The Supreme Court of India has formally discharged a man from longstanding criminal charges, including rape, cheating, and bigamy, emphasizing that the criminal justice system cannot be weaponized to settle personal scores when adult relationships sour. In a significant judgment, the Court ruled that consensual sexual acts between adults during a mutually affectionate relationship cannot be retrospectively criminalized simply because the relationship later terminated.

The bench, comprising Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice R. Mahadevan, addressed the legality of the prosecution initiated by the appellant’s former partner. The couple had cohabited as husband and wife between 1996 and 2003, following a ceremony in Mysuru. Years after the relationship concluded, the respondent filed a complaint alleging that the appellant had deceived her by claiming to be a bachelor when he was already married, thereby rendering her consent to sexual acts invalid under the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

Rejecting the prosecution’s reliance on these allegations, the Court observed that it was not within its mandate to act as a moral arbiter over the private decisions of consenting adults. "It is trite to reiterate at this stage that this court has not been entrusted to pass moral judgment on the varying exercises of free choice, autonomy and agency by individuals in the country," the bench stated. The justices reasoned that while individuals may make decisions that are wise or unwise, prudent or reckless, such personal choices do not automatically transform into criminal offenses requiring the intervention of the state.

Examining the Validity of Consent

The Court scrutinized the specific allegations regarding the appellant’s matrimonial status. It was noted that the respondent acknowledged in earlier legal proceedings that she had become aware of the appellant’s previous marriage within six months of their initial cohabitation. Despite this knowledge, she continued to live with him for several years. The Court found that this ongoing conduct effectively undermined the claim that she had been under a constant misconception of fact or that her consent to sexual relations was perpetually vitiated by deception.

The judicial analysis underscored that the definition of rape under Section 376 of the IPC , specifically sub-section (2)(n), is intended to address aggravated instances of sexual assault, not the regrets of a failed union. The Court pointed out that "the legislature has never intended that consensual sexual acts between adults occurring during a mutually affectionate relationship, to be retrospectively criminalised merely because the relationship came to an end."

By distinguishing between genuine cases of sexual violence—where trust and autonomy are fundamentally violated through coercion—and consensual relationships that have turned acrimonious, the Court aimed to protect the integrity of the criminal law. It warned that failing to make this distinction risks diluting the gravity of heinous offenses and subjects accused individuals to irreparable stigma and harassment through prolonged litigation.

Procedural History and Legal Recourse

The case arrived before the Supreme Court following multiple rounds of litigation. After the initial separation in 2003, the respondent had initiated proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, which were dismissed in 2009 for lack of evidence regarding a validly subsisting marriage. Subsequently, a private complaint was filed, which was also dismissed for non-prosecution.

The FIR at the center of the current appeal was the result of a second, nearly identical complaint referred to the Kadirur Police Station under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Kerala High Court had previously upheld the trial court's decision to frame charges, concluding that a prima facie case existed. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the lower courts had failed to properly evaluate whether the essential ingredients for offenses under Sections 376, 420, 493, 494, and 495 of the IPC were actually present.

Regarding the charge of cheating under Section 420, the Court found no evidence that the appellant had induced the respondent to deliver any property or valuable security through deceit. Similarly, the charges related to bigamy and the concealment of a former marriage were found wanting, as the nature of the relationship was characterized as a domestic arrangement rather than a legally recognized marriage. The Court noted that the respondent was unable to provide definitive details of the marriage ceremony or produce witnesses, further weakening the prosecution's claim.

Judicial Caution Against Weaponization

The ruling serves as a stern reminder of the growing trend of converting failed interpersonal relationships into criminal cases. The Supreme Court highlighted that such "weaponization of criminal law" often occurs after a long delay and is sometimes motivated by personal vengeance or the desire to force financial settlements. The bench observed that the judiciary must be vigilant in ensuring that the criminal justice apparatus is not exploited to settle grievances that are essentially civil or personal in nature.

"The mere factum of the relationship having turned sour and acrimonious cannot on its own convert earlier incidences of consent to sexual acts into offences of rape," the Court held. It further cautioned that courts must adopt a holistic view of the relationship rather than fixating solely on its end point.

The Supreme Court ultimately allowed the appeals filed by the appellant and set aside the impugned orders of the High Court and the trial court. Consequently, the appellant was discharged from all charges related to the FIR. This directive effectively terminates the ongoing criminal proceedings, providing a definitive end to a legal saga that spanned over two decades. The judgment concludes that it would not be in the interest of justice to continue a prosecution where the probability of the commission of the alleged offenses is found to be non-existent.