Gauhati High Court Quashes 1992 Termination of Teachers, Orders Reinstatement Due to Lack of Communication

Guwahati: In a significant ruling, the Gauhati High Court has set aside termination orders dating back to 1992 concerning several Assistant Teachers in Dhemaji district. The court emphasized that a termination order does not become effective unless it is duly communicated to the employee. Justice Kardak Ete , presiding over the case, held that the State authorities failed to provide evidence demonstrating that the termination orders were ever served upon the petitioners.

The judgment was delivered on January 8, 2025, in a batch of analogous writ petitions (WP(C)/9573/2019, WP(C)/3288/2016, WP(C)/3329/2016, and WP(C)/1772/2017) filed by teachers appointed in 1989.

Background of the Case

The petitioners, appointed as Assistant Teachers in Lower Primary Schools in Dhemaji district in 1989 after due selection processes, claimed to have been continuously discharging their duties. They contended that their services were confirmed, efficiency bars crossed, and some even served as Headmasters.

However, their salaries were stopped from April 1996, only to be partially released later until July 2007, when payment stopped again. The State authorities later contended that the petitioners' appointments were illegal/irregular, made against non-existent posts and without following due process, leading to their termination in May 1992.

The petitioners approached the High Court previously (WP(C) 5635/2007) seeking release of salaries. That petition was disposed of in 2012 with a direction to the authorities to examine if show-cause notices or termination orders were served. Following this, the Director of Elementary Education, Assam, in 2015, stated that show-cause notices were issued and replies were unsatisfactory, resulting in termination in May 1992. It was against this backdrop that the current petitions were filed, specifically challenging the alleged show-cause notice of March 1992 and the termination order of May 18, 1992.

The State also highlighted a screening process for illegally/irregularly appointed teachers, where the petitioners were categorized as 'not recommended but working'. A Cabinet decision in 2020 proposed accommodating such teachers as 'Tutors' with prospective effect, based on qualifications. The State argued that many petitioners accepted appointment as Tutors thereafter, thereby waiving their past claims.

Arguments Presented

Counsel for the petitioners, Mr. N. Borah and Mr. J.I. Borbhuiyan, argued that their clients were duly selected and appointed, continuously worked, and were never served with any show-cause notice for termination or the termination order itself. They contended that the alleged termination proceedings were unsustainable in law. They relied on Supreme Court judgments, including Union of India vs. Dinanath Shantaram Karekar , Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Qimat Rai Gupta , and National Textile Corporation (M.P) Limited vs. M.R. Jadhav , on the necessity of communication of termination orders. Crucially, they cited Dulu Devi -vs- State of Assam and Others ((2016) 2 SCC 622), a case involving a similarly situated teacher from Assam where the Supreme Court held that services of a teacher working for years should not be assumed to be terminated without communication.

Mr. R. Mazumder, learned Standing Counsel for the Elementary Education Department, submitted that the appointments were indeed illegal, made against non-existent posts without advertisement or procedure. He argued that show-cause notices were issued in March 1992, replies were found unsatisfactory, and termination orders were issued and duly served in May 1992. He also pointed to the petitioners' participation in the screening process and their subsequent acceptance of accommodation as Tutors, suggesting waiver of past claims. He cited G.M. Haryana Roadways -vs- Jai Bhagwan & Anr. ((2008) 4 SCC 127) on the principle that suppression of material facts disentitles a litigant to relief.

Court's Reasoning

Justice Ete acknowledged the State's claim that show-cause notices were issued and replies received, and that termination orders were passed. However, the court repeatedly noted that despite several opportunities, the respondent authorities failed to produce records demonstrating that the termination orders dated May 18, 1992, were served upon the petitioners.

Referring to the Supreme Court judgments cited by the petitioners, the High Court reiterated the settled legal principle that an order of dismissal or termination is ineffective unless it is published and communicated to the officer concerned. An order merely passed and kept in the file does not terminate services.

The court found the State's failure to prove service of the termination orders conclusive. Citing the specific instance in Dulu Devi , the court highlighted that a similarly situated teacher from Assam was granted relief based on the lack of effective termination.

While acknowledging the State's argument regarding the petitioners joining as Tutors after the Cabinet decision, the court observed that the petitioners might not have had equal bargaining power with the State, and accepting accommodation under new terms did not necessarily disentitle them from their claim as Assistant Teachers, particularly when their original termination was found legally flawed due to lack of communication. The court also distinguished the Jai Bhagwan case on the suppression of facts based on the contextual circumstances here.

The Verdict

Based on the failure of the State to prove the service of the 1992 termination order, the Gauhati High Court held the termination legally unsustainable.

The court ordered:

• The impugned termination order dated May 18, 1992, is set aside and quashed.
• The petitioners shall be entitled to all benefits as Assistant Teachers, as they were allowed to continue serving until the filing of these petitions (and presumably thereafter, before the accommodation as tutors).
• The petitioners shall be treated as regular Assistant Teachers for all purposes.

The writ petitions were accordingly allowed. The judgment underscores the critical requirement of communicating punitive orders in service law.