SC/ST Act Conviction Requires Proof Victim's Caste Was 'A Ground' for Offence: Supreme Court Sets Aside Conviction Under S.3(2)(v) - 2025-05-02

Supreme Court Upholds Gang Rape Conviction, Sets Aside SC/ST Act Charge Citing Lack of Evidence on Caste Motivation

New Delhi: The Supreme Court of India, in a significant ruling, has set aside the conviction of an appellant under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (SC/ST Act), emphasizing that for a conviction under this provision (as it stood before the 2016 amendment), the prosecution must establish that the victim's caste identity was at least one of the grounds for the commission of the offence.

While overturning the SC/ST Act conviction due to insufficient evidence on this specific ground, the Bench comprising Justices K.V. Viswanathan and Sanjay Karol upheld the appellant's conviction for kidnapping (Section 366 IPC), wrongful confinement (Section 342 IPC), and gang rape (Section 376(2)(g) IPC). The Court modified the sentence for gang rape from life imprisonment to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment, ensuring parity with a co-accused.

Case Background

The appeal challenged a Madhya Pradesh High Court judgment which had confirmed the conviction and sentence imposed by the Special Judge (SC/ST Act), Katni. The appellant, Raju @ Umakant (Accused No. 1), along with Jalandhar Kol (Accused No. 2), was accused of abducting the prosecutrix ('R') on the night of June 23, 2004, confining her, and committing gang rape.

The prosecution case began with a missing person report filed by the prosecutrix's father (PW-2). 'R' was recovered four days later. The initial FIR (Exh. P-20) and a subsequent complaint (Exh. P-3) detailed the abduction and rape. The Trial Court convicted both accused, sentencing Raju to life imprisonment for gang rape under IPC and the SC/ST Act. The High Court upheld these findings.

Arguments Presented

The appellant's counsel highlighted inconsistencies between the initial FIR (which primarily implicated Jalandhar in the rape, suggesting Raju merely assisted) and the prosecutrix's later testimony where she accused both of rape. The defence also suggested a prior relationship between the prosecutrix and Jalandhar , implying consent.

The State counsel relied heavily on the prosecutrix's (PW-1) testimony, arguing it was consistent, credible, and sufficient for conviction, corroborated by the recovery evidence.

Court's Reasoning on IPC Convictions

The Supreme Court found the prosecutrix's (PW-1) testimony credible and confidence-inspiring, despite minor contradictions between initial reports and her deposition. The Court reiterated the principle that a rape victim is not an accomplice, and her testimony, if trustworthy, can form the sole basis for conviction.

Gang Rape (S. 376(2)(g) IPC): The Court emphasized Explanation 1 to Section 376(2)(g), stating: > "Where a woman is raped by one or more in a group of persons acting in furtherance of their common intention, each of the persons shall be deemed to have committed gang rape..."

Referring to precedents like Pramod Mahto and Ashok Kumar , the Court held that common intention was evident from the coordinated abduction, confinement, and assault. Therefore, even if initial reports were less specific about Raju 's role in the sexual act itself, his participation in the crime with common intention made him liable for gang rape.

Consent (S. 114A Evidence Act): The Court invoked Section 114A of the Evidence Act (as it stood in 2004), which presumes absence of consent in gang rape cases if the prosecutrix states she did not consent. The Court found the defence failed to rebut this presumption, dismissing defence witness testimonies as unreliable.

Two-Finger Test: The Court strongly deprecated the use of the 'two-finger test' during the victim's medical examination in 2004, reaffirming its rulings in Lillu v. State of Haryana and State of Jharkhand v. Shailendra Kumar Rai that the practice is unscientific, inhuman, and has no bearing on consent.

Analysis of SC/ST Act Charge (S. 3(2)(v))

This became the crucial point leading to partial relief for the appellant. The Court analyzed Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act (pre-2016 amendment), which required the offence under the IPC (punishable with 10+ years) to be committed against an SC/ST member "on the ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe" .

Citing Dinesh v. State of Rajasthan , the Court noted the sine qua non was proof that the offence was committed because of the victim's caste. It further elaborated on the interpretation provided in Patan Jamal Vali v. State of Andhra Pradesh :

> "...A true reading of Section 3(2)(v) would entail that conviction under this provision can be sustained as long as caste identity is one of the grounds for the occurrence of the offence." (Emphasis added - from Patan Jamal Vali )

While acknowledging that caste need not be the sole ground, the Court, applying this standard to the present case, found a complete lack of evidence:

> "Reverting to the facts of this case, we find that there was no evidence to bring the case within the threshold of Patan Jamal Vali (supra). There is no evidence whatsoever to establish the fact that the victims caste identity was one of the grounds for the occurrence of the offence. In the absence of any evidence attracting the offence of Section 3(2)(v), we are constrained to record an acquittal for the appellant from the charge of Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act." (Para 44)

Final Decision and Sentence Modification

Based on this analysis, the Court reached the following conclusion:

The conviction under Sections 366, 342, and 376(2)(g) of the IPC was upheld .

The conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act, 1989 was set aside .

The sentence for the offence under Section 376(2)(g) IPC was modified from life imprisonment to 10 years rigorous imprisonment (with fine and default sentence), bringing it in line with the sentence imposed on the co-accused Jalandhar Kol.

Sentences under Sections 366 and 342 IPC were maintained.

All sentences are to run concurrently.

The appeal was thus partly allowed. The appellant, currently in custody, will serve the remainder of his modified sentence.