election does not qualify as an "official act" within the meaning of the PC Act. This argument could have far-reaching implications for how the actions of legislators are defined and policed under anti-corruption laws.
The Court was also reminded of a recent development in the same case. Last month, the Supreme Court had approved a Telangana High Court judgment that quashed the proceedings against a co-accused, Jerusalem Mathai, lending potential precedential weight to the arguments being made for Reddy.
The outcome of this hearing will be closely watched by the legal community. A definitive ruling from the Supreme Court on the necessity of an FIR before a trap operation could reshape investigative protocols for anti-corruption agencies nationwide. Furthermore, its interpretation of the pre-2018 PC Act will be determinative for numerous pending cases from that era, clarifying the legal liability of alleged bribe-givers.
The hearing is scheduled to continue on Thursday, when the prosecution is expected to present its counter-arguments.
#SupremeCourt #PreventionOfCorruptionAct #CrPC
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