The Supreme Court of India has set aside the conviction of Sau. Kamalbai Waman Patil in a long-standing murder case, ruling that a person charged solely under the principle of common intention cannot be convicted of murder if all co-accused are acquitted, absent a specific, independent charge under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The ruling effectively quashed the judgment of the Bombay High Court, which had previously overturned a trial court’s decision to acquit the appellant. The bench, comprising Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar, emphasized that the lack of an independent charge created insurmountable procedural prejudice, rendering the conviction legally unsustainable.

The case originated from the 2005 death of Sunitabai, the daughter-in-law of the appellant, who succumbed to severe burn injuries. Initially, the prosecution alleged that Kamalbai Waman Patil, along with her husband and two sons, had collectively ill-treated the victim over dowry demands and infertility issues, culminating in the victim being set on fire on April 10, 2005. The trial court had acquitted all four accused of charges under Sections 498A, 342, 406, and 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, citing significant inconsistencies in the victim’s dying declarations and the failure of the prosecution to examine crucial witnesses. While the High Court of Bombay later convicted only the appellant for the substantive offense of murder, the Supreme Court has now restored the original acquittal, highlighting that such a departure from the initial prosecution case effectively manufactured an accusation for which the appellant had never been brought to trial.

The Supreme Court’s scrutiny of the evidence focused heavily on the credibility of multiple, contradictory dying declarations. The High Court had opted to rely on a single statement recorded by a medical officer at the Civil Hospital, dismissing the two other statements provided to police and a magistrate. The apex court held that this selective reliance was flawed, particularly because the prosecution failed to provide necessary corroborative evidence. Central to this failure was the non-examination of Vishwas Desle, a local police official who was identified as the first person to reach the crime scene, extinguish the fire, and transport the victim to the hospital. According to the Supreme Court, the absence of this material witness left the primary dying declaration unsupported, especially given the severity of the victim's 94% burns.

In its judgment, the Court observed: “A Court cannot obviously make out a case for the prosecution which is not disclosed either in the charge or in regard to which there is no basis in the evidence.” This principle of fair trial, the Court noted, was breached by the High Court's attempt to isolate the appellant’s actions from the broader conspiracy alleged by the prosecution. By maintaining the acquittal of the other three co-accused while convicting the appellant, the High Court had created a legal impossibility, suggesting that the appellant acted in concert with people who were legally declared to have had no involvement in the crime.

Furthermore, the Court addressed the high threshold required to invoke Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, which relates to facts within the special knowledge of an accused. The High Court had heavily weighed the fact that the appellant was alone in the house with the victim at the time of the incident, using this as a basis to shift the burden of explanation onto her. However, the Supreme Court clarified that this provision does not absolve the prosecution of its foundational duty to establish a prima facie case. As the Court stated: “Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked to make up the inability of the prosecution to produce evidence of circumstances pointing to the guilt of the accused. This section cannot be used to support a conviction unless the prosecution has discharged the onus by proving all the elements necessary to establish the offence.”

The Court also highlighted a procedural lapse in the High Court’s handling of the sentence, noting that the appellant had not been given an opportunity to be heard on the quantum of punishment after her acquittal was reversed, which is a mandatory requirement under Section 386(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. While the Court found this to be a significant error, it deemed the reversal of the conviction on substantive grounds the primary and necessary resolution.

The verdict reinforces the constitutional mandate that the prosecution must substantiate its case through consistent and corroborated evidence. The inconsistency between the various declarations—one of which implicated the husband and brother-in-law as active participants in binding the victim, while another omitted these details—was sufficient to grant the appellant the benefit of doubt. The Supreme Court underscored that the presumption of innocence in favor of the appellant was strengthened rather than weakened by the initial acquittal in the trial court.

By allowing the appeal and quashing the conviction, the Supreme Court has ordered the immediate release of the appellant. The ruling serves as a reminder to the lower judiciary that the reversal of an acquittal requires a high degree of certainty and that conviction cannot be sustained through speculative findings that deviate from the charges framed at the commencement of the trial. The case concludes with the appellant being set free, as the Supreme Court found the prosecution's evidence insufficient to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt.