Supreme Court Cautions on PILs in Sabarimala Hearing

In a poignant observation during the fourth day of hearings in the high-stakes Sabarimala reference case , Chief Justice of India Surya Kant remarked that "The most difficult task for a Court is how to give a declaration that the belief of millions of people is wrong or erroneous." This statement encapsulated the Supreme Court of India 's delicate balancing act between constitutional rights and deeply held religious faiths. Senior Advocate Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi , representing the Travancore Devaswom Board (TDB) —the custodians of the Sabarimala temple—urged the 9-judge Constitution Bench to impose a "ten times higher" threshold for entertaining Public Interest Litigations (PILs) challenging religious practices, particularly those filed by non-believers. The Bench, comprising CJI Surya Kant, Justices BV Nagarathna, MM Sundresh, Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Aravind Kumar, Augustine George Masih, Prasanna B Varale, R Mahadevan, and Joymalya Bagchi, probed these submissions intensely, highlighting concerns over judicial overreach in matters of faith.

The hearing revisited foundational questions referred in 2019 from the review petitions against the 2018 Sabarimala verdict , which by a 4:1 majority had permitted women of all ages to enter the temple, overturning age-based restrictions. Singhvi's arguments extended beyond PIL locus standi to a radical call: abolish the 'Essential Religious Practices' (ERP) doctrine birthed in the Shirur Mutt case , arguing it empowers judges to dissect religion's core.

The Sabarimala Reference: A Recap

The Sabarimala saga traces back to a 2018 judgment where a 5-judge Bench, led by then-CJI Dipak Misra, held that the temple's ban on women of menstruating age (10-50 years) violated Articles 14 (equality) and 15 (non-discrimination) . Dissenting, Justice Indu Malhotra emphasized religious denominations' autonomy under Article 26 . Massive protests ensued, prompting review petitions. In 2019 , a 7-judge Bench referred 11 intertwined questions to a larger Bench, including the ERP test 's scope, inter-play of religious freedoms ( Articles 25-26 ) with equality provisions, and whether non-Hindus or non-believers can challenge practices via PIL.

This reference transcends Sabarimala, potentially impacting issues like Muslim women's mosque entry, Parsi women’s fire temple access post-interfaith marriage, Dawoodi Bohra female genital mutilation, and excommunication practices. The TDB, managing the Kerala temple, has positioned itself as defender of tradition, disagreeing with groups like the Nair Service Society on Article 25(2)(b) interpretations.

PILs in Religious Disputes: High Threshold Advocated

Central to Day 4 was Issue 7: Can courts entertain PILs questioning religious practices by non-adherents? Singhvi argued for a "very high threshold" , decrying third-party petitioners imposing "objective PIL collective consciousness standards" on believers. "You have a supposed PIL petitioner coming and saying that look my belief is that this religious practice is not a good religious practice," he illustrated, noting the right-holder (believer) isn't challenging, yet the state and temple become respondents.

Justice Joymalya Bagchi posed a hypothetical: If a leader preaches mass suicide for salvation , can a non-sect PIL intervene? Singhvi conceded "extreme cases" might justify it, but the ordinary rule is non-interference —courts could even act suo motu . CJI Surya Kant agreed, stressing higher bars. Justice BV Nagarathna labeled such petitioners "interlopers" , dismissing PILs if aggrieved believers haven't approached. "Believer will not question it. Who is this, who is the petitioner?" she queried.

Justice MM Sundresh asked: "Can the Court decide without hearing the representatives of millions?" Singhvi submitted a chart of 23 judgments by adherents, urging: "PIL should not become a vehicle for interpreting a religious practice." Last week, the Bench had questioned entertaining non-devotee PILs in Sabarimala itself.

Dismantling the Essential Religious Practices Test

Singhvi's tour de force targeted the ERP doctrine, which protects only "fundamental" practices under Article 25. "Please eschew and eradicate the essentiality or integral test , which has caused confusion," he pleaded. Categorizing religion as essential/non-essential invites judges to play theologian: "It becomes a license to permit judges or external adjudicators to decide the essential and non-essential component of what is religion. That cannot be... then your lordships don't know where to stop."

Alternatives? Use Article 25's opening restrictions (public order, morality, health) or 25(2)(a)/(b) for social reform. Practices failing "subjective-objective" religion test are regulable; genuine collective beliefs are shielded unless violating Article 26 's triad (public order, health, morality). He cited Digambar Jain nudity : Sadhus appear naked at functions attended by women, tracing to Mahavira (6th BC). "Nudity in all other forms is proscribed... But it is nobody’s case that [Jainism] will be abolished because of some external standard."

Extreme practices outside "collective, institutional... belief" aren't religion; others demand deference.

Defending Sabarimala's Traditions

Abstract constitutionalism won't suffice, Singhvi insisted—facts matter. Sabarimala worships Lord Ayyappa as Naisthika Brahmachari (eternal celibate, renouncing grihastha ashram). Rituals like 41-day vratam embody austerity/celibacy. Restriction isn't gender-based exclusion: Women <10 and >50 enter freely, creating age classification with " direct rational nexus " to deity's identity.

Women 10-50 aren't denied Ayyappa worship—they access other temples. "The Sabarimala issue cannot be decided in abstract constitutional terms without understanding the unique religious character of the deity."

Bench's Probing Remarks

The Bench echoed caution. Justice Nagarathna: "We cannot hollow out religion in the name of social welfare reform." On constitutional morality , she clarified: "Legislation cannot be struck down on the ground of constitutional morality " —only Part III violations or incompetence. Singhvi called it an " unruly horse ... a dinosaur." Justice Amanullah queried blanket rejection; Singhvi limited it to constitutional silences.

Post-entry, Article 26 governs: Equal access under 25(2)(b), but denomination controls worship modes.

Navigating Constitutional Tensions

Debates illuminated Article 25/26 vs. 14/15. Singhvi distinguished: Entry invokes 25(2)(b); internal rites, 26. Reforms target social discrimination, not core faith. "The Court is bound to accept the belief of the community, and it is not for the Court to sit in judgment on that belief."

Implications for Constitutional Jurisprudence

Overruling ERP could pivot from judge-centric to community-centric religion definition, aligning with text-based limits. PIL restrictions may evolve locus standi, favoring suo motu in dangers. Sabarimala might uphold restrictions as denomination right, influencing precedents like Shirur Mutt/Durgah Committee.

Ramifications for Legal Practitioners

For advocates: Marshal community evidence over judicial theology; PIL filers face dismissal as "interlopers." Litigators in religious cases prepare subjective belief proofs. Judges: New deference standard curbs overreach, but hypotheticals warn against absolutism. Impacts ripple to secularism debates, equality claims in faith contexts.

Looking Ahead

Hearings continue, promising clarity on religion's constitutional turf. As CJI noted, invalidating millions' faith tests judiciary's wisdom. This reference may redefine India's secular fabric, prioritizing lived faith over imposed reform.