Supreme Court Grants Bail in Bengaluru Riots Case, Citing Five-Year Incarceration and Trial Delays

New Delhi – In a significant ruling that underscores the constitutional mandate for a speedy trial, the Supreme Court of India has granted bail to two individuals accused in the 2020 Bengaluru riots case. The decision, delivered by a bench of Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma, pivots on the extensive period of pre-trial detention—over five years—faced by the accused and the sheer logistical impracticality of a swift conclusion to the trial.

The appellants, Kadeem @ Sadam and Zia Ur Rahma @ Ziya, had their bail pleas previously rejected by the Karnataka High Court. The Supreme Court, in setting aside the High Court's order, highlighted the daunting scale of the ongoing trial, which involves 138 accused persons and a list of 254 witnesses yet to be examined.

This judgment provides a critical legal perspective on the balance between the stringent provisions of anti-terror legislation, such as the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA), and the fundamental right to liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution.

Case Background and Charges

The case stems from the riots that erupted in parts of Bengaluru in August 2020. The investigation was taken over by the National Investigation Agency (NIA), which subsequently filed charges against a large number of individuals. The appellants faced a battery of serious charges under several statutes:

• Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860: Sections 143 (unlawful assembly), 147 (rioting), 148 (rioting, armed with a deadly weapon), 353 (assault to deter public servant from discharge of his duty), 333 (voluntarily causing grievous hurt to deter public servant), 332 (voluntarily causing hurt to deter public servant), 436 (mischief by fire or explosive substance), and 427 (mischief causing damage). All were read with Section 149 (common object of an unlawful assembly).
• Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), 1967: Sections 16 (terrorist act), 18 (conspiracy), and 20 (being a member of a terrorist gang or organisation).
• Prevention of Destruction and Loss of Property Act, 1981: Section 2.

The gravity of these charges, particularly those under the UAPA, typically makes securing bail extremely difficult due to the restrictive conditions laid out in Section 43D(5) of the Act. This provision mandates that bail shall not be granted if the court, after perusing the case diary or the charge sheet, is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such a person is prima facie true.

The Supreme Court's Rationale: A Focus on Procedural Delays

The crux of the Supreme Court's decision was not a detailed examination of the merits of the allegations but a pragmatic assessment of the trial's progress and the appellants' prolonged incarceration. The bench unequivocally pointed to the "judicial custody of more than five years" as a primary factor influencing its decision.

In its order, the Court observed:

"We have perused the charges framed. The appellants have been under incarceration for more than five years. There are 254 witnesses to be examined. The appellants are two amongst the 138 accused persons."

This observation encapsulates the core problem: the sheer impossibility of concluding the trial in the near future. The bench reasoned that such an inordinate delay, with no end in sight, effectively amounts to a pre-conviction sentence, which militates against the principles of natural justice and the presumption of innocence.

Expressing its firm stance, the Court stated that it had "no hesitation in setting aside the impugned order(s) and grant bail to the appellants.” The bail is subject to terms and conditions to be imposed by the Trial Court, a standard procedure to ensure the accused cooperate with the ongoing legal process.

Legal Implications and Jurisprudential Context

This ruling is a significant addition to the evolving jurisprudence surrounding bail under the UAPA. While the Supreme Court has previously upheld the stringent nature of Section 43D(5) in cases like NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (2019), it has also carved out exceptions based on the violation of fundamental rights, particularly the right to a speedy trial.

In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021), the Court held that even if the charges are prima facie true under the UAPA, constitutional courts can grant bail if the accused has undergone a significant period of incarceration and the trial is unlikely to conclude in a reasonable time. The present order in Kareem @ Sadam v State by National Investigation Agency appears to be a direct application of this principle.

Legal experts suggest that this decision will have a ripple effect. It provides a strong precedent for other accused persons in the same case, and in similar mass-prosecution cases under the UAPA, to seek bail on grounds of prolonged pre-trial detention. It places an onus on the prosecution and the judicial system to expedite trials, failing which the continued detention of the accused becomes constitutionally untenable.

Systemic Delays and Judicial Concerns

The issue of systemic delays in UAPA trials is not new and has been a recurring concern for the judiciary. The news source references a related development from February of this year, where a different Supreme Court bench, while denying bail to another accused in the same riots case, expressed grave concerns over the delay in the commencement of the trial. That bench went a step further, directing the State to establish additional special NIA Courts to fast-track the trial of UAPA offences.

This highlights a systemic bottleneck: the mismatch between the high volume of UAPA cases being investigated by the NIA and the limited judicial infrastructure available to try them. The result is a backlog that leads to years of pre-trial detention, a situation the Supreme Court has now addressed by granting relief to Kadeem and Zia Ur Rahma.

For legal practitioners, this judgment reinforces the strategy of meticulously documenting trial delays and presenting them as a substantive ground for bail, even in the face of stringent statutory bars. It serves as a reminder that procedural fairness and the right to liberty are not rendered moot by the severity of the charges alone. The State's inability to provide a swift trial can, and should, be a determinative factor in restoring liberty to an undertrial prisoner.