Supreme Court Defers to High Court in Challenge to UP School Closures, Reinforcing Jurisdictional Boundaries

NEW DELHI, August 18, 2025 – The Supreme Court of India today declined to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution in a significant public interest litigation, instead directing the matter to the Allahabad High Court. The case, brought by Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) MP Sanjay Singh, challenges the Uttar Pradesh government's decision to close 105 government-run primary schools, raising critical questions about the intersection of executive policy, statutory mandates, and the fundamental right to education.

A division bench comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice A.G. Masih dismissed the writ petition as withdrawn, emphasizing that since identical challenges are already sub-judice before the Allahabad High Court, it is the appropriate forum to adjudicate the dispute. The Court’s decision underscores a crucial jurisprudential principle: the preference for exhausting remedies at the High Court level, particularly when the enforcement of statutory rights is the primary issue.

While acknowledging the gravity of the matter, with Senior Advocate Kapil Sibal highlighting that the future of thousands of students hangs in the balance, the bench granted the petitioner liberty to approach the High Court. It further stressed that the High Court should prioritize the hearing, given the significant public interest involved.

The case, Sanjay Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. , serves as a pivotal examination of the limits of executive power in the realm of educational policy and its accountability to legislative frameworks like the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act).

Background: Policy Justification vs. Statutory Mandate

The legal challenge stems from executive orders issued by the Uttar Pradesh government on June 16 and June 24, 2025, which sanctioned the closure of 105 primary schools. The state justified this move by citing zero or negligible student enrollment in these institutions. It framed the decision not as a shutdown but as a "pairing" or merger with proximate, better-functioning schools. This, the government argued, is a strategic step towards resource rationalization and quality enhancement, in alignment with the objectives of the National Education Policy (NEP) 2020.

However, the petitioner contested this narrative, framing the government's action as an "arbitrary, unconstitutional, and legally impermissible" infringement upon the rights of children. The core of the legal challenge rests on the argument that this executive decision directly contravenes both the constitutional guarantee of education and the specific, non-negotiable provisions of the RTE Act.

Key Legal Arguments Advanced

The writ petition meticulously detailed several grounds for challenging the state's decision, offering a compelling analysis for legal practitioners in administrative and constitutional law.

1. Violation of the "Neighbourhood School" Norm: The petition places significant reliance on Rule 4(1)(a) of the RTE Rules, which statutorily obligates the state to establish a primary school (Classes I-V) within a one-kilometre walking distance of any habitation with a population of at least 300. This provision is the bedrock of the RTE Act's goal of ensuring universal access to elementary education.

The petitioner argued that by closing existing schools, the state is effectively dismantling this statutory infrastructure, thereby creating access barriers. The petition contends that the "impugned action has the effect of denying children access to education within the statutory neighborhood limits and fails to make alternative arrangements as per the mandatory requirements under the Rules." This raises a critical question: can a policy objective, such as resource rationalization, override a clear statutory mandate designed to ensure fundamental rights?

2. The Doctrine of Ultra Vires : A central pillar of the petitioner's case is that the government’s closure order is an ultra vires executive action. The argument posits that once a school is established under the authority of Section 6 of the RTE Act, its existence is protected by that statute. Consequently, its closure or merger cannot be effected through a simple executive instruction lacking specific legislative authority.

"The closure or merger of a school, once established under Section 6 read with Rule 4(1)(a), cannot be undertaken on the basis of an executive instruction lacking legislative authority," the petition averred. This argument challenges the state's power to unilaterally alter the educational landscape without adhering to the procedural and substantive safeguards laid out in the parent legislation.

3. Disproportionate Impact on Vulnerable Communities: The plea brought a crucial social justice dimension to the legal arguments, asserting that the school closures would disproportionately harm the most marginalized sections of society. It specifically identified children aged 6 to 11 from Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, minority communities, and particularly girls, as the primary victims.

The petition vividly described the tangible consequences: "Many parents have withdrawn their wards from schools due to safety concerns and logistical impossibilities, resulting in de facto denial of access to schools, and pushing children back into labour or 'domestic work.'" This transforms the legal challenge from an abstract debate on administrative power into a pressing issue of fundamental rights and social equity.

4. Failure of Procedural Fairness: The petition also alleged a significant procedural lapse, claiming the decision was made without any public consultation. More specifically, it pointed to the failure to involve the School Management Committees (SMCs), whose role is statutorily defined under the RTE Act. The circumvention of these grassroots bodies, the plea suggests, renders the decision-making process arbitrary and non-compliant with the participatory governance model envisioned by the Act.

The Supreme Court's Jurisdictional Stance

The Supreme Court's refusal to entertain the petition was not a comment on its merits but a reinforcement of judicial hierarchy and process. The bench noted that the enforcement of statutory rights, such as those under the RTE Act, should first be pursued through the High Courts under Article 226. The writ of Mandamus under Article 32 is typically reserved for direct and egregious violations of fundamental rights where no alternative efficacious remedy exists.

By directing the petitioner to the Allahabad High Court, where similar matters are already being heard, the apex court promotes judicial consistency and allows the High Court, which has a better grasp of the local context, to conduct a thorough first-instance review. This procedural propriety ensures that the Supreme Court is not inundated with matters that can be effectively resolved by the High Courts.

Broader Implications for Education Law and Policy

While the Supreme Court's order is procedural, the case itself signals a looming legal battle over the implementation of the NEP 2020. As states move to consolidate schools and restructure educational resources, they will likely face legal challenges grounded in the RTE Act's framework. This case will be closely watched by legal experts, policymakers, and civil society organizations.

The eventual decision by the Allahabad High Court will have far-reaching implications. It will need to balance the state's executive prerogative to formulate policy for efficient governance against its statutory and constitutional duty to provide accessible education. The outcome will likely set a precedent on whether the "rationalization" and "consolidation" goals of NEP 2020 can legally justify actions that may dilute the "neighbourhood school" guarantee of the RTE Act. The fate of the 105 schools, and potentially many more across the country, now rests with the High Court's interpretation of these competing interests.