Supreme Court Sidesteps Key Federal Jurisdiction Question in Presidential Reference

New Delhi – In a significant development with far-reaching implications for the country's federal structure, the Supreme Court of India has indicated its intention to defer a crucial question on its own jurisdiction in disputes between the Union and State governments. A Constitution Bench, while hearing a Presidential Reference on the powers of Governors, has opted to leave the contentious issue of whether States can file writ petitions under Article 32 against the Union for another day.

The five-judge bench, led by Chief Justice of India B.R. Gavai, is examining a Reference made by President Droupadi Murmu concerning the scope of gubernatorial and presidential powers under Articles 200 and 201 of the Constitution, particularly regarding assent to Bills. However, a pivotal question (the 14th in the Reference) sought the Court's opinion on whether a suit under Article 131 is the exclusive remedy for such inter-governmental disputes, thereby barring writ petitions under Article 32 filed by State governments.

The decision to sidestep this question preserves, for now, a procedural avenue frequently used by states to seek swift judicial intervention against actions of the Union government. However, it also prolongs the constitutional uncertainty surrounding this practice.

The Heart of the Jurisdictional Debate: Article 32 vs. Article 131

The Indian Constitution provides two primary, yet distinct, pathways for matters to reach the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction.

• Article 131 (Original Jurisdiction): This provision is specifically designed to adjudicate disputes between the constituents of the Indian federation. It grants the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction over disputes between the Government of India and one or more States, or between two or more States. Suits filed under this article are treated as original civil suits, involving a more elaborate procedure of filing plaints, written statements, and framing of issues.

• Article 32 (Remedies for Enforcement of Fundamental Rights): Considered the "heart and soul" of the Constitution, this article empowers any person (including juristic persons, a category that States have argued they fall under) to directly approach the Supreme Court for the enforcement of fundamental rights. The remedy is a writ petition, which is often seen as a more expeditious route compared to a full-fledged suit.

The core legal question is one of exclusivity and applicability. Is the specific provision of Article 131 for federal disputes a complete code that implicitly ousts the general remedy under Article 32 for State governments? Or can a State, arguing that the Union's actions have violated its constitutional rights (which could be framed as a violation of a fundamental right), choose the writ petition route?

During the hearing, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, representing the Union government, highlighted this distinction. He submitted, "All federal questions are amenable under Article 131... Article 131 is the constitutional provision that all federal issues amongst federating units States-Centre, State-State will be adjudicated only by this Court, but under Article 131. But whether the Article 32 petition will lie because it lies only for fundamental rights violations."

A Bench-Driven Deferral

The impetus to defer the question came from within the bench itself. Justice P.S. Narasimha had earlier questioned the necessity of delving into this complex jurisdictional issue when the primary focus of the Presidential Reference was on the legislative process and the Governor's role.

Responding to Justice Narasimha's query, the Solicitor General acknowledged the Court's potential reluctance. "One question which Justice Narasimha initially said that Articles 32 and 131, yourship may perhaps not like to answer. It can be kept open," Mr. Mehta stated, suggesting the Union's acquiescence to the Court's preference.

Chief Justice Gavai provided a pragmatic, albeit telling, rationale for the deferral. Remarking that the court frequently sees "all sorts of Article 32 petitions," he concluded, "We will keep it for some other time.... We know what happens to Article 131 suits." This candid observation alludes to the protracted and often cumbersome nature of original suits under Article 131, implicitly acknowledging why State governments might prefer the more direct Article 32 route for quicker resolutions.

Despite agreeing to keep the question open, the Solicitor General noted the unique nature of the proceeding. "Since this is a Presidential Reference which has its own sanctity," he remarked, committing to take formal instructions on the matter by the next hearing.

Legal and Practical Implications of the Deferral

The Court's decision to avoid a definitive ruling in its advisory capacity carries significant weight for legal practitioners and the dynamics of Centre-State relations.

• Status Quo Maintained: For the immediate future, State governments can continue to file writ petitions under Article 32 to challenge actions of the Union government. This is a crucial procedural tool, especially in politically charged disputes where time is of the essence. Had the court ruled that Article 131 is the sole remedy, it would have fundamentally altered the litigation strategy for every State government in the country.

• Lingering Constitutional Uncertainty: The fundamental question remains unanswered. The constitutional validity of a State invoking Article 32 for what is essentially a federal dispute remains in a grey area. This lack of clarity could lead to future preliminary objections being raised by the Union in such writ petitions, forcing benches to grapple with the issue on a case-by-case basis without the guidance of a Constitution Bench.

• Judicial Reluctance in Advisory Jurisdiction: The deferral highlights a broader principle of judicial caution. Courts are generally more comfortable deciding contentious legal questions within the framework of a live, adversarial dispute where specific facts and harms are presented. A Presidential Reference provides an abstract, advisory context, and the bench may feel it is not the ideal forum to lay down a binding precedent on such a foundational aspect of its own jurisdiction.

• Spotlight on Article 131's Efficacy: CJI Gavai's comment casts an indirect spotlight on the procedural hurdles associated with Article 131 suits. It serves as a subtle commentary on the need for procedural reforms to make this constitutionally mandated forum for federal disputes more efficient and effective.

Conclusion

While the Constitution Bench, comprising CJI B.R. Gavai and Justices Surya Kant, Vikram Nath, P.S. Narasimha, and A.S. Chandurkar, will proceed to deliberate on the core issues of gubernatorial assent raised in the Presidential Reference, it will do so without settling the foundational question of how such disputes should reach its doorstep.

The decision to "keep it for some other time" ensures that the debate over Article 32 versus Article 131 will continue to animate constitutional law discourse. Legal professionals representing both Union and State governments must remain attuned to this unresolved issue, as the "other time" for a definitive ruling could arise in any future Centre-State legal battle, potentially reshaping the contours of federal litigation in India.

(Case Details: IN RE : ASSENT, WITHHOLDING OR RESERVATION OF BILLS BY THE GOVERNOR AND THE PRESIDENT OF INDIA | SPL.REF. No. 1/2025)