UAPA Accused Cannot Claim Default Bail After 90 Days Under BNSS: Delhi High Court

The Delhi High Court has ruled that an accused under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) cannot claim default bail merely after 90 days, even though the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) has replaced the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). A Division Bench of Justice Prathiba M. Singh and Justice Vikas Mahajan held that the reference to Section 167 CrPC in Section 43D UAPA is "legislation by reference," meaning Section 187 BNSS now applies, and the provision allowing detention up to 180 days remains valid.

The Background: Explosion at Lal Qila Metro Station

The case arose from a November 10, 2025 explosion at Gate No. 4 of the Lal Qila Metro Station in Delhi, allegedly caused by a vehicle-borne IED. The appellant, Jasir Bilal Wani @ Danish, was arrested on November 17, 2025 from the NIA camp office in Srinagar and booked under UAPA, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, and the Explosive Substances Act.

While in custody, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) moved two applications seeking extension of the investigation period beyond the statutory 90 days—first up to 135 days, then up to 180 days. Both were allowed by the trial court. The appellant subsequently filed an application for default bail after 90 days, which was dismissed on March 30, 2026. Aggrieved, he approached the High Court.

A Legal Conundrum: 90 Days or 180?

The central legal question was whether, after the repeal of the CrPC and the enactment of the BNSS in 2023 (effective July 1, 2024), a UAPA accused is entitled to default bail after 90 days or after 180 days. Section 43D(2) of the UAPA modifies Section 167 of the CrPC, extending the maximum detention period to 180 days. However, Section 43D still refers only to Section 167 of the CrPC, which has been repealed.

The appellant argued that since the UAPA provision does not mention Section 187 of the BNSS, the earlier 90-day default bail timeline should apply. The NIA countered that the reference to Section 167 is "legislation by reference"—a dynamic reference that automatically incorporates the corresponding new provision.

Legislation by Reference: The Crucial Distinction

The court delved into the distinction between "legislation by reference" and "legislation by incorporation," drawing on the Supreme Court’s decision in Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India (1979) and the Bombay High Court’s ruling in Nagani Akram Mohammad Shafi v. Union of India (2025), which was affirmed by the Supreme Court.

The Bench explained that where a provision is merely referred to and not bodily lifted into another statute, Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 applies. This provision mandates that references to a repealed enactment shall be construed as references to the re-enacted provision. "By applying Section 8 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 along with the principle of ‘ Legislation by reference ’, it becomes clear that in the case of Section 43D(2) of the UAPA , reference to Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. has to be construed as reference to Section 187 of the BNSS ," the court observed.

Legislative Intent Cannot Be Ignored

The court emphasized that the purpose of the UAPA’s special detention regime must be preserved. "The purpose of increasing the detention period to 180 days in the UAPA, is clearly to provide longer period of detention for heinous offences such as terrorism. While answering the questions raised herein, the said intention cannot be forgotten," the judgment stated. It added that "by the mere enactment of BNSS the said intention of the Legislature cannot be defeated."

The court also noted that Section 4 of both the CrPC and BNSS make it clear that offences under special laws are to be investigated and tried in accordance with those special laws. The UAPA, being a special enactment, prevails over the general procedural code.

Belated Challenge and Acquiescence

The court also found that the appellant had lost the right to challenge the extension orders by failing to do so promptly. The first extension was granted on February 13, 2026, and was not immediately challenged. The Supreme Court’s order in State of Uttarakhand v. Javed Siddiqui ( May 4, 2026 ) was cited, holding that an accused who does not challenge extension orders loses the right to default bail due to acquiescence . "Thus, by the time the appellant approached the High Court, they had lost the right to seek default bail by their acquiescence ," the Bench noted.

Key Observations from the Judgment

"By applying Section 8 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 along with the principle of ‘ Legislation by reference ’, it becomes clear that in the case of Section 43D(2) of the UAPA , reference to Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. has to be construed as reference to Section 187 of the BNSS . The first proviso to Section 43D(2) would therefore apply and the period of detention can be extended upto 180 days."

"The purpose of increasing the detention period to 180 days in the UAPA, is clearly to provide longer period of detention for heinous offences such as terrorism. While answering the questions raised herein, the said intention cannot be forgotten."

"Thus, by the mere enactment of BNSS the said intention of the Legislature cannot be defeated."

"Thus, in the opinion of this Court, that ship has sailed." (regarding the belated challenge to extension orders)

The Verdict

The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant was not entitled to default bail after 90 days. The court clarified that while the right to default bail had been lost, the appellant remained free to pursue any other legal remedies available under the law. The charge-sheet having been filed on May 14, 2026, the matter will now proceed to trial.