Karnataka High Court Overturns Rape and Cheating Conviction, Cites Consensual Relationship

Bengaluru, Karnataka – The Karnataka High Court, in a significant judgment dated April 16, 2025, has set aside the conviction and sentence of A.R. Jayakumar , who was previously found guilty of rape (Section 376 IPC) and cheating (Section 417 IPC) by the I Additional District & Sessions Judge, Chikmagalur. The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ramachandra D.Huddar , presiding over Criminal Appeal No. 820 of 2013, ruled that the sexual relationship between the appellant and the prosecutrix (PW.3) was consensual, arising from a love affair, and that the subsequent failure to marry did not automatically render the prior acts as rape under a "misconception of fact."

Case Background

The prosecution's case originated from a complaint lodged by PW.2, the father of the victim (PW.3). It was alleged that A.R. Jayakumar , a neighbour of the victim's family in Athimogge village, developed a love affair with PW.3. Under the promise of marriage, Jayakumar allegedly had forcible sexual intercourse with her on several occasions. When PW.3 became pregnant, Jayakumar reportedly refused to marry her, leading to the complaint.

The trial court, after examining 18 prosecution witnesses (PW.1 to PW.18) and documentary evidence (Exs.P1 to P28), convicted Jayakumar under Sections 376 and 417 of the IPC, sentencing him to 7 years of simple imprisonment for rape and 6 months for cheating, with sentences to run concurrently. The accused was, however, acquitted of charges under Section 420 IPC.

Arguments Presented

Appellant's Counsel (Sri. Umesh P.B for Sri. Ravindra B. Deshpande): The defence argued that the trial court's judgment was contrary to law and evidence. Key contentions included: * The testimonies of the complainant (PW.2), the victim (PW.3), and her mother (PW.5) were contradictory, unreliable, and artificial. * There was suppression of material facts regarding consent. * The prosecution failed to prove the ingredients of Sections 376 and 417 IPC beyond a reasonable doubt. * The acquittal under Section 420 IPC indicated that the ingredients of cheating were not established. * The complaint was a fabrication arising only after the accused refused to marry the victim.

Respondent's Counsel (Sri. Channappa Erappa, HCGP): The prosecution maintained that: * The victim's testimony was sufficient to prove the offences. * The accused exploited the love affair and the promise to marry to have sexual intercourse. * The victim's pregnancy and alleged abortion at the instance of the accused established his motive. * The trial court rightly convicted the accused based on the evidence.

High Court's Analysis and Legal Principles

Justice Huddar meticulously re-evaluated the evidence, particularly the testimonies of PW.2 (father), PW.3 (victim), and PW.5 (mother). The Court noted crucial aspects:

Nature of Relationship: PW.3 herself admitted to a physical relationship with the accused for about two years prior to the complaint. She stated that they had sexual intercourse frequently at various places. Her father (PW.2) and mother (PW.5) were also aware of the love affair.

Consent: The Court scrutinized the definition of "consent" under Section 90 of the IPC, which clarifies that consent given under fear of injury or a misconception of fact is not true consent. The judgment emphasized: > "The conduct of the victim girl shows that, she being an aged more than 18 years has given consent for sexual intercourse with the accused with whom she was deeply in love... The conduct of this PW.3 itself goes to shows that, this consent cannot be said to be given under misconception of facts. Therefore, it appears that, the consensus of judicial opinion is in favour of the view that, the consent given by the victim to sexually intercourse with whom she was deeply in love on a promise that, he would marry her on later days, cannot be said to be given under misconception of facts. A false promise is not a fact within the meaning of the penal code." (Para 36)

Timing of Complaint: The complaint was lodged only after two years of the relationship, when the accused allegedly refused to marry PW.3. PW.2, the father, admitted knowing about the relationship for 2-3 years prior to the complaint but took no steps.

The Court referred to key Supreme Court precedents to underscore its reasoning:

Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar V/s. State of Maharashtra and Others (2019) 18 SCC 191: The High Court quoted: > "Thus, there is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex. The court, in such cases, must very carefully examine whether the complainant had actually wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide motives and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception... If the accused has not made the promise with the sole Intention to seduce the prosecutrix to indulge in sexual acts, such an act would not amount to rape." (Para 38, quoting Dr. Dhruvaram)

Naim Ahamed V/s. State (NCT of Delhi) (2023) 15 SCC 385 (referencing Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana): The High Court highlighted: > "Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim... The 'failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term 'misconception of fact', the fact must have an immediate relevance'." (Para 40, quoting Naim Ahamed/Deepak Gulati)

Applying these principles, the Court found that the prosecution failed to establish that the accused had a mala fide intention from the outset or that PW.3's consent was vitiated by a "misconception of fact" as legally understood.

The Court observed: > "Thus, from the evidence of PWs. 2, 3 and 5, it can never be stated that, the ingredients of the offence so made out against the accused are fulfilled by the prosecution with legal evidence. There is a clear evidence spoken by PW.3 that, she herself had submitted herself for sexual intercourse. She was in continuous such relationship for a period of two years prior to filing of the complaint... At the most, it is consensual sexual intercourse in between PW.3 and the accused. No mala fide intention on the part of the accused is established under the provisions of Sections 376 or 417 of IPC." (Para 41)

Final Decision and Implications

The High Court concluded that the trial court had erred in its appreciation of evidence and that its judgment suffered from legal infirmities.

The Court ordered: 1. The Criminal Appeal was allowed. 2. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 26/27.07.2013 were set aside. 3. A.R. Jayakumar was acquitted of the charges under Sections 376 and 417 of the IPC. 4. Bail bonds, if any, were cancelled, and he was set at liberty.

This judgment reinforces the legal distinction between a breach of a promise to marry arising from a consensual relationship and a fraudulent promise of marriage made with the sole intent to deceive for sexual gratification, the latter potentially falling under the ambit of rape. It underscores the necessity for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that consent was obtained under a "misconception of fact" from the very beginning of the relationship.