The Supreme Court of India has ruled that courts exercising appellate jurisdiction under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, cannot reduce an arbitral award simply because the sum appears excessive or because the award debtor is a government entity. In a significant judgment, the apex court set aside a Calcutta High Court decision that had halved an arbitration award in favor of M/s Marino Dredgeco Limited, reaffirming that the scope of judicial interference in arbitration is strictly limited by statute.

The dispute originated from a contract awarded to Marino Dredgeco for dredging the riverbed and shores at Sagar Island, intended to create an approach channel and basin for a shore-based pilot station. Following completion of the primary work, the contractor was tasked with additional dredging necessitated by adverse force majeure conditions and a mismatch between the soil constitution data provided by the Port Trust and actual site conditions. Despite the successful inauguration of the pilot station in 2001, the Port Trust withheld payments for the additional works, leading to an arbitration process that culminated in an award favoring the contractor on November 3, 2003.

While a single judge of the Calcutta High Court initially upheld the arbitrator’s findings, a subsequent Division Bench, hearing an appeal under Section 37 of the Act, modified the award. The Division Bench halved the quantum of compensation and reduced the interest rate to 6%, reasoning that the cost of additional work—exceeding 70% of the original contract value—"shocked the conscience" of the court.

Writing for the Bench, Justice K. Vinod Chandran, alongside Justice J. B. Pardiwala, explicitly rejected this approach. The Court noted that the Division Bench had itself acknowledged that the award was supported by sufficient evidence and could not be termed as perverse or patently illegal. The Supreme Court underscored that the "shocking the conscience" test is not a license for a court to perform an ad hoc reassessment of the merits of a claim.

Limitations of Judicial Review

The Supreme Court emphasized that the High Court’s intervention relied on a subjective presumption that additional work cannot be valued at a substantial percentage of the original contract. The judgment clarified that an award backed by valid evidence, including joint measurements and documented invoices, is not subject to arbitrary modification. "Having found that the arbitration award was based on adequate evidence and by no stretch of imagination it can be termed as perverse or patently illegal , we find the modification on the ground of ‘ shocking the conscience ’ to be not coming within the contours of the jurisdiction conferred under Section 37," the Court observed.

Furthermore, the Bench dismissed the notion that government entities warrant special treatment when challenging a money decree. Referring to the precedent in Pam Developments Private Ltd. v. State of West Bengal , the Court reiterated that all parties to an arbitration must be treated with equality, regardless of the status of the award debtor. The Court found no legal basis for the Port Trust to receive preferential treatment or for the High Court to substitute its own perception of a "reasonable" bill for the arbitrator’s quantified determination.

Rejection of Arbitrary Severance

The ruling also addressed the legal constraints on partially setting aside an arbitration award. Applying the principles from the recent Constitution Bench decision in Gayatri Balasamy v. M/s ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited , the Court held that the High Court’s flat 50% reduction was improper because the claims for additional dredging work were intrinsically linked to the same project and measurements. There was no distinct, invalid portion of the award that could be severed; rather, the Division Bench had merely replaced the arbitrator’s technical assessment with a generalized, unsupported reduction.

The Court held that because the arbitrator had relied upon pre- and post-work levels and valid invoices, the quantification of the claim was a matter within the arbitrator's mandate. By re-examining these documents and arbitrarily slashing the award, the High Court effectively exceeded the scope of its supervisory power, which is designed to ensure procedural fairness rather than to reopen factual findings.

The Supreme Court’s decision serves as a stern reminder that the "shocking the conscience" ground for interference must be grounded in substantive reasons, such as a blatant conflict with the fundamental notions of morality or justice, rather than mere disagreement with the size of a financial claim. The Court allowed the contractor’s appeal, set aside the impugned judgment, and restored the original arbitral award in its entirety. The appeal filed by the Port Trust was consequently disposed of, bringing a definitive end to the protracted legal battle over the additional dredging invoices.