Supreme Court Upholds Binding Precedent: Dismisses Art. 32 Petition Challenging Earlier Judgment on Pension Scheme Repeal

Supreme Court Rejects Plea of Retired H.P. Corp Employees for Pension, Affirms Finality of Prior Judgment

New Delhi: In a significant ruling on judicial finality, the Supreme Court has dismissed a writ petition filed by retired employees of the Himachal Pradesh State Forest Development Corporation Limited, holding that a judgment of the Court cannot be collaterally challenged through a fresh petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. The three-judge bench, led by Justice UjjalBhuyan , affirmed the validity of its 2016 decision in * State of H.P. Vs. Rajesh Chander Sood *, which had upheld the state's repeal of a 1999 pension scheme.

The Court emphasized that "finality of a lis is a core facet of a sound judicial system," and allowing such challenges would lead to chaos in the administration of justice.

Case Background: A Discontinued Pension Scheme

The dispute originated with the Himachal Pradesh Corporate Sector Employees (Pension, etc.) Scheme, 1999, which offered pension benefits to employees of state-owned corporations. The petitioners, like many others, opted into this scheme, forgoing their rights under the previous Contributory Provident Fund (CPF) scheme.

However, citing a High- Level Committee report that found the scheme financially unviable, the State Government repealed it via a notification on December 2, 2004. Crucially, the repeal notification created a protected class: only employees who had retired between the scheme's inception (April 1, 1999) and the date of repeal (December 2, 2004) would continue to receive benefits.

This led to a protracted legal battle. The Himachal Pradesh High Court initially sided with the employees, striking down the cut-off date as arbitrary. However, in 2016, a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court in Rajesh Chander Sood reversed the High Court's order. It ruled that the state was within its rights to alter its policy based on financial considerations and that the classification created by the cut-off date was reasonable.

The current petitioners, who retired after the 2004 cut-off date, filed a fresh writ petition under Article 32, arguing that the Rajesh Chander Sood judgment was per incuriam (wrongly decided by ignoring binding precedents) and sought pension benefits at par with those who retired before the cut-off.

Clashing Arguments Before the Court

Petitioners' Stance: Senior Counsel Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayan argued that the Rajesh Chander Sood decision was flawed. He contended: - The right to pension under the 1999 scheme was a vested right that could not be unilaterally withdrawn. - The 2004 notification created an arbitrary classification among a homogeneous group of employees who had all opted for the same scheme, violating Article 14 of the Constitution. - The earlier judgment failed to consider binding precedents on vested rights and arbitrary cut-off dates.

State's Defence: Representing the State of Himachal Pradesh, Senior Counsel Mr. Devadatt Kamat raised a preliminary objection to the petition's maintainability. He argued: - The present petition was a "collateral challenge" to a binding Supreme Court judgment, which is impermissible. - All issues raised by the petitioners had already been adjudicated in Rajesh Chander Sood . - The state's decision to repeal the scheme was a bona fide policy decision based on a High- Level Committee 's finding of financial non-viability. - The petitioners were not government employees, and the scheme was a welfare measure that the state could withdraw when found unsustainable.

Court's Reasoning: Upholding Precedent and Judicial Finality

The Supreme Court bench conducted a thorough review of the Rajesh Chander Sood judgment and found that it was not per incuriam . Justice Bhuyan , writing for the bench, noted that the earlier decision had provided elaborate reasons for its conclusions.

> "Merely because according to the petitioners the reasons given in the judgment while accepting the stand of the State may not be in sync with previous decisions, it cannot be said to be a judgment rendered per incuriam. The judgment rendered in Rajesh Chandra Sood (supra) by no stretch can be said to have ignored any binding precedent."

The Court's primary focus, however, was on the maintainability of the writ petition itself. It held that allowing a final judgment of the Supreme Court to be challenged through a fresh Article 32 petition would undermine the principle of finality.

> "From the above, it is evident that the contentions that are being raised now were all advanced before this Court in Rajesh Chander Sood (supra) and those were all adjudicated. It is not open for the petitioners to once again seek the same reliefs as was sought in the earlier round of litigation which were negatived by this Court."

Citing a long line of precedents, including the nine-judge bench decision in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar and the Constitution Bench in Rupa Ashok Hurra , the Court reiterated the established legal position:

> "Law is well settled that a decision rendered by this Court... cannot be assailed directly or collaterally under Article 32. Remedy of an aggrieved litigant is to file for review. If the grievance persists even thereafter, he may invoke the curative jurisdiction... But certainly it is not open for him to file a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India seeking the same relief."

Final Verdict

The Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition as "thoroughly misconceived," holding that the decision in Rajesh Chander Sood was binding on the petitioners. The Court stressed that permitting such litigation would open the floodgates, creating "chaos in the administration of justice." While dismissing the plea, the Court refrained from imposing costs, considering the petitioners are retired senior citizens.